Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV10218, Date: 2023-11-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV10218 Hearing Date: November 2, 2023 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, and for Order to Show Cause Re: Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction
Moving Party: Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants
William Xiaoyu Guo, Qichen Guo, and Xiaoping Liu
Resp. Party: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Dawn M. Petschauer
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ Motion for TRO is
GRANTED in part.
A temporary
restraining order is issued as follows:
(1) The Parties
– including Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants and Defendant/Cross-Complainant, as
well as the Parties’ guests, tenants, agents, employees, contractors, and/or
animals – shall not create, construct, and/or maintain any obstructions on,
along, or across the alleged easement described by the Community Driveway
Agreement, excluding parking vehicles in the alleged easement, so long as such
parking allows continued ingress and egress to both properties; and
(2)
Defendant/Cross-Complainant, as well as Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s guests,
tenants, agents, employees, contractors, and/or animals – shall not trespass on
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ property, excluding the area on, along, or across
the alleged easement described by the Community Driveway Agreement.
An
Order to Show Cause is issued regarding why the Court should not issue a
preliminary injunction. The Parties shall appear on November ___, 2023 for a
hearing on this matter.
The
Motion for TRO is DENIED as to all other requests for relief.
BACKGROUND:
On May 8,
2023, Plaintiffs William Xiaoyu Guo, Qichen Guo, and Xiaoping Liu filed their
Verified Complaint against Defendant Dawn M. Petschauer on causes of action
arising from alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ rights regarding their real
property.
On June 12,
2023, Plaintiffs filed their Verified First Amended Complaint.
On July 17,
2023, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Dawn M. Petschauer filed: (1) Answer to the
Verified First Amended Complaint; and (2) Verified Cross-Complaint against
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants William Xiaoyu Guo, Qichen Guo, and Xiaoping Liu.
On September
14, 2023, Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants filed their Verified Answer to the
Verified Cross-Complaint.
On October
10, 2023, Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants filed their Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, and for Order to Show Cause Re: Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
(“Motion for TRO”). In support of their Motion for TRO,
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants concurrently filed: (1) Request for Judicial
Notice; (2) Proposed Order; and (3) Proof of Service.
On October
20, 2023, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed her Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Ex
Parte Application TRO, and Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction [sic]
(“Opposition”).
On October 25,
2023, Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants filed their Reply Re: Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, and for Order to Show Cause Re: Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction (“Reply”).
ANALYSIS:
I.
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants
request that the Court take judicial notice of the following items:
(1) the Verified First Amended Complaint in this
matter;
(2) the Request for Civil Harassment Restraining
Orders and the Minute Order dated February 28, 2022 in Case No. 22PDRO00143 in
the Los Angeles Superior Court; and
(3) the Request for Civil Harassment Restraining
Orders and a Minute Order dated May 18, 2022 in Case No. 22PDRO00367 in the Los
Angeles Superior Court.
The Court DENIES as superfluous judicial
notice to the first item. Any party that wishes to draw the Court’s attention
to a matter filed in this action may simply cite directly to the document by
execution and filing date. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(d).)
The Court GRANTS judicial notice to the
second and third sets of items.
II. Legal Standard
“An injunction is a writ
or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It may be granted
by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted
by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
525.)
“An injunction may be granted in the
following cases:
“(1) When it appears by the complaint that the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part
thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.
“(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits
that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would
produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.
“(3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a
party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party
to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
“(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford
adequate relief.
“(5) Where it would be extremely difficult to
ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.
“(6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a
multiplicity of judicial proceedings.
“(7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a).)
III. Discussion
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants
move the Court to enjoin Defendant/Cross-Complainant from acting in certain
ways that would affect the real properties at issue. (Motion for TRO, pp. 2–3,
4:3–8, 10–11.)
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants
argue: (1) that Defendant/Cross-Complainant has acted improperly; (2) that any alleged
easement created by the “Community Driveway Agreement” does not allow
Defendant/Cross-Complainant to perform acts of interference; (3) that the Court
should issue an injunction pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
section 526, subdivision (a) ; and (4) that the Court should issue a temporary
restraining order because Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants will succeed on their
claims and Defendant/Cross-Complainant will not suffer irreparable harm because
of such an order. (Motion for TRO, pp. 4:9, 6:1–3, 7:9–10, 8:19–21.)
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants also note two requests for civil harassment
restraining orders that were previously made, tried, and dismissed. (Id. at
p. 10:1–2.)
