Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV24958, Date: 2023-01-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV24958    Hearing Date: January 11, 2023    Dept: 34

SUBJECT:         Demurrer

 

Moving Party:  Defendants Urbane Builders, Inc., Gagik Patrick Nazaryan, Amirhosin Ebrahimi, Neda Abousaidi, GCN Properties, LLC, Tyrone Development, LLC, Black Star Development LLC, Ehsan Sombolestani, Cynthia Sarkissian, Urbane Design, Inc., and Redwood Inc.

Resp. Party:    Plaintiff Robert Sanati

                                     

       

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED in part. The Demurrer is sustained with 10 days leave as to the cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (b). The Demurrer is sustained without leave as to the cause of action for restitution. The Demurrer is overruled as to the other grounds claimed.

 

BACKGROUND:

On August 2, 2022, Plaintiff Robert Sanati filed his Complaint against Defendants Urbane Builders, Inc., Gagik Patrick Nazaryan, Amirhosin Ebrahimi, Neda Abousaidi, GCN Properties, LLC, Tyrone Development, LLC, Black Star Development LLC, Ehsan Sombolestani, Cynthia Sarkissian, Urbane Design, Inc., and Redwood Inc. The causes of action are for:

(1)       Breach of contract;

(2)       Negligence;

(3)       Violation of Civil Code sections 1788.20 and 1788.30;

(4)       Conversion;

(5)       Fraud and deceit;

(6)       Theft;

(7)       Common counts;

(8)       Violation of Civil Code sections 1761 and 1770;

(9)       Violation of Business & Professions Code sections 7031, et seq.;

(10)    Unfair, unethical business practices;

(11)    Accounting;

(12)    Rescission, pursuant to Civil Code section 1691;

(13)    Restitution, pursuant to Business & Professions Code sections 7031 and 7118; and

(14)    Money had and received.

On November 16, 2022, Defendants filed their Demurrer. Defendants concurrently filed: (1) Request for Judicial Notice; and (2) Proposed Order.

On December 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Opposition. Plaintiff concurrently filed his Affidavit of Venue.

        On January 4, 2023, Defendants filed their Reply.

ANALYSIS:

 

I.           Judicial Notice

 

Defendants request judicial notice of Certified License History for License #1046293, which is a public document filed with the State of California’s Contractors State License Board.

 

The Court GRANTS judicial notice of this item.

 

II.        Legal Standard for a Demurrer

 

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 422.10, 589.)

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). A demurrer is brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 (grounds), section 430.30 (as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken), and section 430.50(a) (can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within).

 

A demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. A demurrer for uncertainty (Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f)), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Id.)

 

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).  

 

III.     Discussion

 

Defendants demur against the Complaint on the following grounds:

 

(1)       That all causes of action fail because Plaintiff did not set out verbatim in the Complaint the terms of the contract;

(2)       That the first cause of action for breach of contract fails because it does not identify the existence of a contract or state the terms of the contract;

(3)       That the third cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal Act fails because Plaintiff fails to allege prohibited conduct by Defendants;

(4)       That the fourth cause of action for conversion fails because the funds paid were for services performed;

(5)       That the fifth cause of action for fraud and deceit fails because the fraud allegations are not specifically pleaded;

(6)       That the sixth cause of action for theft fails because criminal intent is not established pursuant to Penal Code section 496;

(7)       That the eighth cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) fails because CLRA does not apply to construction contract pursuant to Civil Code section 1754;

(8)       That the ninth cause of action for violation of the Business & Professions Code section 7031, et seq. fails because Defendant is and was properly licensed;

(9)       That the tenth cause of action for unfair, unethical business practices fails because the allegations do not show unlawful conduct and are impermissibly uncertain; and

(10)    That the thirteenth cause of action for restitution fails against all Defendants because Defendant Urbane was properly licensed at all times.

 

(Demurrer, pp. 4–12.)

 

A.      Breach of Contract

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

If a breach of contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) “In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198–199.)

 

 

2.       Analysis

 

        Here, Plaintiff discussed the legal effect of the contract at length in the Complaint. (Complaint, ¶¶ 25–32.) However, “plaintiff’s failure to either to attach or to set out verbatim the terms of the contract [is] not fatal to his breach of contract cause of action.”  (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402.)

 

The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Demurrer on the grounds that either all causes of action or the breach of contract cause of action fail for lack of including the contract verbatim.

 

B.      Rosenthal Act

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

The Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA) prohibits debt collectors from engaging in unfair debt collection practices. (Civ. Code, §§ 1788.10, et seq.) In addition to listed conduct and other practices that are deemed unfair, the RFDCPA also prohibits conduct that is prohibited by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). (Civ. Code, § 1788.17.) Among the federally banned practices is the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. (15 U.S.C. 1692e, subdivision (2)(A).)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that, among other things, Defendants “regularly sent bills to Plaintiff” and that Defendants “repeatedly told Plaintiff that he was in default when he was not.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 85, 87.) That is sufficient to allege a cause of action under the RFDCPA. The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege prohibited conduct under the RFDCPA.

