Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV12635, Date: 2023-05-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV12635 Hearing Date: May 1, 2023 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time
Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred
Moving Party: Plaintiff
Yuri Sukiasyan
Resp. Party: Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America,
LLC and Terry York Motor Cars, Ltd.
Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in part.
Attorneys’ fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendants, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $36,240.96, which is
comprised of $33,490.75 in attorneys’ fees and $2,750.21 in costs and expenses.
BACKGROUND:
On
April 14, 2022, Plaintiff Yuri Sukiasyan filed his Complaint against Defendants
Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Land Rover Encino (actual name Terry
York Motor Cars, Ltd.) on causes of action involving the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act.
On
May 26, 2022, Defendants filed their Answer.
On
March 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time
Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred. In support of his Motion, Plaintiff
concurrently filed: (1) Memorandum of Costs; and (2) Proposed Order.
On
April 18, 2023, Defendants filed their Opposition.
On
April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Reply.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Legal
Standard
“Any buyer of
consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under
this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may
bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable
relief.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1794, subd. (a).)
“If the buyer
prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the
court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of
costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended,
determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in
connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1794, subd. (d).)
II.
Discussion
A. The
Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff
moves the Court to award Plaintiff $55,523.71, which comprises of $52,773.50 in
lodestar attorney’s fees and $2,750.21 in costs and expenses. (Motion, p.
19:9–14.)
Among
other things, Plaintiff argues: (1) that Plaintiff is the prevailing party; (2)
that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable; (3) that the fee
request is justified by the case and results achieved; (4) that Plaintiff is
entitled to recover for the time to draft a fee motion; and (5) that Plaintiff
is entitled to recover all costs and expenses reasonably incurred in connection
with this action. (Motion, pp. 11:18, 12:5, 12:24, 13:3, 17:1, 17:19,
18:17–18.) Plaintiff provides an exhibit that indicates 86.4 hours were spent
by the various attorneys Plaintiff’s Counsel employs. (Motion, Exh. A.)
Defendant
opposes the Motion, arguing: (1) that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s hours and base fees
are excessive and should be reduced by the Court; and (2) that Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Costs should be taxed by the Court. (Opposition, pp. 3:5–6,
7:9–10.) Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party or
that Plaintiff should be awarded fees and costs, but instead proposes that the
total amount awarded should be no more than $34,571.64, comprised of $33,490.75
in fees and $1,080.89 in costs. (Id. at 7:22–24.)
Plaintiff
reiterates his arguments in his Reply and responds to minor points made in the
Opposition.
B.
Analysis
Both parties agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this
litigation. Pursuant to the relevant sections of the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the lodestar
adjustment method. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1137.)
The Court finds that the costs incurred are reasonable.
The Court does not find that all of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s hourly rates
are reasonable. For example, Counsel Saeedian’s billing rate of $695.00 per
hour seems excessive for this run-of-the-mill lemon law case. Similarly, 86.4
hours is excessive considering that this case began in April 2022, has not
included a single motion (aside from this Motion), and was settled five months
before trial.
Defendant concedes that $33,490.75 in fees would be the maximum appropriate
attorney's fees. (See Opposition, p. 7:5-8.) Plaintiff disagrees, but states that any
award of attorney's fees “should remain above this minimum amount conceded by
Defendant as reasonable.” (Reply, p. 1:11.)
The Court also notes that Defendant has spent $11,610.76 in attorney's
fees on this case – just 1/3 of the amount Defendant’s state would be the
maximum reasonable amount of attorney's fees. (See Reply, p.3:20.) It is not uncommon for courts to
compare opposing counsel’s fees to help determine whether the moving party’s
fees are reasonable. That is because a “comparative analysis of each side’s
respective litigation costs may be a useful check on the reasonableness of any
fee request.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 273, 281, quoting Donahue
v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272.)
Considering all of the facts presented, the Court finds that a reasonable
lodestar attorney's fees in this case is $33,490.75.
III.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in part.
Attorneys’ fees and costs are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendants, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $36,240.96, which is
comprised of $33,490.75 in attorneys’ fees and $2,750.21 in costs and expenses.