Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV24378, Date: 2024-05-17 Tentative Ruling
The Court often posts its tentative several days in advance of the hearing. Please re-check the tentative rulings the day before the hearing to be sure that the Court has not revised the ruling since the time it was posted.
Please call the clerk at (213) 633-0154 by 4:00 pm. the court day before the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative.
Case Number: 23STCV24378 Hearing Date: May 17, 2024 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Request for
Default Judgment
Moving Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
Resp. Party: Defendant
Group Atom Development Inc.
SUBJECT: Request for
Default Judgment
Moving Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
Resp. Party: Defendant
Jose Carlos Uribe
SUBJECT: Request for
Default Judgment
Moving Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
Resp. Party: Defendant
Miguel Uribe
SUBJECT: Request for
Default Judgment
Moving Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
Resp. Party: Defendant
Israel Jimenez Miron
SUBJECT: Request for
Default Judgment
Moving Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
Resp. Party: Defendant
Jose Miguel Salisone Rosas
SUBJECT: Motion to Set
Aside Default
Moving Party: Defendant Group Atom Development Inc.
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
SUBJECT: Motion to Set
Aside Default
Moving Party: Defendant Jose Carlos Uribe
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
SUBJECT: Motion to Set
Aside Default
Moving Party: Defendant Miguel Uribe
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
SUBJECT: Motion to Set
Aside Default
Moving Party: Defendant Israel Jimenez Miron
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
SUBJECT: Motion to Set
Aside Default
Moving Party: Defendant Jose Miguel Salisone Rosas
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC
The Motions to Set
Aside Default are DENIED without prejudice.
The Requests for Default
Judgment are CONTINUED to June 14, 2024.
BACKGROUND:
On October 6,
2023, Plaintiff Sunny and 80 LLC filed its Complaint against Defendants Group
Atom Development Inc., Jose Carlos Uribe, Miguel Uribe, Israel Jimenez Miron
(erroneously sued as “Israel Jimeniz Miron”), and Jose Miguel Salisone Rosas on
causes of action arising from alleged construction work without a license in
violation of the Business and Profession Code.
On January 4,
2024, by request of Plaintiff, the Clerk’s Office entered default on each of
the Defendants.
On February
16 and 20, 2024, Plaintiff submitted filed Judicial Council Form CIV-100,
Request for Court Judgment for each of the Defendants, as well as other
documents in support of Plaintiff’s Requests for Default Judgment.
On February
20, 2024, by request of Plaintiff, the Clerk’s Office dismissed without
prejudice the doe defendants from the Complaint.
On March 4,
2024, each of the Defendants filed their own Motion to Set Aside Default. In
addition, each of the individual Defendants filed a declaration, and one
request for judicial notice was filed.
On March 4,
2024, Plaintiff filed amended versions of Judicial Council Form JUD-100,
Proposed Judgment regarding all Defendants except Defendant Israel Jimenez
Miron.
On March 8,
2024, by request of Plaintiff, the Clerk’s Office entered default on Defendant
Israel Jimenez Miron. (Default was re-entered due to a prior issue with this
Defendant’s incorrect name in the pleading.) Plaintiff also submitted a
declaration in support of Plaintiff’s Request for Default Judgment against Defendant
Israel Jimenez Miron.
On April 29,
2024, Plaintiff filed Oppositions to each of the five Motions to Set Aside
Default. In support of each Opposition, Plaintiff concurrently filed: (1)
Declaration of William F. Bresee; (2) Supplemental Declaration of William F.
Bresee; (3) Request for Judicial Notice; and (4) Proof of Service.
On May 9,
2024, Defendants filed their Omnibus Reply in support of their Motions to Set
Aside Default.
On May 13,
2024, Plaintiff filed its Objection to Defendants Omnibus Reply.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Objection
Plaintiff’s Counsel filed a document it
titled “Objection to Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Set Aside
Entry of Default.”
There appears to be some confusion within the
Objection. In some parts of the Objection, Plaintiff’s Counsel refers to “Defendants’
Opposition to the Motions to Set Aside Default.” (Objection, pp. 1:18–19,
2:7–8.) In other parts of the Object, Plaintiff’s Counsel refers to Defendants’
“reply.” (Id. at p. 1:20–23.)
To clarify, Defendants moved
to vacate the defaults entered against them, and they have filed a single
“Omnibus Reply” in support of their individual Motions to Set Aside Default.
Plaintiff is the party that filed multiple Oppositions to the individual Motions
to Set Aside Default.
Plaintiff’s Counsel argues
that the Omnibus Reply “is late and respectfully should not be considered by
the Court” because the Omnibus Reply “was filed on May 9, 2024, but was due on
May 6, 2024.” (Objection, p. 1:20–23.)
