Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV16604, Date: 2023-01-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV16604    Hearing Date: January 6, 2023    Dept: 34

SUBJECT:         Demurrer

 

Moving Party:  Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Eric Milestone

Resp. Party:    Defendant/Cross-Complainant Sean P. Dunn

                                     

 

 

Defendant’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the fifth and sixth causes of action in the Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint. The Demurer is OVERRULED as to the first, second, third, fourth, and seventh causes of action.

 

BACKGROUND:

On May 19, 2022, Plaintiffs Gas Pedal Delivery & Distribution LLC and Eric Milestone filed their Complaint against Defendant Sean P. Dunn on causes of action relating to Messrs. Milestone’s and Dunn’s control of Plaintiff Gas Pedal Delivery & Distribution LLC.

On October 3, 2022, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed: (1) Answer to the Complaint; and (2) Cross-Complaint against Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Gas Pedal Delivery & Distribution LLC and Eric Milestone.

On October 7, 2022, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed his Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint.

On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Eric Milestone filed his Demurrer to the Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint.

On December 22, 2022, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed his Opposition.

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Eric Milestone has not filed a reply or other response.

ANALYSIS:

 

I.           Legal Standard

 

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for the purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 422.10, 589.)

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). A demurrer is brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 (grounds), section 430.30 (as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken), and section 430.50(a) (can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within).

 

A demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. A demurrer for uncertainty (Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f)), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Id.)

 

II.        Discussion

 

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant demurs as all seven causes of action listed in Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint. (Demurrer, p. 2:3–22.) Plaintiff argues that these causes of action are not supported by sufficient facts and are uncertain. (Id.)

 

A.      Involuntary Dissolution and Appointment of Receiver

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“A verified complaint for involuntary dissolution of a corporation on any one or more of the grounds specified in subdivision (b) may be filed in the superior court of the proper county by any of the following persons:

 

(1)       “One-half or more of the directors in office.

(2)       “A shareholder or shareholders who hold shares representing not less than 331/3 percent of (i) the total number of outstanding shares (assuming conversion of any preferred shares convertible into common shares) or (ii) the outstanding common shares or (iii) the equity of the corporation, exclusive in each case of shares owned by persons who have personally participated in any of the transactions enumerated in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b), or any shareholder or shareholders of a close corporation.

(3)       “Any shareholder if the ground for dissolution is that the period for which the corporation was formed has terminated without extension thereof.

(4)       “Any other person expressly authorized to do so in the articles.”

(Corp. Code, § 1800, subd. (a).)

“The grounds for involuntary dissolution are that:

 

(1)       “The corporation has abandoned its business for more than one year.

(2)       “The corporation has an even number of directors who are equally divided and cannot agree as to the management of its affairs, so that its business can no longer be conducted to advantage or so that there is danger that its property and business will be impaired or lost, and the holders of the voting shares of the corporation are so divided into factions that they cannot elect a board consisting of an uneven number.

(3)       “There is internal dissension and two or more factions of shareholders in the corporation are so deadlocked that its business can no longer be conducted with advantage to its shareholders or the shareholders have failed at two consecutive annual meetings at which all voting power was exercised, to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon election of their successors.

(4)       “Those in control of the corporation have been guilty of or have knowingly countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority or persistent unfairness toward any shareholders or its property is being misapplied or wasted by its directors or officers.

(5)       “In the case of any corporation with 35 or fewer shareholders (determined as provided in Section 605), liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or shareholders.

(6)       “The period for which the corporation was formed has terminated without extension of such period.”

(Corp. Code, § 1800, subd. (b)(1)–(6).)

2.       Analysis

 

Among other things, Defendant/Cross-Complainant alleges: (1) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant owns at least a 49% ownership interest in Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Gas Pedal Delivery & Distribution LLC; (2) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone has forged an operating agreement for the corporation and defrauded Defendant/Cross-Complainant; and (3) that in attempting to run the corporation, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone has engaged in fraud and mismanagement of the corporation. (Verified First Amended Cross Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 21, 22.)

 

Assuming that these allegations are true for the purposes of the Demurrer, they are sufficient for the first cause of action to survive because they support: (1) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant has standing to sue for this cause of action pursuant to Corporations Code section 1800, subdivision (a)(2); and (2) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant has grounds to sue for this cause of action pursuant to Corporation Code section 1800, subdivision (b)(4).

 

        The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as to the first cause of action for involuntary dissolution and appointment of receiver.

 

B.      Breach of Fiduciary Duty

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 483.)

 

“There are two kinds of fiduciary duties ­– those imposed by law and those undertaken by agreement.” (Gab Bus. Servs. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 409, 416, emphasis omitted, overruled in part on other grounds by Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1154.)

