Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case 22STCV16883 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV16883, Date: 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV16883 Hearing Date: August 10, 2022 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Demurrer

Moving Party: Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC (“Defendants”)

Resp. Party: Plaintiff Nguyen Huynh Bao Tri aka John Tri Nguyen (“J. Nguyen”)

Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC’s demurrer as to the naming of Defendants Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC in Plaintiff Nguyen Huynh Bao Tri aka John Tri Nguyen’s Complaint is SUSTAINED pursuant to CCP § 430.10(e) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these named defendants.

Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC’s demurrer as to the First Cause of Action for Libel in Plaintiff Nguyen Huynh Bao Tri aka John Tri Nguyen’s Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend pursuant to CCP § 430.10(e) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC’s demurrer as to the Second Cause of Action for Slander in Plaintiff Nguyen Huynh Bao Tri aka John Tri Nguyen’s Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend pursuant to CCP § 430.10(e) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC’s demurrer as to the Third Cause of Action for Intentional Interference in Contractual Relations in Plaintiff Nguyen Huynh Bao Tri aka John Tri Nguyen’s Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend pursuant to CCP § 430.10(e) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC’s demurrer as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage in Plaintiff Nguyen Huynh Bao Tri aka John Tri Nguyen’s Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend pursuant to CCP § 430.10(e) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2022, Plaintiff Nguyen Huynh Bao Tri aka John Tri Nguyen filed a complaint against Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC (“Defendants”) alleging the following causes of action:

1. Libel per se (Civil Code § 45a.);

2. Slander (Civil Code § 46.);

3. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations;

4. Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

On July 15, 2022, Defendants Kieu Hoang, Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC demurred to J. Nguyen’s Complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10 et seq.

On July 26, 2022, J. Nguyen opposed Defendants’ demurrer.

On August 3, 2022, Defendants replied to J. Nguyen’s opposition.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. (Cty. of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1008–09; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint. (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of Univ. of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 365, as modified (May 15, 2008).) For purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be. (CCP §§ 422.10, 589.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). A demurrer is brought under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10 (grounds), § 430.30 (as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken), and § 430.50(a) (can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within).

A demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. A demurrer for uncertainty may be brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f). “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) “In general, ‘demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.’” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

The demurring party must file with the court, and serve on the other party, the: (1) demurrer; (2) notice of hearing; (3) memorandum of points and authorities; and (4) proof of service. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1112(a), rule 3.1300(c), rule 3.1320; Code Civ. Proc., § 1005(b).) “A demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint . . . are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” (CCP § 430.60.)

B. Discussion

1. Allegations of Wrongdoing Against Defendants Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC

The Court finds that the J. Nguyen’s Complaint does not allege that Defendants Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC committed any wrongdoing whatsoever. While J. Nguyen argues in opposition that RAAS Nutritionals, LLC “clearly participated” in the wrongdoing through actions of its senior management, the Court finds no direct allegations of wrongdoing attributed to Defendants Kieu Hoang Winery, LLC, and RAAS Nutritionals, LLC.

2. First Cause of Action for Libel

“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” (Civil Code, § 45.) “A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo, or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damage is defined in Section 48a of this code.” (Civil Code, § 45a.)

“The sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the existence of falsehood. Because the statement must contain a provable falsehood, courts distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion for purposes of defamation liability. Although statements of fact may be actionable as libel, statements of opinion are constitutionally protected. That does not mean that statements of opinion enjoy blanket protection. On the contrary, where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can constitute actionable defamation. The key is not parsing whether a published statement is fact or opinion, but whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact. … Use of hyperbolic, informal, crude, or ungrammatical language, satirical tone, or vituperative, juvenile name-calling provide support for the conclusion that offensive comments were nonactionable opinion. Similarly, overly vague statements, and generalized comments . . . lacking any specificity as to the time or place of alleged conduct may be a further signal to the reader there is no factual basis for the accusations. On the other hand, if a statement is factually specific, earnest, or serious in tone, or the speaker represents himself as unbiased, having specialized or first-hand experience, or having personally witnessed ... abhorrent behavior, this may signal the opposite, rendering the statement actionable.” (ZL Technologies, Inc. v. Does 1-7 (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 603, 624 (cleaned up).)

J. Nguyen’s Complaint alleges twice that Defendant Kieu Hoang (“Hoang”) “by message disparaged J NGUYEN to his boss Hoang Thi Cham, calling him a dishonest scammer who was also incompetent.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 21, 26.) J. Nguyen alleges the effect of this alleged statements given the context of the Vietnamese business community he shares with Hoang. However, the allegations lack of specificity and there is a lack of documentation verifying its written publication. Further, the use of an informal ad hominem (“scammer”) suggest that the language of the allegation presented inadequately fulfills the elements required for a libel cause of action under ZL Technologies. (Complaint, ¶¶ 21-32; Demurrer, MPA, p. 9:19—10:14; Opposition, p. 8:11-16; Reply, p. 3:27—5:2.)

3. Second Cause of Action for Slander

“Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means which:

1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime;

2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease;

3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits;

4. Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; or

5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.” (Civil Code, § 46.)

As noted above (See II.B.2.), J. Nguyen alleges a false oral statement that he states directly injured him in respect to his office and standing in the Vietnamese business community (Complaint, ¶¶ 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 35, 36.) However, the Court does not find sufficient specificity in the alleged statement to determine that the elements required for a slander cause of action under ZL Technologies have been fulfilled by the alleged statements.

4. Third Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

To prevail on a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant's intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. To establish the claim, the plaintiff need not prove that a defendant acted with the primary purpose of disrupting the contract but must show the defendant's knowledge that the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his or her action. (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148 (cleaned up).)

J. Nguyen alleges Defendants’ knowledge of a valid contract between J. Nguyen and Hanoi mask manufacturing company Thinh Long JSC (“TL”) (Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 39), Defendants’ actual disruption of the alleged contractual relationship between J. Nguyen and TL (Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 40), and resulting damage (Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 42, 43.) The Court does not find that J. Nguyen alleges the existence of a valid conflict between J. Nguyen and TL. Thus, all elements for an intentional interference with contractual relations have not been adequately pled by J., Nguyen’s Complaint.

5. Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

The tort of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage is established where a plaintiff demonstrates that (1) an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff and a third party which contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware or should have been aware that if it did not act with due care its actions would interfere with this relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future economic benefit or advantage of the relationship; (3) the defendant was negligent; and (4) such negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that the relationship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship. (Venhaus v. Shultz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1078.)

The Court finds that J. Nguyen fails to allege all elements of a cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. J. Nguyen alleges that he and TL were in an economic relationship that would likely result in a future economic benefit to J. Nguyen but does not allege that Defendants knew of this relationship and were aware or should have been aware that a lack of due care on their part could result in actions that would interfere with that relationship. (Complaint, ¶¶ 45-47.) J. Nguyen does not plead sufficient facts to establish negligence, but successfully alleges harm resulting from the actual disruption imposed by Defendants’ alleged actions. (Complaint, ¶¶ 48-51.)

III. CONCLUSION