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
opposes the Motion for TRO, arguing: (1) that a noticed motion is the
appropriate procedure here, not an ex parte motion; (2) that the Court is
collaterally estopped because the matter has already been previously
adjudicated by courts on two occasions; and (3) that the request is defective
because Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants have failed to offer an undertaking for the
injunction they seek. (Opposition, pp. 4:1–2, 4:21–22, 5:7–8.)
In their
Reply, Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants argue: (1) that they are not seeking ex
parte relief; (2) that collateral estoppel does not apply here; (3) that
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants are not required to offer an undertaking; and (4)
that Defendant/Cross-Complainant did not present any evidence in opposition to the
merits of the Motion for TRO. (Reply, pp. 2:1–2, 2:16, 5:1, 5:14–15.)
B. Temporary Restraining Order vs.
Preliminary Injunction
The Court
begins its discussion by considering what relief is actually requested here.
Temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions are not the same. (Landmark Holding Grp.
v. Super. Ct. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [“In contrast to the ex parte
proceeding (on a temporary restraining order), the hearing on the preliminary
injunction is a full evidentiary hearing giving all parties the opportunity to
present arguments and evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.) A TRO is purely
transitory in nature and terminates automatically when a preliminary injunction
is issued or denied.”].)
“Whether an order
restraining a defendant from an action is a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction is determined not by the title of the document, but its
effect.” (Integrated Lender Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 867, 872, fn. 2, citing McManus v. KPAL Broad. Corp. (1960)
182 Cal.App.2d 558, 562.)
Counsel for
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants was not careful in drafting the Motion for TRO. At
times, the Motion for TRO explicitly requests a temporary restraining order,
while at other times the Motion for TRO explicitly requests a preliminary
injunction. (See, for example, Motion for TRO, pp. 8:19–21, 10:16–17.)
Ultimately,
the clearest indication of what Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants seek comes from
their Proposed Order, which seeks a
temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why the Court should not
issue a preliminary injunction. (Proposed Order, pp. 2–4.)
The Court
thus considers whether it would be appropriate to issue a temporary restraining
order and an order for Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff to show cause as to why a
preliminary injunction should not issue.
C. Noticed vs. Ex Parte Relief
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
argues that the Motion for TRO is inappropriate because it is not a noticed
motion.
This argument
is frivolous. While it is true that there was an ex parte application for a
temporary restraining order filed on September 18, 2023, it was taken off
calendar on September 19, 2023. This Motion for TRO, filed on October 10, 2023,
is a noticed motion and not an ex parte application for relief. That a request
for a temporary restraining order could be noticed (as opposed to unnoticed,
i.e., filed on an ex parte basis) is explicitly contemplated by the Code of Civil
Procedure. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (c) [“No temporary restraining
order shall be granted without notice to the opposing party, unless both of the
following requirements are satisfied . . . .”].)
D. Collateral
Estoppel/Issue Preclusion)
The
California Supreme Court recently clarified its doctrines of res judicata
(a.k.a. claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). (DKN
Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823–825.) While it is
unnecessary to revisit the entire doctrine here, “[i]n summary, issue
preclusion applies (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3)
actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted
against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that
party.” (Ibid.)
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
argues that Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants are collaterally estopped from seeking
a temporary restraining order because the identical issue has been ruled on
twice.
The Court has
taken judicial notice of two prior orders in unrelated cases: (1) the Minute
Order dated February 28, 2022 (located on actual page 87 of the Request for
Judicial Notice); and (2) the Minute Order dated May 18, 2022 (located on
actual page 128 of the Request for Judicial Notice).
Upon
assessing these two minutes orders, it
does not appear that there are any identical issues in those two cases that
would bear upon this case.
Those two
cases (Case Nos. 22PDRO00143 and 22PDRO00467) involved petitions for civil
harassment. The final judgments of dismissal in both of those cases solely considered
the issue of civil harassment. The minute orders do not clarify what the
specific issues considered were, and trial transcripts have not been provided
to this Court.
In contrast,
the Motion for TRO requests an injunction regarding: (1) whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant
and her future tenants can walk along part of Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’
property; (2) whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant can maintain and/or install a
“Ring” security camera on an accessory dwelling unit (ADU); (3) whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant
can maintain and/or construct any obstructions on, along, or across an alleged
easement; (4) whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant is allowed to use an alleged
easement in a manner not contemplated or allowed by that alleged easement; and
(5) whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant can trespass on
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ property, including but not limited to allowing
Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s dog to use part of Plaintiffs’ property.
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
has not submitted any evidence to the Court that would indicate these identical
issues were actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior cases.
Thus, these issues are not subject to issue preclusion.
E. Undertakings
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
argues that the Motion for TRO is defective because Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants
have not offered an undertaking.