 

C.      Conversion

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

        Plaintiff alleges that Defendant wrongfully interfered with Plaintiff’s property by wrongfully taking Plaintiff’s money, refusing to return the money, and thus causing damages to Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶¶ 105, 110.) That is sufficient to allege a cause of action for conversion. The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the elements of conversion.

 

D.      Fraud and Deceit

 

1.          Legal Standard

 

“The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)  

 

The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)  

 

To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) 

 

2.       Analysis

 

        Here, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that Defendants concealed certain information from Plaintiff; (2) that Defendants made multiple, specific false representations to Plaintiff; (3) that Defendants intended to deceive Plaintiffs by concealing the facts; (4) that Plaintiff reasonably relief on Defendants’ deception; and (5) that Plaintiff was harmed.

 

        Plaintiff has made sufficiently specific allegations to meet the higher pleading standard for fraud. The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the elements of fraud and deceit.

 

E.       Theft

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen and obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).)

 

“Any person who has been injured by a violation of subdivision (a) or (b) may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (c).)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Here, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Defendants “were systematically stealing money by providing false invoices for more than agreed to amounts coming to work on Plaintiff’s property for minimal time while working on other projects”. (Complaint, ¶ 144.) These are sufficient allegations to constitute the cause of action for theft, which includes theft by false pretense. (Bell v. Feibush (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1043, holding that the phrase “any manner constituting theft” under section 496(a) includes theft by false pretense.)

 

The Court notes that, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, criminal intent is not a prerequisite for civil liability pursuant to Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c). (Bell, supra, at 1043, holding that a criminal conviction under section 496(a) is not a prerequisite to recovery of treble damages under section 496(c).) Defendants have not cited to any case law that would indicate otherwise.

 

        The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the elements of theft.

 

F.       Violation of CLRA

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

Among other things, the CLRA prohibits “[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.” (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(7).)

 

“The provisions of this title shall not apply to any transaction which provides for the construction, sale, or construction and sale of an entire residence or all or part of a structure designed for commercial or industrial occupancy, with or without a parcel of real property or an interest therein, or for the sale of a lot or parcel of real property, including any site preparation incidental to such sale.” (Civ. Code, § 1754.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

        Here, Plaintiff alleges multiple violations of the CLRA, including that Defendants represented that services Defendants provided were of a particular standard quality or grade when they were not. (Complaint, ¶ 167.) This is a sufficient allegation to constitute a violation of CLRA. In addition, the Court notes that Civil Code section 1754 does not apply here as the services at question regarded construction of a pool and remodel of a home, not the construction, sale, or both of an entire residence.

 

         The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ Demurrer on the grounds that the CLRA does not apply here due to Civil Code section 1754.

 

G.      Violation of Business & Professions Code

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

Except as provided in subdivision (e), a person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (b).)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were unlicensed. However, by request of Defendants, the Court has taken judicial notice of Defendant Urbane Builders Inc.’s license, which has been in effect since January 1, 2019. Plaintiff has not made sufficient allegations as to which Defendant played which role in the incident at issue, making it unclear to the Court whether this document is for the general contractor. Defendants argue that the contract at issue ­­– which has not been provided to the Court – is only between Plaintiff and Defendant Urbane Builders Inc. (Opposition, p. 5:4–5.)

 

Given that the Complaint is uncertain on this matter, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer as to the cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (b), with 10 days leave for Plaintiff to amend the Complaint.

 

H.      Violation of Unfair Competition Law

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

To set forth a claim for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”), Plaintiff must establish Defendant was engaged in an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and certain specific acts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) A cause of action for unfair competition “is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

        Here, Plaintiff has extensively alleged unfair, deceptive, and misleading acts that are sufficient to constitute a cause of action for a violation of the UCL. The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as to the cause of action for violation of the UCL.

 

I.        Restitution

 

1.       Legal Standard

 

“Unjust enrichment…is synonymous with restitution.” (Dinosaur Dev., Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1314.) “The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are ‘receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.’” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb, & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1132, quoting Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726.)

 

“The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit which may not justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched.” (Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 460.) “The phrase ‘Unjust Enrichment’ does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so.

 

“In addition, as [trial courts have] observed, there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment.” (Melchior v. New Line Prod., Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793.)

 

2.       Analysis

 

Plaintiff pleads a cause of action that does not exist in California. While restitution as a remedy may be available later, it is not available as a cause of action based on the allegations made. The Court SUSTAINS without leave the Demurrer as to the cause of action for restitution.

 

IV.       Conclusion

 

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED in part. The Demurrer is sustained with 10 days leave as to the cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (b). The Demurrer is sustained without leave as to the cause of action for restitution. The Demurrer is overruled as to the other grounds claimed.