Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV15784, Date: 2023-11-01 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 23STCV15784 Hearing Date: November 1, 2023 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motions
to Strike
Moving Party: (1)
Defendants Snorkel International, LLC and Snorkel International Holdings, LLC;
and
(2) Defendant Ahern Rentals Inc.
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Daniel Michael Freitas
Defendants Snorkel International, LLC and Snorkel International
Holdings, LLC’s motion to strike is DENIED.
Defendant Ahern Rentals Inc.’s motion to strike is DENIED.
BACKGROUND:
On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff
Daniel Michael Freitas (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Ahern
Rentals (“Ahern”), Snorkel International, LLC, Snorkel International Holdings,
LLC (together “Snorkel”), and State Compensation Insurance Fund.
Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges causes of action for (1) general negligence, (2) negligent undertaking,
(3) strict products liability – design defect, (4) strict products liability –
failure to warn, (5) strict products liability – manufacturing defect, (6)
negligent failure to recall/retrofit, and (7) declaratory relief.
Plaintiff alleges that,
while Plaintiff was working for a third-party employer, Plaintiff was required
to use a scissor lift which was rented out by Defendant Ahern. While Plaintiff
was attempting to use this lift, the controls for the lift did not operate
properly and Plaintiff suffered severe injuries.
On August 17, 2023,
Defendant Snorkel filed this motion to strike the punitive damages allegations
and paragraphs that alleged that Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or
oppression. On August 30, 2023, Defendant Ahern filed a motion to strike
certain paragraphs also alleging that Ahern acted with malice, fraud, or
oppression.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Motion to Strike
A.
Legal Standard
Any party, within the time
allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to
strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or
at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out
any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2)
strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity
with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767,
782.)
In order to state a prima
facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as
stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College.
Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These
statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice is defined in the
statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff
or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital,
Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code, § 3294, subd.
(c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice
within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an
award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and
that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24
Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)
“As amended to include
[despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the
plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of
the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional
component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so
vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be
looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been
described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with
crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269,
1287.)
“In order to survive a motion
to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an
entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing
on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations
of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their
context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike,
courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v.
Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an
intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of
punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of
oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support
such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
159, 166 [footnote omitted].)
“[T]he imposition of punitive
damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of
the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979)
88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are
legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or
intent to injure or deceive. An award of
punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the
corporation’s employees. But the law
does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute
requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the ‘officer[s], director[s], or managing
agent[s].’” (Cruz v. Home Base
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [citation omitted].) As to ratification, “[a] corporation cannot
confirm and accept that which it does not actually know about.’” (Ibid.
[citing College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726 [for
ratification sufficient to justify punitive damages against corporation, there
must be proof that officers, directors, or managing agents had actual knowledge
of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character]].)
B.
Discussion
1. Defendant
Snorkel’s Motion to Strike
Snorkel moves to strike three paragraphs: 47,
64, 80, and the prayer for exemplary and punitive damages. Snorkel argues that
the Complaint does not plead any facts that would tend to show that Defendants
acted with the necessary intent, malice, oppression, or fraud required for punitive
damages.
Snorkel argues that Plaintiff does not plead
any specific fact that shows that Defendants knew that the Lift was defective
and dangerous. Snorkel also argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead specific
facts showing that any of Defendants’ officers, directors, or managing agents
engaged in malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct, or that they ratified
or authorized such conduct.
The Complaint alleges that the joystick of
the Lift was installed backwards, which caused the Lift to be operated in a
confusing and dangerous manner. (Compl. ¶ 37.) The Complaint alleges that
“Defendants and their officers, directors, and managing agents knew that the
subject Lift was defective and dangerous…as a result of prior complaints and
notice from purchasers and users of their lift.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Further,
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants . . . acted with conscious disregard for the
rights, safety and well-being of Plaintiff and other members of the public and
continued to allow the Lifts to be manufactured, distributed, sold, used, and
installed in California… without recall and/or alerting, advising, warning or
otherwise adequately informing purchasers and/or users of the defective and
dangerous Lifts.” (Compl. ¶ 45.) Further, “Defendants . . . failed to alert,
advise, or otherwise adequately inform purchasers and/or users of the Lift
while knowing that the Lifts would not be and/or were not likely to be examined
or inspected for defects by their users.” (Compl. ¶ 46.) The Complaint also
alleges that “Defendants . . . acted . . . and/or failed to take actions
mentioned above, for reasons of economic gain and to save money and increase
their business profits. Defendants consciously, willfully and wantonly decided
that their profits were more valuable and important than human suffering and
life.” (Compl. ¶ 47.)