This argument
mistakes the order of procedure for undertakings.
“On granting an injunction,
the court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to
the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not
exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may sustain by reason of the
injunction, if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to
the injunction. Within five days after the service of the injunction, the
person enjoined may object to the undertaking. If the court determines that the
applicant’s undertaking is insufficient and a sufficient undertaking is not
filed within the time required by statute, the order granting the injunction
must be dissolved.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 529, subd. (a).)
Undertakings
are not required to seek injunctive relief; they are required when the Court
grants or issues an injunction. As the Court has not yet granted or issued an
injunction, no undertaking is required at present.
F. The Merits of the Motion for TRO
1. Legal Standard for a Temporary Restraining
Order
“The granting or denial
of a temporary restraining order is discretionary with the trial judge and
amounts to a mere preliminary or interlocutory order to keep the subject of
litigation in status quo
pending the determination of the action on its merits.” (Gray v. Bybee (1943)
60 Cal.App.2d 564, 571, citation omitted.)
“The ex parte hearing concerning a TRO is no more than a review of
the conflicting contentions to determine whether there is a sufficiency of
evidence to support the issuance of an interlocutory order to keep the subject
of litigation in status quo pending a full hearing to
determine whether the applicant is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The
issuance of a TRO is not a determination of the merits of the controversy. All
that is determined is whether the TRO is necessary to maintain the status quo
pending the noticed hearing on the application for preliminary injunction.” (Landmark
Holding Grp., supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 528, citations omitted.)
“As a general rule, an
injunction lies to prevent threatened injuries and has no application to
completed wrongs for the redress of which the plaintiff is relegated to an
action at law. Obviously, a completed wrong cannot be corrected by a
preliminary injunction, the purpose of which is to preserve the status quo until after final judgment, though
the facts be such that the plaintiff is entitled to some form of permanent
relief. Thus, an injunction will not be granted to restrain the destruction of
a ditch already destroyed, or to prevent the opening of a street already
opened, or to prohibit the erection of a building previously built.” (McManus,
supra, 182 Cal.App.2d at p. 563, citations omitted.)
2. The Community Driveway Agreement
An underlying
issue in this litigation is what is required by the “Community Driveway
Agreement,” which is allegedly an easement on the Parties’ respective
properties. According to documents submitted to the Court, the Community
Driveway Agreement states in full:
“THIS AGREEMENT entered into this 17th day of
April, 1943, by and between HOWARD O. BROWN AND ALICE BROWN, his wife, parties
of the first part; and GRACE D. RIEDEL, an unmarried woman, the party of the
second party, WITNESSETH:
“THAT WHEREAS, the parties of the first part
are the legal owners of that certain real property in the City of Pasadena,
County of Los Angeles, State of California, to-wit:
“PARCEL 1: Lot 25 of Slayden and Jones Tract
in the City of Pasadena, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as
recorded in Book 6 Page 159 of Maps in the Office of County Recorder of said
County, EXCEPT the North 10 feet thereof; and
“WHEREAS, said party of the second part is the
legal owner of that certain real property in the City of Pasadena, County and
State aforesaid, adjoining said Parcel 1 on the North, to-wit:
“PARCEL 2: The North 10 feet of Lot 25 and the
South 30 feet of Lot 24 of Slayden and Jones Tract, City of Pasadena, County of
Los Angeles, State of California as per map recorded in Book 6 Page 159 of Maps
in the office of County Recorder of said County; and
“WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to create
a community driveway to be used and enjoyed by the owners of said Parcels 1 and
2 over a tract of land described as follows:
“PARCEL 3: The South 8 feet of the North 14
feet of Lot 25 of Slayden and Jones Tract in the City of Pasadena, County of
Los Angeles, State of California as per map recorded in Book 6 Page 159 of Maps
in the office of County Recorder of said County;
“NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
premises and the sum of one dollar paid by each of the parties to this
agreement to the other party, the parties of the first part do hereby grant to
the party of the second part a perpetual right of way and easement over that
portion of Parcel 3 included within the boundaries of Parcel 1 above described,
and the party of the second part does hereby grant to the parties of the first
part a perpetual right of way and easement over that portion of Parcel 3 included
within the boundaries of said Parcel 2, as a community driveway to be used and
enjoyed for the purposes of ingress and egress by the respective owners of said
Parcels 1 and 2 abbutting [sic] thereon and to remain appurtenant to said
respective properties of the parties hereto. All of the rights, privileges,
benefits and obligations hereby granted, created and provided, shall inure to
and be binding upon the parties hereto, their respective devisees, successors
and assigns.”
(Request for Judicial Notice, actual pages
27–28.)
