Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV39551, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV39551 Hearing Date: May 11, 2023 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Request to Stay All Legal Proceedings
Moving Party: Defendant
BMW of North America, LLC
Resp. Party: Plaintiffs Willie L. Fair and Julie Fair
Defendant BMW NA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay
All Legal Proceedings is DENIED.
BACKGROUND:
On December 21, 2022,
Plaintiffs Willie L. Fair and Julie Fair filed their Complaint against
Defendants BMW of North America, LLC, and SAI Monrovia B, Inc. on causes of
action arising from the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.
On January 20, 2023,
Defendant BMW of North America, LLC filed its Answer.
On January 26, 2023, Defendant
SAI Monrovia B, Inc. filed its Answer.
On April 10, 2023,
Defendant BMW of North America, LLC filed: (1) Notice of Motion to Compel
Arbitration; (2) Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay All Legal
Proceedings (“Motion”); and (3) Declaration of Aaron Grener.
On April 28, 2023,
Plaintiffs filed: (1) Opposition; (2) Request for Judicial Notice; (3)
Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Aaron Grener; (4) Proposed Order;
and (5) Proof of Service.
On May 4, 2023,
Defendant BMW of North America, LLC filed: (1) Reply; (2) Request for Judicial
Notice; (3) Response to Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of
Aaron Grener; and (4) Objections to Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Judicial
Notice
A.
Plaintiffs’
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of a variety of
cases from various jurisdictions. Defendant BMW of North America, LLC filed
Objections to Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice.
The Court declines to
take judicial notice of these cases because they are not “necessary, helpful or
relevant.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)
B.
Defendant’s
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of a variety of
cases from various jurisdictions, none of which are binding authority on the
Court.
The Court declines to
take judicial notice of these cases because they are not “necessary, helpful or
relevant.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)
II.
Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiffs filed
evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Aaron Grener. The following are
the Court’s rulings on the evidentiary objections.
|
Objection |
|
|
|
1 |
|
OVERRULED |
|
2 |
|
OVERRULED |
|
3 |
|
OVERRULED |
|
4 |
|
OVERRULED |
|
5 |
|
OVERRULED |
III.
Legal
Standard
“A written agreement to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the
revocation of any contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.)
¿¿
“On petition of a party to an
arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to
arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate
that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists [unless it makes certain determinations].” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1281.2.)¿¿¿¿¿¿
“Under both federal and state
law, arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable, unless they are
revocable for reasons under state law that would render any contract revocable.
. . . Reasons that would render any contract revocable under state law include
fraud, duress, and unconscionability.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 231, 239, citations omitted.)
“The party seeking to compel
arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the
existence of an arbitration agreement.¿The party opposing the petition bears
the burden of establishing a defense to the agreement's enforcement by a
preponderance of the evidence.¿In determining whether there is a duty to
arbitrate, the trial court must, at least to some extent, examine and construe
the agreement.” (Id.)
IV.
Discussion
A. The
Contract and Its Arbitration Provision
Defendant BMW of North America, LLC (“BMW NA”) submits to the Court
a Retail Installment Sales Contract that is signed by: (1) Buyer Willie L.
Fair; and (2) Seller BMW of El Cajon. (Decl. Grener, Exh. A, p. 1.)
The Buyer and the Seller both signed the agreement on August 5,
2019, and the sections for Co-Buyer signature and date both state “N/A”. Buyer
further signed a section titled “Agreement to Arbitrate,” which states: “By
signing below, you agree that, pursuant to the Arbitration Provision on the
reverse side of this contract, you or we may elect to resolve any dispute by
neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. See the Arbitration
Provision for additional information concerning the agreement to arbitrate.”
(Decl. Grener, Exh. A, p. 1.)
The
relevant portion of the arbitration provision states:
ARBITRATION PROVISION
PLEASE REVIEW – IMPORTANT –
AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS
1. EITHER
YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND
NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL.
