Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV21399, Date: 2024-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21399 Hearing Date: January 17, 2024 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Demurrer to the Complaint
Moving Party: Defendants
Band of Outlaws and Renee Mytar
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Runway Fash Inc.
The Demurrer is OVERRULED.
On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff Runway Fash Inc. filed
its Complaint against Defendants Band of Outlaws, Renee Mytar, and Alan Luu on
causes of action arising from the Parties’ business relationships.
On November 3, 2023, Defendant Alan Luu filed an Answer
to the Complaint.
On December 1, 2023, Defendants Band of Outlaws and Renee
Mytar (“Defendants”) filed their Demurrer to the Complaint.
On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Opposition to
the Demurrer.
On December 19, 2023, Defendants filed their Reply to the
Demurrer.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Legal
Standard
“The party
against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by
demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or
more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
“When any ground
for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face
thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take
judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the
pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)
“A demurrer to a
complaint or cross-complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or
cross-complaint or to any of the causes of action stated therein.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.50, subd. (a).)
“In reviewing the sufficiency
of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules.
We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially
noticed. Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985)
39 Cal.3d 311, 318, citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)
II.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the entire Complaint, as well as to each of the
twelve causes of action within it.
A.
Demur
to the Entire Complaint
1.
Legal
Standard
“The party against whom a complaint or
cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in
Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
. . .
“(e)¿The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
“(f)¿The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’
includes ambiguous and unintelligible.”
(Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subds. (e)–(f).)
2.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the entire Complaint, arguing that it is uncertain
and does not allege the facts upon which relief can be granted. (Demurrer, p.
10:8–9.)
The Court disagrees with this argument.
The Complaint is sufficiently certain, unambiguous and intelligible, and
sufficiently alleges facts upon which relief can be granted.
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the
entire Complaint.
B.
First
Through Fifth Causes of Action — Breach of Contract
1.
Legal
Standard
To state a cause of action for breach of
contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the
contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3)
defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis
W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
If a breach of contract claim “is based on
alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the
body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and
incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.)
“In an action based on a written contract, a
plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise
language.” (Constr. Protection Servs., Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198–199.)
2.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the first five causes of action for breach of
action, arguing: (1) that the first four of these causes of action do not
succeed because the Parties’ agreement from 2023 contains an integration
clause; and (2) that the fifth cause of action for breach of contract does not
succeed because Exhibit 6 attached to the Complaint shows that Plaintiff did
not perform under their agreement from 2023. (Demurrer, pp. 13:23–24,
14:25–26.)
Among other things, Plaintiff alleges:
(1) that the Parties have multiple contracts; (2) that Plaintiff performed
under the contracts; (3) that Defendants breached the contracts; and (4) that
Plaintiff was harmed because of those breaches. (Complaint, ¶¶ 12–39.)
The pleading sufficiently alleges each
of the elements for the causes of action for breach of contract. Moreover, on a
demurrer, the Court must assume the truth of the allegations. Disputes over
facts or mixed questions of fact and law, such as whether Plaintiff actually
performed under the relevant contract(s), are inappropriate for resolution on a
demurrer.
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the
first five causes of action for breach of contract.
C.
Sixth
Cause of Action — Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1.
Legal
Standard
“A breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty
itself and it has been held that bad faith implies unfair dealing rather than
mistaken judgment.” (Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc.
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394.)
“If the allegations do not go beyond the
statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts,
simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion
contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no
additional claim is actually stated. . . . [T]he only justification for
asserting a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is to
obtain a tort recovery.” (Careau & Co., supra, at pp.
1394–1395.)
To recover in tort for breach of the implied
covenant, the defendant must “have acted unreasonably or without proper cause.”
(Careau & Co., supra, at p. 1395, citations and italics
omitted.)
2.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the sixth cause of action for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, arguing: (1) that this cause of action
must fail because the breach of contract causes of action failed; and (2) that
this cause of action must fail because it is duplicative of the breach of
contract causes of action. (Demurrer, p. 16:4–8.)