“All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with
the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all
reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1005, subd. (b), abridged.)
The hearing on the Motions
to Set Aside Default is May 17, 2024. Nine court days before the hearing was
May 6, 2024; five days court days before the hearing was May 10, 2024. As the
Oppositions were all filed on April 29, 2024 and the Omnibus Reply was filed on
May 9, 2024, it appears all the responsive papers in this matter were timely
filed.
The Objection is OVERRULED.
II. Requests
for Judicial Notice
A. Defendants’
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendants request that the Court take
judicial notice of a complaint filed in Case No. 23STCV17548, SoCal Lien
Solutions LLC v. Sunny and 80 LLC, et al., filed on July 26, 2023 in the
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
The Court GRANTS judicial
notice of this item.
B. Plaintiff’s
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff requests that the Court take
judicial notice of a first amended complaint filed in Case No. 23STCV18712, Evolution
Design LLC v. Group Atom Development Inc., et al., filed on October 6, 2023
in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
The Court GRANTS judicial
notice of this item.
III. Legal
Standard
“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his
or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be
accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed
therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made
within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment,
dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . . No affidavit or declaration of
merits shall be required of the moving party. Notwithstanding any other
requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for
relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper
form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or
her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting
default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result
in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal
entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or
dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect. The court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an
attorney’s affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable
compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties. However, this
section shall not lengthen the time within which an action shall be brought to
trial pursuant to Section 583.310.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
IV. Discussion
A. The
Parties’ Arguments
Defendants move the Court to set aside the
defaults entered against them. (Motions to Set Aside Default, p. 4:18–19.)
Defendants argue that relief is appropriate
here pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) due to
their inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect because they thought that
another entity was handling the dispute with Plaintiff in another case.
(Motions to Set Aside Default, p. 3:17–20.)
Defendants submit declarations that attest
under penalty of perjury to the same. (Decls. Miguel Uribe; Jose Carlos Uribe;
Israel Jimenez Miron; Jose Miguel Salisone Rosas.)
Defendants note that they do not present a
proposed answer because they plan to demur that the earlier action precludes
the instant action. (Id. at p. 21–23.)
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing: (1) that
Defendants have not shown any credible or competent evidence of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect sufficient to relieve them from default;
(2) that Defense Counsel’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s action against Defendants
as being separate and distinct from the earlier litigation is imputed to
Defendants, and the inexcusable neglect and failure to respond does not justify
setting aside the default; (3) that the Motions to Set Aside Default should be
denied because Defendants did not submit a proposed responsive pleading; and
(4) that if the Court does set aside the entry of default, attorney’s fees
should be imposed against Defendants and fully paid as a condition precedent
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (c)(1).
(Oppositions, pp. 7, 12–14.)
Defendants reiterate their
arguments in their Omnibus Reply.
B. Discussion
Defendants have shown credible and competent
evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect.
Specifically, Defendants submitted declaratory evidence that indicates they
were confused about the multiple ongoing actions, did not realize this was a
separate action, and did not realize they needed to respond to this separate
action.
The Court does not agree with Plaintiff that
Defense Counsel’s knowledge should be imputed to Defendants. The Court has not
been presented with evidence that would indicate Defense Counsel (a) actually
had such knowledge and/or (b) actually transmitted such knowledge to any of the
Defendants.
The Court also does not agree that attorney’s
fees are appropriate here. Defendants claim that this was a mistake by
Defendants, not by Defense Counsel. Further, this appears to have been a
reasonable mistake.
However, the Court still cannot set aside any
of the defaults.
“Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the
answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the
application shall not be granted . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
This has been a strictly-enforced rule for over 100 years. (See Bailiff v.
Hildebrandt (1920) 47 Cal.App. 564, 566–567.)
Defense Counsel did not submit a proposed
answer, demurrer, or other pleading to be filed upon setting aside of the
default. Instead, Defense Counsel appears to believe that the statute first
requires setting aside the default before a proposed demurrer is to be
presented to the Court. (Motions to Set Aside Default, p. 3:21–23.) This is incorrect. As stated above, “Application for this relief shall be
accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed
therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, . . .” (CCP §473(b).)
Because Defense Counsel did not provide an
accompanying pleading, the Court must deny the motions.
The Court shall continue the Requests for
Default Judgment by one month. Defense Counsel may re-file the motions with the
accompanying pleading to be heard no later than the date of the continued
hearings on the Request for Default Judgment.
V.
Conclusion
The Motions to Set
Aside Default are DENIED without prejudice.
The Requests for Default
Judgment are CONTINUED to June 14, 2024.