3. Discussion
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants
seek a temporary restraining order as to the following issues: (1) whether
Defendant/Cross-Complainant and her future tenants can walk along part of
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ property; (2) whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant
can maintain and/or install a “Ring” security camera on an accessory dwelling
unit (ADU); (3) whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant can maintain and/or
construct any obstructions on, along, or across an alleged easement; (4)
whether Defendant/Cross-Complainant is allowed to use an alleged easement in a
manner not contemplated or allowed by that alleged easement; and (5) whether
Defendant/Cross-Complainant can trespass on Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’
property, including but not limited to allowing Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s
dog to use part of Plaintiffs’ property.
The Court
notes that, as stated above, Defendant/Cross-Complainant has not presented any evidence
in opposition to the merits of any aspect of the requested TRO. (See Opposition, filed 10/20/2023.)
The Court
considers each of these issues separately.
1. First
Issue – Walking Along Part of Property
A temporary
restraining order would be inappropriate to prohibit walking upon the Easement.
According to the clear language of the Community Driveway Agreement, the land
upon which there is allegedly an easement is a “community driveway to be used
and enjoyed for the purposes of ingress and egress by the respective owners of
said Parcels 1 and 2”. No evidence has been provided to the Court that would
indicate (1) “ingress and egress” only includes ingress and egress by driving a
vehicle, (2) “ingress and egress” excludes ingress and egress by driving a
vehicle, or (3) that the Parties lack the authority to allow their guests to
use the community driveway for ingress and egress (whether by vehicle or
otherwise) to their own property.
2. Second
Issue – Ring Camera
A temporary
restraining order would also be inappropriate to prohibit use of the Ring
camera. According to
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ own pleading, it appears that the “Ring” security
camera has already been installed and been operating since March 2022.
(Verified First Amended Complaint, ¶ 25.) While damages and/or removal of the
camera might ultimately be appropriate, the status quo for more than a year has
been that the camera is installed and maintained.
3. Third
Issue – Obstructions Along Easement
A temporary
restraining order would be appropriate to prevent Obstructions along the
Easement. The Community Driveway Agreement gives the joint owners of the
alleged easement “a perpetual right of way and easement . . . to be used and
enjoyed for the purposes of ingress and egress by the respective owners of said
Parcels 1 and 2 abbutting [sic] thereon and to remain appurtenant to said
respective properties of the parties hereto. All of the rights, privileges,
benefits and obligations hereby granted, created and provided, shall inure to
and be binding upon the parties hereto, their respective devisees, successors
and assigns.” This language indicates that the construction on or obstruction
of the community driveway could impede the rights, privileges, benefits, and
obligations that arise from the alleged easement. Such construction and/or
obstruction on the community driveway is an appropriate subject for a temporary
restraining order. However, parking on the community driveway is not a
construction or obstruction, so long as that parking allows for continued
ingress and egress to both properties.
4. Fourth
Issue – Use of Easement
A temporary
restraining order would be inappropriate here. Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants have
not clarified exactly what is or is not “contemplated or allowed by the
Community Driveway Agreement.” Without more specifics about what would (and
what would not) be enjoined, the Court cannot properly ascertain whether the
issuance of a temporary restraining order would maintain the status quo.
5. Fifth
Issue – Trespass
A temporary
restraining order would be appropriate to prevent trespass, but solely as to
the portion of Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ real property that is not covered
by the alleged easement. The alleged easement does not give Defendant/Cross-Complainant
the right to enter the land owned by Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants which is not
covered by the alleged easement. This includes trespasses by
Defendant/Cross-Complainant, and/or by Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s guests,
tenants, agents, employees, contractors, and animals.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ Motion for TRO is
GRANTED in part.
A temporary
restraining order is issued as follows:
(1) The
Parties—including Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants and Defendant/Cross-Complainant,
as well as the Parties’ guests, tenants, agents, employees, contractors, and/or
animals—shall not create, construct, and/or maintain any obstructions on,
along, or across the alleged easement described by the Community Driveway
Agreement, excluding parking vehicles in the alleged easement, so long as such
parking allows continued ingress and egress to both properties; and
(2)
Defendant/Cross-Complainant, as well as Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s guests,
tenants, agents, employees, contractors, and/or animals—shall not trespass on
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ property, excluding the area on, along, or across
the alleged easement described by the Community Driveway Agreement.
An
Order to Show Cause is issued regarding why the Court should not issue a
preliminary injunction. The Parties shall appear on November ___, 2023 for a
hearing on this matter. Any arguments concerning the amount of an undertaking
will be heard at that time.
The
Motion for TRO is DENIED as to all other requests for relief.