2. IF A
DISPUTE IS ARBITRATED, YOU WILL GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A CLASS
REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS MEMBER ON ANY CLASS CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST US
INCLUDING ANY RIGHT TO CLASS ARBITRATION OR ANY CONSOLIDATION OF INDIVIDUAL
ARBITRATIONS.
3. DISCOVERY
AND RIGHTS TO APPEAL IN ARBITRATION ARE GENERALLY MORE LIMITED THAN IN A
LAWSUIT, AND OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU AND WE WOULD HAVE IN COURT MAY NOT BE
AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION.
Any
claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including
the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the
arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees,
agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit
application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any
resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with
third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be
resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.
(Decl.
Grener, Exh. A.)
B. The
Parties’ Arguments
Defendant BMW NA moves the Court to: (1) order Plaintiffs to submit
this entire matter to arbitration; and (2) order the arbitration stayed pending
completion of arbitration. (Motion, p. 17:7–10.)
Defendant BMW NA argues: (1) that the Court must compel arbitration
because Plaintiffs entered into a purchase contract containing a valid
arbitration provision that encompasses the entire dispute; (2) that Defendant
BMW NA may compel arbitration as a third-party beneficiary; (3) that BMW NA may
compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel; and (4) that
proceedings should be stayed while arbitration is pending. (Motion, pp.
8:25–26, 12:24, 14:5, 16:9–10.)
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion, arguing: (1) that the Motion must be
denied on procedural grounds; (2) that the Motion must be denied because
Defendant BMW NA cannot invoke the arbitration clause; and (3) that collateral
estoppel applies here; (4) that equitable estoppel does not apply here; (5)
that Plaintiff’s preferred case law (i.e., Ford Motor Warranty Cases
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324) applies here, not Defendant BMW NA’s preferred case
law (i.e., Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, et al. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486);
(6) that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) does not apply here; and (7) that
Plaintiff Julie Fair cannot be compelled to arbitration. (Opposition, pp. 2:2,
3:1–2, 4:1–2, 6:26, 8:2–3, 11:1–2, 12:16, 13:17.)
In its Reply, Defendant BMW NA argues: (1) that Defendant BMW NA
established a valid arbitration agreement exists; (2) that Plaintiffs have not
presented evidence that a valid arbitration agreement does not exist; (3) that
Defendant BMW NA is a third-party beneficiary; (4) that Felisilda is
binding California authority that holds equitable estoppel applies; (5) that
Plaintiffs’ arguments that collateral estoppel applies is improper; and (6)
that the agreements’ choice of law provision establishes that the FAA applies.
(Reply, pp. 3:2–3, 3:21, 6:3, 7:26, 8:26.)
C. Discussion
1.
FAA
There is no disagreement: the
contract clearly falls within the ambit of the FAA. (See Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 96–99, abrogated in part on other grounds by AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion (2010) 565 U.S. 333.).
2.
Standing to Invoke Arbitration
Defendant BMW NA has put forth sufficient evidence to meet its
initial burden that there is a signed contract between Buyer Willie L. Fair
(who is one of the two Plaintiffs) and Seller BMW of El Cajon (who is not a
party to this litigation).
However, as thoroughly discussed regarding an equivalent situation
by the recent Court of Appeal decision in Ford Motor Warranty Cases,
Defendant BMW NA does not have standing to invoke the arbitration provision
pursuant to either the doctrine of equitable estoppel or the doctrine of
third-party beneficiaries. (Ford
Motor Warranty Cases, supra, at pp. 1332–40.)
Accordingly, BMW NA, as the owner of assigned party BMW Bank of
North America, cannot invoke the arbitration provision. Plaintiffs meet their
burden of establishing a defense to the Motion.
Because BMW NA cannot invoke the arbitration provision, the Court
does not reach the question of whether Plaintiff Julie Fair could be compelled
to arbitrate these claims.
The Court DENIES the Motion.
V.
Conclusion
Defendant BMW NA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay
All Legal Proceedings is DENIED.