Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case 22STCV10154 2023-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV10154, Date: 2023-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10154 Hearing Date: April 25, 2023 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories from Defendant, and Request for Sanctions

Moving Party: Plaintiffs Celina Rabago and Jaime Flores

Resp. Party: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Plaintiffs’ SROGs Motion is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Sanction is DENIED.

Defendant’s Request for Sanction is GRANTED. Monetary sanctions are AWARDED for Defendant and against Plaintiffs and their Counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,460.00.

BACKGROUND:

On March 23, 2022, Plaintiffs Celina Rabago and Jaime Flores filed their Complaint against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. on causes of action arising from issues with Plaintiffs vehicle, which was manufactured by Defendant.

On August 11, 2022, Defendant filed its Answer.

On March 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories from Defendant, and Request for Sanctions (“SROGs Motion”). In support of their motion, Plaintiffs concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Thach Tran; (2) Separate Statement; and (3) Proposed Order.

On April 12, 2023, Defendant filed its Opposition to SROGs Motion. Defendant concurrently filed its Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement. The Opposition to SROGs Motion includes a Request for Sanctions.

On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Reply.

ANALYSIS:

I. Legal Standard

On receipt of a response to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and/or demand requests, the propounding and/or demanding party “may move for an order compelling further response” if: (1) the response is evasive or incomplete; (2) the representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) the objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a), 2031.310, subd. (a).)

“On receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or both of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete[;] (2) An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)

II. Discussion

A. Special Interrogatories Propounded

On June 8, 2022, Plaintiffs served Defendant with special interrogatories (“SROGs”). (SROGs Motion, p. 15–16.) On February 24, 2023, after prior efforts at resolving a dispute over the SROGs failed, the Parties participated in an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) with the Court. (Id. at p. 2:6.) On March 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the SROGs Motion.

Although the SROGs Motion initially involved nearly two dozen SROGs, Defendant served supplemental responses on April 10, 2023, and Plaintiffs state that only the following SROGs remain at issue. (Opposition to SROGs Motion, p. 6:20–21; Reply, p. 2:2–4.)

INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

Do YOU track the number of AHM vehicles that have been repurchased or replaced in California?

INTERROGATORY NO. 94:

IDENTIFY all PERSONS, employed by YOU, with knowledge of the facts that support YOUR contention that extended service contracts purchased by Plaintiffs in connection with purchase of the SUBJECT VEHICLE is not a consequential damage.

INTERROGATORY NO. 95:

IDENTIFY each DOCUMENT which evidences, refers, or relates to any fact that supports YOUR contention that extended service contracts purchased by Plaintiffs in connection with purchase of the SUBJECT VEHICLE is not a consequential damage.

INTERROGATORY NO. 97:

INTERROGATORY NO. 98:

B. Discussion

Plaintiffs move the Court to compel Defendant to provide Code-compliant, verified further responses to these five SROGs. Plaintiff argue: (1) that they have met the requirements for further responses; (2) that there is good cause to seek further responses; and (3) that Defendant’s responses do not comply with the discovery act, and its objections are improper. (SROGs Motion, p. 2:15–18, 3:21, 5:17–19.)

Defendant opposes the SROGs Motion, arguing: (1) that it is moot because further responses have been served; and (2) that the initial responses were full and complete. (Opposition to SROGs Motion, p. 7:2–4.)

In their Reply, Plaintiffs continue to seek further responses, arguing that Defendant’s further responses to the remaining SROGs at issue were not Code-compliant. (Reply, p. 5:3–4.)

Defendant clearly answered each of the SROGs in their further responses. (Opposition to SROGs Motion, Exh. G, pp. 3–4, 9–13.)

For example, Plaintiffs asked if Defendant tracks the number of its vehicles that have been repurchased or replaced in California. Defendant provided a further response that “[Defendant] does not specifically track the number of [Defendant’s] vehicles that have been repurchased or replaced in California. Although not considered ‘tracking,’ and not specific to California, [Defendant] maintains information related to repurchase and replacement of vehicles.”

