Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case Number: 23STCV25809, Date: 2024-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV25809, Date: 2024-04-11 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23STCV25809 Hearing Date: April 11, 2024 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Demurrer

Moving Party: Defendant Burbank Rogers Place I, LLC

Resp. Party: Plaintiff John Hopson

SUBJECT: Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendant Burbank Rogers Place I, LLC

Resp. Party: Plaintiff John Hopson

The Demurrer is OVERRULED.

The Motion to Strike is DENIED.

BACKGROUND:

On October 23, 2023, Plaintiff John Hopson filed his Complaint against Defendants Burbank Rogers Place I, LLC and Luxe at Burbank on causes of action arising from Plaintiff’s tenancy with Defendants.

On March 4, 2023, Defendant Burbank Rogers Place I, LLC (“Defendant”) filed its Demurrer and its Motion to Strike. In support of each of these filings, Defendant concurrently filed a Declaration of Samuel D. Frasher and a Proposed Order.

On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Oppositions to the Demurrer and the Motion to Strike.

On April 4, 2024, Defendant filed its Replies in support of the Demurrer and the Motion to Strike.

ANALYSIS:

I. Demurrer

A. Legal Standard

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)

“A demurrer to a complaint or cross-complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or cross-complaint or to any of the causes of action stated therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.50, subd. (a).)

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)

B. Discussion

Defendant demurs to the second through sixth causes of action in the Complaint.

1. Second Cause of Action — Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability

a. Legal Standard

To establish a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs must establish (1) “the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability,” (2) “notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition,” (3) “the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and” (4) “resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)

b. Discussion

Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability, arguing that the pleading is ambiguous about the allegedly uninhabitable conditions. (Demurrer, p. 4:11–22.)

The Court disagrees with this argument.

Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that the following conditions were allowed at the subject property during Plaintiff’s tenancy: (1) leaking roof; (2) infestation of insects; (3) defective plumbing; and (4) rodents and vermin. (Complaint, ¶ 11.)

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability.

2. Third Cause of Action — Nuisance

a. Legal Standard

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.)

“A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480.)

“Every nuisance not included in the definition of the last section is private.” (Civ. Code, § 3481.)

“The remedies against a private nuisance are: 1. A civil action; or, 2. Abatement.” (Civ. Code, § 3501.)

The elements of an action for private nuisance are: (1) the plaintiff must prove an interference with their use and enjoyment of their property; (2) the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; (3) the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262–63, quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938.)

b. Discussion

Defendant demurs to the third cause of action for nuisance, arguing: (1) that the allegations are uncertain and ambiguous; and (2) that portions of the cause of action are barred by the landlord-tenant relationship. (Demurrer, p. 5:1, 5:10.) Defendant further demurs that this cause of action is redundant with the fifth cause of action for negligence. (Reply, p. 2:14–15.)

The Court disagrees with Defendant’s arguments.

Among other things, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that the conditions discussed regarding the second cause of action have interfered with Plaintiff’s comfortable enjoyment of the subject property; (2) that the interferences were substantial; (3) that the interferences were indecent and offensive to the senses of Plaintiff and the public at large; and (4) Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries from Defendant’s failure to abate the nuisance. (Complaint, ¶ 38–41.)

These allegations are sufficiently certain and unambiguous to withstand demur.

Further, the Court is unaware of any authority for the proposition that a legal relationship (as opposed to a third-party relationship) will obviate a claim for nuisance. Rather, case law contains numerous examples of tenants suing landlords for nuisance claims. (See, for example, Peviani v. Arbors at Cal. Oaks. Prop. Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 880, 890–898.)

Finally, even if the third and fifth causes of action are duplicative in that they are simply different theories of liability, “[t]he court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any error, improper ruling, instruction, or defect, in the pleadings or proceedings which, in the opinion of said court, does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Arguing duplicative theories does not affect the Parties’ substantial rights. Thus, it is not appropriate at this stage for the Court to prevent such alternate theories of liability.

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the third cause of action for nuisance.

3. Fourth Cause of Action — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

a. Legal Standard

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.)

b. Discussion

Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, arguing: (1) that Plaintiff is trying to convert a negligence claim into an intentional tort in order to claim punitive and exemplary damages; (2) that the acts alleged are not so extreme and outrageous to exceed all bounds of human decency; (3) that the allegations are conclusory; and (4) that not all the elements of the cause of action have been alleged. (Demurrer, pp. 6:17–7:1.)

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ arguments.

Among other things, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that that Defendant’s conduct of failing to maintain the subject property and allowing slum living conditions to persist is extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) that Plaintiff suffered severe mental and emotional distress; and (3) that Defendant’s conduct is the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s distress. (Complaint, ¶¶ 48–50.)

These allegations sufficiently address each of elements for this cause of action and are not conclusory. Furthermore, a trier of fact could reasonably find that the conditions alleged do constitute extreme and outrageous conduct that implicates tort liability.

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

4. Fifth Cause of Action — Negligence

a. Legal Standard

In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

b. Discussion

Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action for negligence, arguing that the allegations are uncertain and ambiguous because the conditions are never described. (Demurrer, p. 7:9–15.)

The Court disagrees with this argument.

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the fifth cause of action for negligence.

5. Sixth Cause of Action — Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4

a. Legal Standard

“A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice:

(1) “The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

(2) “A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

(3) “The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

(4) “The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.”

(Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a)(1)–(4).)

b. Discussion

Defendant demurs to the sixth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, arguing that the allegations are uncertain and ambiguous regarding: (1) the conditions cited; (2) the government housing enforcement agency referred to; and (3) any citation. (Demurrer, pp. 7:22–8:4.)

The Court disagrees with this argument.

In addition, Plaintiff alleges: (1) “[a]t various times during plaintiffs’ tenancies a public officer responsible for the enforcement of housing laws noted the substandard conditions in the SUBJECT PROPERTY and ordered the defendants by written notice . . . to abate the nuisances and/or repair the substandard conditions . . . ”; (2) that Defendant did not abate the conditions within 35 days of the issuance of the notices; and (3) that Defendants continued to demand and accept rent and illegally served 3-Day Notices to Pay Rent or Quit, both in violation of Civil Code section 1942.4. (Complaint, ¶¶ 63–65.)

These allegations are sufficiently certain and unambiguous for the cause of action to withstand demur. Furthermore, for the purposes of a demurrer, the Court must assume the truth of the allegations. A copy of the alleged notices need not be attached to the Complaint.

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the sixth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.

C. Conclusion

The Demurrer is OVERRULED.

II. Motion to Strike

A. Legal Standard

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

“(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

“(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a).)

B. Discussion

Defendant moves the Court to strike Plaintiff’s allegations that implicate punitive and/or exemplary damages, as well as Plaintiff’s prayers for such relief and for attorney’s fees. (Motion to Strike, p. 2:1–10.)

The Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument.

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. Plaintiff is entitled to so allege; it will ultimately be Plaintiff’s burden to prove that he is entitled to the relief he seeks.¿¿

C. Conclusion

The Motion to Strike is DENIED.