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that
have a tendency to show that Defendants acted with the necessary intent or
malice required to support a claim for punitive damages. This Complaint is not
similar to the cases that Defendant cites to where the plaintiff merely
incorporates conclusory phrases of “intentional, willful, and fraudulent.” (See
e.g., Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants knew that the Lift was defective and dangerous from
prior complaints, but they failed to recall the product or issue warnings
because of economic motive. These are sufficient factual allegations to show
malice and willful and despicable disregard of public safety.
In Magallanes, the
plaintiff alleged that the manufacturers of a drug knew that the drug was
dangerous and defective because it did not provide a medically safe method to
prevent an abortion or miscarriage and caused injury to the mother or baby, but
Defendants continued to manufacture and distribute this drug for sale and use
by the public. (Magallanes v. Superior Court (1985) 167
Cal.App.3d 878, 882, fn. 1.) The Court of Appeal overturned the trial court
decision, finding that these allegations were sufficient to support a prayer
for punitive damages. (Id. at 883.)
Here, Plaintiff’s
allegations in the Complaint similarly alleged that Defendants knew of the
dangerous defect apparent in the Lift, but failed to issue a recall or warn
consumers, despite knowing that users would not check or look for this defect.
Defendants argue that there are no
allegations showing that they “design[ed], manufacture[d], maintain[ed], and/or
distribute[d] the Lift with the intent to harm or injure users of the Lift.”
(Snorkel Motion, p. 9:25-26.) However, these types of allegations are not
necessary. It is sufficient to allege that Defendants knew of the defect and
danger and acted with malice in failing to recall or warn users about a dangerous
product. (See Magallanes, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d 878, 883.)
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff does not
allege any specific fact that shows that Defendants knew about the defect.
However, less specificity is required if “it appears from the nature of
allegations that defendant must necessarily possess full information,” or if
the “facts lie more in the knowledge of” opposing parties. (Alfaro v. Community
Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) Defendants’ knowledge of a defect is clearly a fact
that is within Defendant’s knowledge; Plaintiff will be able to obtain more
information during discovery.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff does not
plead sufficient facts to show that Defendants’ officers, directors or managing
agents personally engaged in malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct.
However, Plaintiff alleges that “officers, directors and managing agents also
failed to alert, advise, warn or otherwise adequately inform purchasers and/or
users of the Lift while knowing that the Lifts would not be and/or were not
likely to be examined or inspected for defects by their users.” (Compl. ¶ 79.)
Defendants do not cite to any authority that states that Plaintiff needs to
name the exact officers, directors, or managing agent at this stage of the
proceedings. This is another fact that is within Defendants’ knowledge.
As such, Defendant Snorkel’s motion to strike
is DENIED.
2. Defendant
Ahern’s Motion to Strike
Similar to Defendant Snorkel’s motion to
strike, Defendant Ahern moves to strike twelve paragraphs (43-45, 47, 60-62,
64, 76-78, 80) and the prayer for exemplary and punitive damages. In these
paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges facts and conclusions about Defendants’ intent,
knowledge, malice, or conscious disregard of the rights, safety and well-being
of Plaintiff and other members of the public.
Most of Ahern’s arguments are similar to
Defendant Snorkel’s arguments that the Complaint lacks the requisite
specificity of showing malice and intent. These arguments are resolved based on
the reasoning above.
However, Ahern also argues that the facts are
not specifically pled with respect to Ahern. The Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff’s employer rented the allegedly dangerous and defective Lift from
Ahern. (Compl. ¶ 14-15.) Ahern argues that there are no specific facts in the
Complaint showing malice with respect to Ahern, especially considering that
Ahern did not manufacture or design the Lift, but only rented the Lift to
Plaintiff.
However, reading the allegations in the
Complaint liberally, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants knew of the defect,
including Ahern, and, despite having this knowledge of this dangerous defect,
Ahern continued to supply the Lift to Plaintiff’s employer without providing
warnings. These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to state a
claim for punitive damages against Defendant Ahern.
Defendant Ahern’s motion to strike is
DENIED.
C.
Conclusion
Defendant’s Motions to Strike are
DENIED.