The Court disagrees with these arguments.
First, the predicate for Defendants’ first argument is missing, because
the Court overruled the Demurrer to the breach of contract causes of action.
Second, a cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is not duplicative of a cause of action for breach of
contract. Even if it were, “[t]he court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any
error, improper ruling, instruction, or defect, in the pleadings and
proceedings which, in the opinion of said court, does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties. . . .”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)
The Court
OVERRULES the Demurrer to the sixth cause of action for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
D.
Seventh
Cause of Action — Fraud
1.
Legal
Standard
“The elements of fraud are (a) a
misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b)
scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d)
justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town
Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)
The elements of a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation include “[m]isrepresentation of a past or existing
material fact, without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and with
intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented; ignorance of
the truth and justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party to
whom it was directed; and resulting damage.” (Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v.
Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
1145, 1154, quotation marks omitted.)
The facts constituting the alleged fraud must
be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the
policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked.
(Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)
To properly allege fraud against a
corporation, the plaintiff must plead the names of the persons allegedly making
the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what
they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)
2.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the seventh cause of action for fraud, arguing: (1)
that the allegations do not meet the heightened pleading requirements for a
cause of action for fraud; and (2) that the allegations are actually breach of
contract allegations that have morphed into fraud allegations. (Demurrer, p.
17:3–5.)
Plaintiff alleges: (1) that Defendants made representations to
Plaintiff, including representations about that certain funds would be used to
perform marketing work; (2) that these representations were not true as
Defendants used the funds in other ways, such as by embezzling at least
$55,800.00 of the advertising budget; (3) that these representations were made
with the intent to defraud Plaintiff; (4) that when Defendants made these
representations, they knew them to be false; (5) that Defendants made these
representations to induce Plaintiff to act in reliance on these
representations; (6) that at the time these representations were made by
Defendants, Plaintiff did not know they were false and Plaintiff thus relied on
those representations; and (7) that Plaintiff was harmed by its reliance on the
intentional misrepresentations. (Complaint, ¶¶ 47–52.)
The pleading sufficiently alleges each of the elements of a cause of
action for fraud and meets the heightened pleading requirements for this cause
of action.
Further, this cause of action is not a mere restatement of the cause of
action for breach of contract. Even if it were, such pleading does not affect
the substantial rights of the Parties and thus must be ignored on a demurrer. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 475.)
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the
seventh cause of action for fraud.
E.
Eighth
and Ninths Cause of Action — Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic
Relations and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relations
1.
Legal
Standard
The elements of a claim for intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage include “(1) an economic
relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability
of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of
the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent acts on the part of the
defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the
relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the
acts of the defendant.” (Crown Imports, LLC v. Super. Ct. (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404, citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.)
Further, “the alleged interference must have
been wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. For
an act to be sufficiently independently wrongful, it must be unlawful, that is,
it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or
other determinable legal standard.” (Crown Imports, LLC, supra,
at p. 1404, citation, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted.)
“[A]n actor’s breach of contract, without more,
is not ‘wrongful conduct’ capable of supporting a tort, including the tort of
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage.” (Drink Tank
Ventures LLC v. Real Soda in Real Bottles, Ltd. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 528,
533, citations omitted.)
2. Discussion
Defendants demur to the eighth cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations (which is also known as
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage), arguing that
Plaintiff has not identified a specific third party with whom Plaintiff had an
existing economic relationship. (Demurrer, p. 17:10–12.)
Defendants also demur to this cause of action, as well as to the ninth
cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic relations,
on the basis that Plaintiff has not alleged actions that were independently
wrongful. (Demurrer, p. 18:6–8.)
