Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV17008, Date: 2022-12-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV17008 Hearing Date: December 13, 2022 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Demurrer
and Motion to Strike
Moving Party: Defendants
Today’s IV Inc. and Interstate Hotels, LLC
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Michelle Casten
The
Demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action. The
Demurer is OVERRULED as to the third, fifth and sixth causes of action.
The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to
Strike.
BACKGROUND:
On August 11, 2022,
Plaintiff amended her Complaint to substitute Interstate Hotels, LLC for Doe 1.
On August 30, 2022,
by request of Plaintiff, the Clerk’s Office dismissed without prejudice
Defendants Interstate Hotels and Resorts and Aimbridge Hospitality from the
Complaint.
On September 15,
2022, Defendants Today’s IV Inc. and Interstate Hotels, LLC filed their
Demurrer and their Motion to Strike.
On October 24, 2022,
the Court accepted a Peremptory Challenge Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §
170.6.
On November 10, 2022,
Defendants re-filed their Demurrer and Motion to Strike.
On November 21, 2022,
Plaintiff filed her Oppositions to the prior Demurrer and Motion to Strike.
On November 30, 2022,
Plaintiff filed her Oppositions to the later Demurrer and Motion to Strike.
On December 6, 2022,
Defendants filed their Replies.
ANALYSIS:
I.
The Prior Demurrer and Motion to Strike are Superseded
and Moot
Defendants’ prior Demurrer and Motion to Strike, filed on September 15,
2022 are nearly identical to Defendants’ later Demurrer and Motion to Strike.
Their arguments and requests for relief are identical. Therefore, the Court
denies as moot the prior Demurrer and Motion to Strike as they have been
superseded by the later Demurrer and Motion to Strike. All references below
shall be to the later Demurrer and Motion to Strike, as well as to Plaintiff’s
later Oppositions.
II.
Demurrer
A. Legal
Standard
A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other
pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of
the opposing party’s pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to
challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for the purpose of the ruling
on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true,
however improbable they may be. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 422.10, 589.)
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the
face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that
are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311.) No
other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). A
demurrer is brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 (grounds),
section 430.30 (as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may
be taken), and section 430.50(a) (can be taken to the entire complaint or any
cause of action within).
A demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10,
subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action
asserted. A demurrer for uncertainty (Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10,
subdivision (f)), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading
is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably
determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are
directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague,
“ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Id.)
B. Discussion
Defendants demur as to the third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Demurrer,
p. 5:1–5). Defendants argue that these causes of action are not supported by
sufficient facts and are impermissibly uncertain. (Id.)
1.
Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
a.
Legal
Standard
“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering
severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be
outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated
in a civilized community.” (Wilson v.
Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.)
b.
Analysis
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that
Defendants rented the hotel room at issue to Plaintiff, even though Defendants
allegedly knew (or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known)
that the room had severe issues with mold, bacteria, and other toxic substances.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 58–59.) Plaintiff further alleges that she was taken to the
emergency room due to the severity of her symptoms. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as
to the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
2.
Breach
of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
a.
Legal
Standard
To establish a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability, Plaintiffs must establish (1) “the existence of a material
defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability,” (2) “notice to the
landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery
of the condition,” (3) “the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the
deficiency, and” (4) “resulting damages.” (Erlach
v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
b.
Analysis
Plaintiff alleges: (1) that the
premises was not habitable because of water intrusion, dampness, and toxic mold
exposure (Complaint, ¶ 74); (2) that Plaintiff initially complained to a
security manager of Defendants named Larry Corley, and that in a subsequent
inquiry she was hung up on by Defendants (Id. at ¶ 37); and (3) that
Plaintiff has suffered a variety of physical ailments and damages as a result
of Defendants’ conduct (Id. at ¶¶ 81–83.)
Plaintiff has not alleged that
Defendants were given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency (e.g., by
immediately moving her as soon as they were put on notice of the material
defect), nor has Plaintiff provided sufficient allegations as to when (both in
exact terms and in terms relative to her discovery of the condition) Defendants
were provided notice of the condition.
The Court SUSTAINS with leave to
amend the Demurrer as to the fourth cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability.
3.
Nuisance
a.
Legal
Standard
b.
