Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV27034, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV27034 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or
Dismiss Judicial Proceedings
Moving Party: Defendant
West Covina Auto Retail, Inc.
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Kaitlyn Limpias
The Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND:
On November 3, 2023,
Plaintiff Kaitlyn Limpias filed her Complaint against Defendant West Covina
Auto Retail, Inc. on causes of action arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of an
automobile from Defendant.
On December 11, 2023,
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (FAC).
On January 19, 2024,
Defendant filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Judicial
Proceedings (“Motion”). Defendant concurrently filed its Proposed Order.
On January 31, 2024,
Plaintiff filed her Opposition to the Motion. Plaintiff concurrently filed
Declaration of Michael A. Klitzke.
On February 8, 2024,
Defendant filed its Reply in support of the Motion.
On February 9, 2024,
Plaintiff filed her Objection.
On March 19, 2024,
the Court heard Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. After oral argument,
the Court allowed each side to file a supplemental brief and continued the
hearing until April 3, 2024.
On
March 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Supplemental Brief. In support of
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief, Plaintiff concurrently filed Declaration of
Kaitlyn Limpias.
On
March 27, 2024, Defendant filed its Supplemental Brief.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Evidentiary
Objection
Plaintiff filed an objection
to portions of Defendant’s Reply. These allegedly objectionable portions of the
Reply are mere assertions in a memorandum, not evidence of any kind.
The
Objection is OVERRULED.
II.
Legal
Standard
“A written agreement to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any
contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.)
“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement
alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and
that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court
shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if
it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists [unless it
makes certain determinations].” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)
“Under both federal and state law, arbitration
agreements are valid and enforceable, unless they are revocable for reasons
under state law that would render any contract revocable. . . . Reasons that would render any
contract revocable under state law include fraud, duress, and
unconscionability.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
231, 239, citations omitted.)
“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an
arbitration agreement.¿The party opposing the petition bears the burden of
establishing a defense to the agreement's enforcement by a preponderance of the
evidence.¿In determining whether there is a duty to arbitrate, the trial court
must, at least to some extent, examine and construe the agreement.” (Tiri,
supra, at p. 239.)
III. Discussion
A. The
Parties’ Arguments
Defendant moves the Court to: (1) compel Plaintiff to
arbitrate this matter with the American Arbitration Association; and (2) stay
this case pending the completion of arbitration. (Motion, p. 13:3–6.)
Defendant argues: (1) that there is a
valid arbitration agreement which subjects Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); (2) that the arbitration agreement may
also be enforced through the procedures set forth in the California Arbitration
Act (CAA); (3) that the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable; and (4)
that the case must be stayed during the period from when the application to
arbitration is pending through the conclusion of arbitration. (Motion, pp. 9:6,
10:1–2, 11:1, 12:12–13.)
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing: (1) that
Defendant did not establish an arbitration agreement exists because Defendant
did not lay a proper foundation for its exhibit; (2) that Defendant did not
establish that they made a pre-motion demand for arbitration or that Plaintiff
refused to arbitrate as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2; and
(3) that grounds exist to revoke the purchase contract. (Opposition, pp. 2:1–2,
2:20–22, 3:14.)
In its Reply, Defendant argues: (1) that
a valid arbitration agreement exists; (2) that the arbitration clause is not
procedurally or substantively unconscionable; and (3) that any provisions found
to be offending can be severed. (Reply, pp. 2:19, 3:12, 4:7, 5:9.)
In her Supplemental Brief, Plaintiff
reiterates her argument that she did not sign an arbitration agreement.
In its Supplemental Brief, Defendant
argues: (1) that the Court need only make a finding of the agreement’s
existence, not its validity; (2) that Defendant had met its initial burden by
attaching the agreement to the petition to compel arbitration; (3) that
Plaintiff did not allege the agreement was not signed in FAC or the Opposition;
and (4) that the agreement is not unconscionable. (Defendant’s Supplemental
Brief, pp. 2:21–26, 3:1–11, 4:16–23.)
B. Whether
an Arbitration Agreement Exists
“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an
arbitration agreement.” (Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 239.)
Here, Defendant submits the Declaration of Gen
Balouev for the purposes of authenticating the purported arbitration agreement.
(Motion, Decl. Balouev and Exh. A.) However, as Plaintiff correctly notes, Gen
Balouev (who is the General Manager for Defendant) discusses the Retail
Installment Sale Contract (RISC) as having a “front” and a “back.” (Motion,
Decl. Balouev, ¶¶ 3–4; Opposition, p. 2:6–14.) This description of the contract
does not match the RISC submitted to the Court, which is six pages in length
and does not have a “front” or “back” demarcated. Thus, the Declaration of Gen
Balouev does not sufficiently lay a proper foundation for authentication of the
purported RISC and the arbitration agreement contained within it.
Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that she did not sign
the RISC. (Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief, 1:17.) She submits prior examples of
her signature to support her declaration that the RISC does not contain her
signature. (Decl. Limpias, Exhs. 3–9; see also Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief,
p. 2:1–25.) In addition to obvious differences in the styles of writing between
the exemplars and the signature on the RISC, it is notable that the signature
on the RISC appears to misspell Plaintiff’s last name by omitting the “s” in
“Limpias.” (Ibid.)
In contrast, Defendant has not provided any
additional evidence that would indicate: (1) there is proper authentication for
the RISC; or (2) that Plaintiff actually signed the RISC. Rather, Defendant
merely argues two points:
· First,
Defendant argues that it has met its initial burden by simply submitting the RISC. This is incorrect, because the RISC agreement
submitted by Defendant has not been properly authenticated; and
· Second,
that the burden is now on Plaintiff regarding validity of the agreement. This too is incorrect, because Defendant has
not yet met its initial burden in establishing the existence of the agreement.
Defendant has not met its initial burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that an arbitration agreement between it and
Ms. Limpias exists. Even had Defendant
met its initial burden, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to show that
the signature on the RISC agreement submitted by Defendant is not her
signature.
IV.
Conclusion
The Motion is DENIED.