Plaintiffs argue that this answer is confusing and not Code-compliant when it only needed a “Yes/No response.” (Reply, p. 5:13–15.) While it may have been more straightforward if Defendant answered yes or no, that is not a requirement to answer SROGs. Indeed, the answer to this SROG may be more accurate and informative than a simple yes or no response. Regardless, the further response to this SROG, and to the others at issue, are sufficient for Defendant to meet its discovery obligations.

Further, Plaintiffs SROGs are overbroad. For instance, SROGs 94 and 96 ask for “IDENTIFY all PERSONS, employed by YOU, with knowledge of the facts that support YOUR contention that extended service contracts purchased by Plaintiffs in connection with purchase of the SUBJECT VEHICLE is not a consequential [or incidental] damage.” Defendant American Honda is a national company. There must be hundreds, if not thousands, of employees with “knowledge of facts” that support Defendant’s contention. There is no possible reason for Plaintiff to need this information.

SROGs 95 and 97 are equally overbroad, requiring Defendant to “IDENTIFY each DOCUMENT which evidences, refers, or relates to any fact that supports” Defendant’s contentions. That these SROGs are overbroad should not come as a surprise to Plaintiff’s counsel. At the Informal Discovery Conference on February 24, 2023, the Court specifically told Plaintiff that her Requests for Production of Documents were overbroad. The Court told counsel that a request for every document “which evidences, refers, or relates” is virtually limitless because any document “relates” to any other document.

The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ SROGs Motion.

III. Sanctions

A. Legal Standard

The court shall impose monetary sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further interrogatories and/or a motion to compel further production of documents, unless the Court finds that the one subject to sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h).)

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d).)

B. Discussion

The Court has denied Plaintiffs’ SROGs Motion. Monetary sanctions would not be appropriate against Defendant, who has successfully opposed the motion. Plaintiffs’ Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

Defendant quickly provided further responses once the SROGs Motion was filed, which was shortly after the Parties participated in the IDC. The further responses to Plaintiffs’ SROGs were clearcut, and the remaining SROGs at issue in this motion were not relevant to the ultimate issues in this case. The Court does not find that Plaintiffs acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of monetary sanction unjust. Thus, the Court is required to impose a monetary sanction against Plaintiffs and their Counsel.

Defendant requests $2,460.00 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs and their Counsel, jointly and severally. (Opposition to SROGs Motion, p. 11:4–7.) Defense Counsel declares that they will have spent 10 hours on this motion at $240.00 per hour, and that they will have incurred $60.00 in costs. (Opposition to SROGs Motion, Decl. Kom, ¶ 15.)

The Court finds that the hourly rate and costs are reasonable. The Court might normally find that that the number of hours spent on this motion is not reasonable. However, Plaintiff has requested $3,220.00 in sanctions. (See Motion, p. i.; Tran Declaration, ¶ 12.)

It is not uncommon for courts to compare opposing counsel’s fees to help determine whether the moving party’s fees are reasonable. That is because a “comparative analysis of each side’s respective litigation costs may be a useful check on the reasonableness of any fee request.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 273, 281, quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272.) “[T]here is one particularly good indicator of how much time is necessary [for the purpose of determining reasonableness of attorneys’ fees] . . . and that is how much time the other side’s lawyers spent . . . [S]uch a comparison is a useful guide in evaluating the appropriateness of time claimed. If the time claimed by the prevailing party is of a substantially greater magnitude than what the other side spent, that often indicates that too much time is claimed. Litigation has something of the tennis game, something of war, to it; if one side hits the ball, or shoots heavy artillery, the other side necessarily spends time hitting the ball or shooting heavy artillery back.” (Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed (9^th Cir. 2004) 388 F.3d 1281, 1287.)

Plaintiff, by requesting $3,220.00 in sanctions, obviously believes that this is a reasonable amount to be spent on the motion. Defendant has spent – and requested – just 75% of this amount.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Request for Sanctions in the amount of $2,460.00.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ SROGs Motion is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Sanction is DENIED.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Request for Sanctions in the amount of $2,460.00.