Plaintiff opposes the Demurrer, arguing:
(1) that this information is within Defendants’ knowledge since they destroyed
and/or prevented access to Plaintiff’s data, including Plaintiff’s historical
data in marketing to certain target clients; (2) that Plaintiff has listed
eight specific instances of how Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s economic
relations; (3) that Plaintiff need not provide more particularity than it
already has; and (4) that Plaintiff has pleaded independent wrongs, such as
violation of the unfair competition law and conversion. (Opposition, p.
15:13–26.)
The Court disagrees with Defendants’
arguments.
First, Plaintiff has alleged various
independent wrongs, such as fraud and conversion.
Second, Plaintiff alleges inter alia
that it “had numerous economic relationships with its customers and clients
that probably would have resulted in significant economic benefits to
Plaintiff.” (Complaint, ¶ 55.)
Although this allegation does not include any names of third parties or
provide more information that would help the Court determine whether there is
actually a probability of future economic benefit to Plaintiff, the Court must
assume the truth of the allegation for the purposes of a demurrer. The Parties
have not made the Court aware of any case law that requires the identification
of such third parties and the prospective economic advantage in the Complaint
at the demurrer stage. Of course, it will ultimately be Plaintiff’s burden to
show these items in order to obtain the relief it seeks.
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the eighth cause of action for
intentional interference with prospective economic relations and the ninth
cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic relations.
F.
Tenth
Cause of Action — Defamation Per Se
1.
Legal
Standard
“Defamation
is effected by either of the following: (a) Libel. (b) Slander.” (Civ. Code, §
44.)
“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing,
printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which
exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation.” (Civ. Code, § 45.)
“A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the
necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other
extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not
libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves
that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damage
is defined in Section 48a of this code.” (Civ. Code, § 45a.)
“Slander
is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also
communications by radio or any mechanical or other means which:
“1. Charges any person with
crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime;
“2. Imputes in him the present
existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease;
“3. Tends directly to injure
him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing
to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other
occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his
office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen
its profits;
“4. Imputes to him impotence or
a want of chastity; or
“5. Which, by natural
consequence, causes actual damage.”
(Civ.
Code, § 46.)
“‘The sine
qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the existence of falsehood.’
Because the statement must contain a provable falsehood, courts distinguish
between statements of fact and statements of opinion¿for purposes of defamation
liability.¿Although statements of fact may be actionable as libel, statements
of opinion are constitutionally protected.” (McGarry v. Univ. of San Diego (2007)
154 Cla.App.4th 97, 112, quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin (1974) 418
U.S. 264, 283.)
“[T]he question is not strictly whether the published statement is fact or opinion.
Rather, the dispositive question is whether a reasonable fact finder could
conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion
of fact.” (Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375,
385, citations omitted.)
“Whether a statement declares or
implies a provable false assertion of fact is a question of law for the court
to decide, unless the statement is susceptible of both an innocent and a
libelous meaning, in which case the jury must decide how the statement was
understood.” (Franklin, supra, at p. 385, citations omitted.)
“To determine whether a statement is
actionable fact or nonactionable opinion, we apply a totality of the
circumstances test pursuant to which we consider both the language of the statement
itself and the context in which it is made.” (Summit Bank v. Rogers
(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 669, 696, citation omitted.)
“In
an action for defamation per se, the meaning is so clear from the face of the
statement that the damages can be presumed. However, that presumption does not mean [a plaintiff] does
not anticipate injury; nor does it mean there is no injury.” (Tilkey v.
Allstate Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 521, 542, citation omitted.)
“Defamation
requires both falsity and injury to reputation; the defamation per se analysis
focuses on the latter, and even if context is necessary to show falsity it
might not be needed for reputational harm. But a harmful meaning must still be
clear to constitute defamation per se.” (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
652, 690, citations omitted.)
2.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the tenth cause of action for defamation per se,
arguing: (1) that there was no defamation for the alleged slander because
Plaintiff actually had not paid money owed to Defendants and was in default
under the terms of their contract; (2) that, pursuant to Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (c), this statement is privileged if made without malice; and (3)
that there is no allegation that the purported defamatory statement was made with
actual malice. (Demurrer, p. 19:15–24.)