Analysis
Plaintiff alleges: (1) that the
damaging effects of the water intrusion, smell, and toxic mold constituted a
continuing and recurring nuisance that deprived Plaintiff of the safe, healthy,
and comfortable use of her hotel room (Complaint, ¶¶ 89); (2) that the invasion
substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of her hotel room,
was harmful to Plaintiff’s health, was offensive to Plaintiff’s senses, and was
an obstruction to the free use of the property (Id. at ¶¶ 93–94); and
(3) that any ordinary person would reasonably be annoyed or disturbed by
Defendants’ conduct (Id. at ¶ 95).
Assuming as true these
allegations for the purposes of the Demurrer, Plaintiff’s allegations for the
fifth cause of action for nuisance are sufficient for the cause of action to
survive.
The Court OVERRULES the
Demurrer as to the fifth cause of action for nuisance.
4.
Breach
of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
a.
Legal Standard
The elements of a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
are: (1) a lease agreement between plaintiff and defendant; (2) absence of
language contrary to the implied covenant that tenant shall have quiet
enjoyment and possession; (3) act or omission of the landlord, or anyone
claiming under the landlord, which “substantially interfere[s] with a
tenant[’]s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by
the tenancy”; and (4) an applicable remedy. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-591.)
b.
Analysis
Plaintiff alleges: (1) that
Plaintiff leased or rented a hotel room from Defendants (Complaint, ¶ 106); (2)
that implied in the rental agreement is a covenant that Defendants would not
interfere with Plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment of the premises during the term of
her stay (Id. at ¶ 107); (3) that Defendants’ acts, omissions, and
conduct as previously alleged (i.e., Defendants renting the room despite
knowing there was mold and making no attempt to alleviate the problems)
substantially affected Plaintiff’s enjoyment of the hotel room (Id. at
¶¶ 61, 109).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has
not established that there was a “lease agreement” and that Plaintiff was a
lodger rather than a renter. (Reply, pp. 5–7.) However, the question of whether
Plaintiff’s rental, which lasted multiple months, is a lodging or a lease is a
question of fact for the trier of fact. It is not a question of law that would
otherwise be appropriate for the Court to consider regarding a demurrer.
Assuming as true these allegations
for the purposes of the Demurrer, Plaintiff’s provides sufficient and certain
allegations for the sixth cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment to survive.
The Court OVERRULES the
Demurrer as to the sixth cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment.
C. Conclusion
The
Demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action. The
Demurer is OVERRULED as to the third, fifth and sixth causes of action.
III. Motion to Strike
A. Legal
Standard
Any party, within the time allowed to respond
to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any
part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a
portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken
except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action,
count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)¿¿
The grounds for a motion to strike shall
appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the
court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The
court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in
any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed
in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the
court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a
complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman
v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)¿¿
B. Analysis
Defendants request that the Court strike the following items
from the Complaint:
(1) Paragraphs 62, 63,
64, and 67, which regard Plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress;
(2) Paragraphs 84,
which regards Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of implied warranty of
habitability;
(3) Paragraph 104,
which regards Plaintiff’s cause of action for nuisance; and
(4) Plaintiff’s
prayers for attorney’s fees and punitive damages.
(Motion to Strike,
pp. 2:10–22, 3:1–14.)
The Court has overruled Defendants’ Demurrer as to
Plaintiff’s causes of action for infliction of emotional distress. Thus, the
Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike as to paragraphs 62, 63, 64 and 67,
which pertain to her IIED cause of action.
“The court must, . . . disregard any . . . defect in the pleadings . .
. . which, in the opinion of said court, does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.” (CCP § 475.) Whether or not paragraph 84 of the Complaint
is stricken will make absolutely no difference to the parties. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike
paragraph 84.
Defendants move that paragraph 104, which discusses
Defendants acting “willfully, maliciously, oppressively, outrageously, and in
conscious disregard and indifference to the safety and well-being of
Plaintiff”, be stricken. Whether
Defendants so acted is question of fact that is relevant to this matter. The
Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike paragraph 104.
In addition, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains allegations that
if proven to be true would be sufficient for grants of attorney’s fees and
punitive damages. It would thus also be improper to strike these prayers for
relief at this time.
C. Conclusion
The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike.