Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV21245, Date: 2023-12-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21245 Hearing Date: February 28, 2024 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Demurrer to Complaint
Moving Party: Defendant
Jaccoma Maultsby, in propria persona
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan
The Demurrer is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
The Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
BACKGROUND:
On September 1, 2023,
Plaintiff Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan filed its Verified Complaint against
Defendants Linda J. Maultsby and All Unknown Occupants, Tenants, and Subtenants
on a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
On September 6, 2023,
Plaintiff filed Notices of Unlawful Detainer (Eviction).
On November 8, 2023,
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby filed her Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession.
On November 16, 2023,
the Court ordered that Defendant Linda J. Maultsby may be served by posting a
copy of the summons and complaint on the premises in a manner most likely to
give actual notice to her, and by immediately mailing, by certified mail, a
copy of the summons and complaint to her and her last known address.
On December 20, 2023,
Plaintiff filed Judicial Council Form POS-010, Proof of Service Summons, which
stated that Defendant Linda J. Maultsby was served on December 14, 2023 by
posting on the premises in a conspicuous place and by mailing.
On January 4, 2024,
by request of Plaintiff, the Clerk’s Office entered default on Defendant Linda
J. Maultsby.
On January 31, 2024,
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby, in propria persona, filed her Demurrer to
Complaint.
On February 14, 2024,
Plaintiff filed its Opposition to the Demurrer.
On February 21, 2024,
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby filed her Reply in support of her Demurrer.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Legal Standard
“The party
against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by
demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or
more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
“When any ground
for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face
thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take
judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the
pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)
“A demurrer to a
complaint or cross-complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or
cross-complaint or to any of the causes of action stated therein.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.50, subd. (a).)
“In reviewing the sufficiency
of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules.
We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially
noticed. Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985)
39 Cal.3d 311, 318, citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)
II.
Discussion
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby demurs to the Complaint, arguing: (1) the
notice to vacate is fatally defective; (2) the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this cause of action because the Complaint was filed before
the time given in the notice expired; (3) that Plaintiff does not have legal
capacity to sue or the Complaint does not state facts sufficient to show
standing; and (4) that the Complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. (Demurrer, pp. 5:2, 5:13–15, 6:1–3, 9:21–22.)
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing: (1) that the notice to vacate complies
with applicable law; (2) that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because
the case was timely filed; (3) that the capacity challenges fail; and (4) that
Plaintiff is not required to change its name and it is not a trust.
(Opposition, pp. 3:1, 4:1–2, 5:1, 6:21–22, 7:1.)
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby reiterates her arguments in her Reply.
B. Sufficiency and Certainty of the Allegations
1. Legal Standard
“The party against whom a complaint or
cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in
Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
[¶]
“(e)¿The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
“(f)¿The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision,
‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.”
(Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subds. (e)–(f).)
2. Discussion
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby demurs on the bases that the Complaint is
uncertain and does not sufficiently state facts to constitute a cause of
action.
The Court disagrees with these
arguments.
The Complaint is sufficiently certain, unambiguous, and intelligible.
It sufficiently alleges facts upon which relief can be granted.
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer on the
bases of insufficiency and uncertainty.
C. Standing and Capacity to Sue
1. Legal Standard
“The party against whom a complaint or
cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in
Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (b).)
“[T]he question of standing to sue is different from that of
capacity. Incapacity is merely a legal disability, such as infancy or insanity,
which deprives a party of the right to come into court.¿The right to relief, on
the other hand, goes to the existence of a cause of action. . . . Where the
complaint states a cause of action in someone, but not in the plaintiff, a
general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action will be sustained.” (Parker
v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351.)
2. Discussion
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby demurs on the bases that Plaintiff lacks
capacity and standing.
The Court disagrees with these arguments.
For the purposes of a demurrer, the Court must assume the truth of the
allegations in the pleading. Here, Plaintiff alleges that is the owner of the
real property at issue. (Verified Complaint, ¶ 1.) That allegation is
sufficient for Plaintiff to have standing for an unlawful detainer cause of
action regarding this real property. Furthermore, Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby
has not made the Court aware of a reason why Plaintiff would lack capacity to
sue (for example, by arguing that Plaintiff is a suspended corporate entity).
The arguments made by Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby (regarding fictitious
personhood, real-parties-in-interest, and trusts) are unavailing.
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer on the bases of standing and capacity.
D. The Notice to Vacate
1. Legal Standard
“In any of the following cases, a person
who holds over and continues in possession of a manufactured home, mobilehome,
floating home, or real property after a three-day written notice to quit the
property has been served upon the person, or if there is a subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as prescribed in Section
1162, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this chapter:
“(1) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a writ
of execution against such person, or a person under whom such person claims,
and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.
“(2) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a
writ of sale, upon the foreclosure by proceedings taken as prescribed in this
code of a mortgage, or under an express power of sale contained therein,
executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the
title under the foreclosure has been duly perfected.
“(3) Where the property has been sold in accordance
with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed
of trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims,
and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.
“(4) Where the property has been sold by such person,
or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has
been duly perfected.
“(5) Where the property has been sold in accordance
with Section 18037.5 of the Health and Safety Code under the default provisions
of a conditional sale contract or security agreement executed by such person,
or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has
been duly perfected.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §
1161a, subd. (b).)
2. Discussion
Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby demurs on the basis that the three-day
notice to quit the property was defective and thus the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this matter.
The Court agrees with this argument.
Plaintiff attached to the Complaint a
copy of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, recorded and filed in the Official
Records of the Recorder’s Office for Los Angeles County, California.
(Complaint, Exh. 1.) The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale purportedly shows, among
other things, that “Mural Media LLC 401K Plan” owns an undivided 47.618%
interest in the real property at issue. (Ibid.) The Verified Complaint
further alleges that “Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan” is the “owner of the real
property.” (Complaint, ¶ 1.) (Notably, the Verified Complaint omits any mention
of the other current owners of the real property, who appear to collectively
own more than 50% of the real property.) But the “notice” states that “the new
legal owner of this Property is Real Time Resolutions, Inc.,” not “Mural Media
LLC 401K Plan.” (Complaint, Exh. 2, p. 1.)
“It is true that where the purchaser at
a trustee’s sale proceeds under section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure he
must prove his acquisition of title by purchase at the sale . . . .” (Cheney
v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159, citations omitted.) “In an action
for unlawful detainer, section 1161a therefore necessarily requires proof that
the property was ‘duly sold . . .’ and that ‘the title under the sale has been
duly perfected.’” (Seidell v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942) 55
Cal.App.2d 913, 920, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a.) In the context of Code
of Civil Procedure section 1161a, a defective notice will be fatal to the
judgment “if it can be shown that the error has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.” (Johnson v. Hapke (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 255, 261, citation
omitted.)
Here, the “notice” was defective because
it did not give proper notice to the occupants of the real property that the
real property had in fact been sold. Even if the occupants saw the notice and
had the insight to check the Official Records of Los Angeles County to
determine if a nonjudicial foreclosure had occurred and been recorded, they
would have seen Mural Media LLC 401K Plan — not Real Time Resolutions, Inc. In
order words, the occupants would have had no notice or reason to believe that
the actual owner of their real property was seeking repossession of the
premises that they lived in.
Plaintiff admits that a mistake was made, calling it a “typo.”
(Opposition, p. 3:2–10.) Yet Plaintiff argues that the notice is fine because
“other parts of the Notice to Vacate correctly identify Plaintiff as the owner
of the subject property and the party that was issuing the Notice to Vacate.” (Ibid.,
emphases omitted.)
The Court disagrees.
First, the notice does not make it clear that Plaintiff is the property
owner. Only at the very end of the notice is the name “Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan”
listed, and even then, it is not clarified in any way that would indicate this
entity is the actual owner of the real property.
Second,
unlawful detainer
proceedings are “limited in scope and demand strict adherence to the statutes’
procedural requirements.” (Stancil v. Super. Ct. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381,
390.) Unlawful detainer cases filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
1161 are regularly dismissed for even the most minute defects in notice. (ESA Mgmt., LLC v. Jacob (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 3, holding
that a notice that did not include the amount of rent due or any information to
permit the tenant to cure the default made the notice “fatally defective.”) In
situations like this one, where the statute requires a “three-day written notice
to quit the property” in situations where “the property has been sold,”
anything less than notice to current occupants that the actual current owner is
seeking repossession does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a
and is “fatally defective.”
Because the three-day notice is fatally defective, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a, subd.
(b).) Therefore, the Court cannot grant leave to amend because such leave would
be futile. (Am. Nat’l Bank of Santa Monica v. Johnson (124 Cal.App.Supp.
783, 787.)
The Court notes two
ancillary issues, neither of which were discussed in the pleadings.
First, Plaintiff’s “notice” — which does not state that it is a
three-day notice to quit the property — is ambiguous. Instead of clearly
stating in the title and the body of the notice that it is a three-day notice
to quit the property, Plaintiff wrote an ambiguous notice that requires the
individuals who receive the notice to figure out whether they are subject a
three-, thirty-, or ninety-day notice to quit the property. The Court is aware
that a similar notice was served in another case. (See, The Bank of New York
Mellon v. Preciado (2013) 224 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4.) However, the
validity of such a notice was not squarely challenged, and the Court doubts
that such notice could survive a strict application of the language of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1161a, which only discusses three-day notices. While it
may not be an issue for an occupant to receive more time than legally required
(for example, ninety days when only sixty days is required), it would be highly
prejudicial to occupants to be forced out of their homes after three days if
they were mistakenly under the belief that they had sixty days because of a
notice’s fundamental ambiguity. (Compare with ESA Mgmt., LLC, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 at p. 4 [“A notice period longer than the three days set
forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision 2 is certainly
permitted.”].)
Second, “[i]n an action regarding residential real property based on
Section 1161a, the plaintiff shall state in the caption of the complaint
‘Action based on Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161a.’” (Code Civ. Proc., §
1166, subd. (c).) Plaintiff has not complied with this procedural requirement.
Instead of listing the required language in the caption of the Complaint,
Plaintiff has only written the following in the footer: “Verified Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer Under CCP § 1161a.” Again, unlawful
detainer proceedings are “limited in scope and demand strict adherence to the
statutes’ procedural requirements.” (Stancil, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 390.) Unlike the failure to attach certain documents, the statute does
not explicitly include the right to amend for failure to include the required
caption statement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1166, subd. (d)(2) [“If the
plaintiff fails to attach the documents required by this subdivision, the court
shall grant leave to amend the complaint for a five-day period in order to
include the required attachments.”].) Given the explicit requirement to amend
for document omissions, the Court presumes that the Legislature knew how to
require such amendments and chose not to require them for caption omissions.
III.
Conclusion
The Demurrer is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
The Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.