The Court disagrees with Defendants’ arguments.
First, among other things, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that Defendants told
Third Party Song Kim that Plaintiff failed to pay monies to Defendants
regarding Third Party Song Kim’s services performed for the benefit of
Plaintiff; (2) that these representations were false as Plaintiff did pay
Defendants the fees associated with Third Party Song Kim’s services; and (3)
that this defamatory conduct was malicious. (Complaint, ¶¶ 65–69.) The Court
must assume the truth of the pleadings, and the pleadings contain sufficient
allegations for a trier of fact to find that all the elements of defamation per
se are present. (Civ. Code, §§ 45, 45a, 46.) Specifically, if false, the libel
and/or slander alleged could be found by a trier of fact to injure Plaintiff in
its occupation or have a natural tendency to lessen its profits. (Ibid.)
Whether the allegation is true or false is a factual question inappropriate for
determination on a demurrer.
“A privilege
publication or broadcast is one made: . . . In a communication, without malice,
to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by
one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a
reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be
innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the
information. . . .” (Civil Code §47(c).)
This portion of the subdivision has
remained intact for decades. The omitted, latter portion of the subdivision
discusses instances of employment, which merely clarify how the subdivision
works in certain employment situations. However, the subdivision has always
involved communications broader than just employment matters.
“Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (c) codifies the common law privilege
of common interest, which protected communications made in good faith on a
subject in which the speaker and hearer shared an interest or duty. This
privilege applied to a narrow range of private interests. The
interest protected was private or pecuniary; the relationship between the
parties was close, e.g., a family, business, or organizational interest; and
the request for information must have been in the course of the relationship. . . . One
authority explains the statutory interest as follows: (1) The ‘interest’
applies to a defendant who is protecting his own pecuniary or proprietary
interest. (2) The required ‘relation’ between the parties to the communication
is a contractual, business or similar relationship, such as between partners,
corporate officers and members of incorporated associations, or between union
members and union officers. (3) The request referred to must have been in the
course of a business or professional relationship.
“This
definition is not exclusive, however, and the cases have taken an ‘eclectic
approach’ toward interpreting the statute. The lesson we deduce from these
cases is that the scope of the privilege under section 47, subdivision 3 [now subd. (c)] is not capable
of precise or categorical definition, and that its application in a particular
case depends upon an evaluation of the competing interests which defamation law and the
privilege are designed to serve.
“The common interest
privilege is usually described as a qualified or conditional one, meaning it
can be overcome by a showing of malice. But, this characterization is
somewhat misleading. Section 47(3) [now § 47, subd. (c)] defines a privileged communication as
one made without malice. Thus, if malice is shown, the privilege is not merely
overcome; it never arises in the first instance. Malice for purposes of the
statute means a state of mind arising from hatred or
ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person. Malice is not
inferred from the communication. (Civ. Code, § 48.)
“Application
of the privilege involves a two-step analysis. The defendant has the initial
burden of showing the allegedly defamatory statement was made on a privileged
occasion, whereupon the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the defendant
made the statement with malice. The existence of the privilege is ordinarily a
question of law for the court.” (Kashian v.
Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 914–915 [cleaned up].)
Here, the Complaint does not contain
many details about the context in which the allegedly false and defamatory
publication was made or the type of business relationship between the Parties
and third parties. Rather, the pleading only contains the allegation that
Defendants “told [Third Party] Kim that, Plaintiff failed to pay monies to [Defendant]
Band of Outlaws and as a result, [Defendants] could not pay [Third Party] Kim
for his digital marketing services that he performed for the benefit of
Plaintiff under the 2023 Agreement.” (Complaint, ¶ 65.)