 

“Fiduciary duties are imposed by law in certain technical, legal relationships such as those between partners or joint venturers, husbands and wives, guardians and wards, trustees and beneficiaries, principals and agents, and attorneys and clients.” (Id., citations omitted.)  

 

“A fiduciary duty is undertaken by agreement when one person enters into a confidential relationship with another.” (Id. at 417.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Among other things, Defendant/Cross-Complainant alleges: (1) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant and Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone co-owned Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Gas Pedal Delivery & Distribution LLC; (2) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone has forged an operating agreement for the corporation and defrauded Defendant/Cross-Complainant; (3) that in attempting to run the corporation, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone has engaged in fraud and mismanagement of the corporation; ad (4) that due to this behavior, Defendant/Cross-Complainant has been harmed in amounts exceeding $25,000.00. (Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 27, 31–33.)

 

Assuming that these allegations are true for the purposes of the Demurrer, they are sufficient for the second cause of action to survive.

 

        The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as to the second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.

 

C.      Negligence

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Among other things, Defendant/Cross-Complainant alleges: (1) that due to their relationship as co-owners of Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Gas Pedal Delivery & Distribution LLC, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone owed duties to Defendant/Cross-Complainant to use reasonable and due care, of loyalty, and of good faith; (2) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone breached his duty of care by not avoiding self-dealing, by not acting responsibly or prudently, and by defrauding Defendant/Cross-Complainant; and (3) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone’s conduct was a substantial factor in proximately causing Defendant/Cross-Complainant harms in excess of $25,000.00. (Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 36–37, 40, 42–43.)

 

Assuming that these allegations are true for the purposes of the Demurrer, they are sufficient for the second cause of action to survive.

 

        The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as to the third cause of action for negligence.

 

D.      Conversion

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Among other things, Defendant/Cross-Complainant alleges: (1) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant owns a 49% equity stake in the corporation; (2) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone attempted to unlawfully take Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s equity stake; and (3) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant was harmed as a result in an amount to be proved at Trial. (Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 45, 47.)

 

Assuming that these allegations are true for the purposes of the Demurrer, they are sufficient for the second cause of action to survive.

 

        The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as to the fourth cause of action for conversion.

 

E.       Intentional Misrepresentation

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“The elements of a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166.)

 

The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

 

To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Among other things, Defendant/Cross-Complainant alleges: (1) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone engaged in misrepresentations, including by representing that Defendant/Cross-Complainant signed an agreement that Defendant/Cross-Complainant did not actually sign; (2) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone knew the representations were false when they were made or made the representations recklessly and without regard for their truth; (3) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone intended to defraud Defendant/Cross-Complainant and for Defendant/Cross-Complainant to rely on the misrepresentations so that Defendant/Cross-Complainant would pay Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone money not actually owed; (4) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant did reasonably rely on the misrepresentations; and (5) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant has been damaged in an amount totaling at least $25,000.00. (Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 49–55.)

 

Even assuming that these allegations are true for the purposes of the Demurrer, they are not sufficiently specific to meet the pleading requirements for a cause of action of intentional misrepresentation. For instance, as to Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Gas Pedal Delivery & Distribution LLC, it is unclear who was spoken to, what exactly was said or written, and when exactly it was spoken or written.

 

The Court SUSTAINS with leave to amend the Demurrer as to the fifth cause of action for intentional misrepresentation.

 

F.       Negligent Misrepresentation

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation include “[m]isrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented; ignorance of the truth and justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party to whom it was directed; and resulting damage.” (Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154, quotation marks omitted.)

 

The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

 

To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiff must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

The Court notes that the same problems arises for this cause of action for negligent misrepresentation as were discussed above for the prior cause of action for intentional misrepresentation.

 

The Court SUSTAINS with leave to amend the Demurrer as to the sixth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.

 

G.      Abuse of Process

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“There are two main elements of a cause of action for abuse of process: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Process is action taken pursuant to judicial authority. Merely obtaining or seeking process is not enough; there must be subsequent abuse, by a misuse of the judicial process for a purpose other than that which it was intended to serve. The gist of the tort is the improper use of the process after it is issued.” (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1580, quotation marks, citations, ellipses, and paragraph breaks omitted.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Among other things, Defendant/Cross-Complainant alleges: (1) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone filed his Complaint with this Court; (2) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Milestone submitted to the Court a forged operating agreement as Exhibit A to the Complaint; and (3) that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant thus intentionally used this legal procedure to extort money and property from Defendant/Cross-Complainant that was not owed. (Verified First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 69–71.)

 

Assuming that these allegations are true for the purposes of the Demurrer, they are sufficient for the second cause of action to survive.

 

        The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as to the seventh cause of action for abuse of process.

 

III.     Conclusion

 

Defendant’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the fifth and sixth causes of action in the Verified First Amended Cross-Complaint. The Demurer is OVERRULED as to the first, second, third, fourth, and seventh causes of action.