Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case Number: 22STCV28478, Date: 2024-01-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV28478, Date: 2024-01-03 Tentative Ruling

SUBJECT: Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication

The Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff Luis Calderon filed his Verified Complaint against Defendants Elliot Megdal and Alana Megdal on a cause of action arising from the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

On November 21, 2023, Defendants filed their Verified Answer to the Verified Complaint.

On October 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication. In support of his Motion, Plaintiff concurrently filed: (1) Memorandum of Points and Authorities; (2) Declaration of Luis Calderon; (3) Declaration of Shiv Samtani; (4) Separate Statement; and (5) Proposed Order.

On December 12, 2023, Defendants filed their Opposition to the Motion. In support of their Opposition, Defendants concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Jason James; (2) Declaration of Elliot Megdal; (3) Requests for Judicial Notice; and (4) Notice of Lodging Deposition Transcript.

On December 13, 2023, Defendants filed these additional items in support of their Opposition: (1) Declaration of Elliot Megdal; (2) Declaration of Jason James; (3) Declaration of Stephen Abraham; (4) Requests for Judicial Notice; and (5) Response to Separate Statement.

On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed: (1) Supplemental Declaration of Shiv Samtani; and (2) Declaration of Hani Youssef.

On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Reply regarding the Motion. In support of her Reply, Plaintiff concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Luis Calderon; (2) Declaration of Shiv Samtani; and (3) Objections to Defendants’ Evidence.

Plaintiff filed evidentiary objections to portions of Defendants’ evidence. The following are the Court’s rulings on these objections.

Objection
1	SUSTAINED
2		OVERRULED
3		OVERRULED

The Court DENIES as irrelevant judicial notice to these items. “Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters (Evid. Code, § 450 et seq.), only relevant material may be noticed.” (Am. Cemwood Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 431, 441, fn. 7, quotation omitted, italics in original.)

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. The motion may be made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (1)(a).)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, citation omitted.)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474, [applying the summary judgment standards in Aguilar to motions for summary adjudication].)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839, citation omitted.)

“The trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a fact finder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Binder, supra, at p. 840, citations omitted; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

“On a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320, citation omitted.)

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, on his Verified Complaint. (Motion, pp. 1–3.)

Plaintiff argues: (1) that he is disabled; (2) that the business located on Defendants’ property is a place of public accommodation; (3) that Defendants’ property had architectural barriers that denied Plaintiff public accommodations because of his disability; (4) that Plaintiff has a cause of action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (5) that Plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief to remedy subsequently discovered additional violations; and (6) that Plaintiff is entitled to $8,000.00 in statutory damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. (Memorandum, pp. 5:14, 6:8, 6:18–19, 7:6–7, 9:21, 11:3–4, 12:12–13.)

Defendants oppose the Motion, arguing: (1) that Plaintiff must demonstrate that access was rendered more difficult, denied, or deterred on a particular occasion because of non-compliant conditions in order to prevail on his claim; (2) that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a basis for his claim of mandatory injunctive relief and his Motion must fail as a matter of law; (3) that Plaintiff has not offered evidence to support his claim, which undermines his credibility; and (4) that Plaintiff has not met his burden on summary judgment of demonstrating damages. (Opposition, pp. 20:14–17, 21:6–8, 22:1–2, 24:17–19.)

In his Reply, Plaintiff argues: (1) that no genuine issues of material fact exist; (2) that Plaintiff was denied full and equal access; and (3) that store bankruptcy and closure is irrelevant. (Reply, pp. 2:16, 5:10, 7:3.)

“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).)

“A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (f).)

“Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6.” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a).)

“Actions brought pursuant to this section are independent of any other actions, remedies, or procedures that may be available to an aggrieved party pursuant to any other law.” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (e).)

Upon review of the Parties’ respective filings, it appears that there are multiple trial issues of material fact in this case, including but not limited to: (1) whether Plaintiff actually visited the property and store in question; (2) if Plaintiff actually visited the property and store in question, whether he encountered a lack of an accessible route of travel; (3) whether the route to the entrance of the property and store in question have accessibility issues, including but not limited to abrupt vertical edges and variations in level; and (4) whether Plaintiff is actually currently deterred from visiting the property and store in question. (See Response to Separate Statement; see also Decl. Megdal and Decl. James.)

Determinations on these issues of fact are necessary prior to arriving at any legal conclusions on the causes of action. Further, such determinations are inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment. Thus, summary judgment and summary adjudication are inappropriate here.

The Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.