Based on these limited allegations, it
does not appear that there was a close business relationship between Defendants
and Third Party Song Kim — at least not of the type envisioned by Civil Code
section 47, subdivision (c). Without such a sharing of “interest” as that term
is used in subdivision (c), there is no litigation privilege. (Kashian, supra,
98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 914–915.)
Finally, as to malice, it is not a
requirement of defamation for there to be malice. Rather, as discussed in the
paragraphs above about the litigation privilege, the presence of malice would
mean the litigation privilege never arises in the first place. (Kashian,
supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.) Because Plaintiff has alleged
that Defendants’ allegedly defamatory conduct was malicious and the Court must
assume the truth of this allegation, the Court must overrule the Demurrer on
the basis of litigation privilege pursuant to Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (c). (Complaint, ¶ 69.)
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the
tenth cause of action for defamation per se.
G.
Eleventh
Cause of Action — Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200
1.
Legal
Standard
“As used in this chapter,
unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500)
of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17200.)
2.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the eleventh cause of action for violation of
Business and Professions Code section 17200 (also known as the “unfair
competition law” or the “UCL”), arguing: (1) Plaintiff does not allege an
independent statute, regulation, or law of which Defendants are in violation;
(2) that Plaintiff does not meet the unlawful prong; (3) that Plaintiff does
not meet the unfair prong; and (4) that Plaintiff does not meet the fraudulent
prong. (Demurrer, pp. 20:20, 21:1–3, 21:20.)
The Court disagrees with Defendants’
arguments.
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants
engaged in outright fraud, unfair conduct (e.g., embezzling funds meant for
social media campaigns), and unlawful conduct (e.g., defamation per se, fraud,
etc.) These allegations are sufficient for the eleventh cause of action to
withstand demur.
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the
eleventh cause of action for violation of the UCL.
H.
Twelfth
Cause of Action — Conversion
1.
Legal
Standard
“Conversion is
the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of
a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of
the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition
of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1225, 1240.)
“It is not necessary that there be a manual
taking of the property; it is only necessary to show an assumption of control
or ownership over the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the
property to his own use. Money can be the subject of an action for conversion
if a specific sum capable of identification is involved. Neither legal title nor
absolute ownership of the property is necessary. A party need only allege it is
entitled to immediate possession at the time of conversion. However, a mere
contractual right of payment, without more, will not suffice.” (Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 451–52 [cleaned up].)
2.
Discussion
Defendants demur to the twelfth cause of action for conversion,
arguing: (1) that Plaintiff did not have the right to the accounts at issue;
(2) that Defendants had a contractual right to withhold transferring ownership
if Plaintiff did not pay its invoices; and (3) that Plaintiff’s allegations
that Defendants stole Plaintiff’s accounts, applications, and budgets are
unintelligible, ambiguous, and contradicted by evidence attached to the
Complaint itself. (Demurrer, pp. 22:15–21, 23:3–8.)
The Court disagrees with Defendants’ arguments.
Among other things, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that Plaintiff possessed or
had a right to possess multiple, specifically-listed accounts, applications,
budgets, service fees, and refund amounts; (2) that Defendants substantially
interfered with Plaintiff’s property by knowingly or intentionally preventing
Plaintiff from having access to specifically-listed accounts and applications;
(3) that Defendants wrongfully took possession of Plaintiff’s
specifically-listed budgets, service fees, and refund amounts; (4) that
Plaintiff did not consent to Defendants’ conduct; (5) that Plaintiff was harmed
by Defendants’ conduct; and (6) that Defendants’ conduct was a substantial
factor in causing Plaintiff harm. (Complaint, ¶¶ 77–81.)
The pleading sufficiently alleges all of the elements for a cause of
action of conversion, and the allegations cross well beyond issues with “a mere
contractual right of payment.” (Farmers, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 451–452.) Further, as previously stated, the pleading is sufficiently
intelligible and unambiguous, and the Court must assume the truth of the
allegations made.
The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the twelfth cause of action for
conversion.
III.
Conclusion
The Demurrer is OVERRULED.