Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV28273, Date: 2024-03-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV28273 Hearing Date: March 22, 2024 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Demurrer
Moving Party: Defendant
State Farm General Insurance Company
Resp. Party: None
SUBJECT: Motion to
Strike
Moving Party: Defendant
State Farm General Insurance Company
Resp. Party: None
The Demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the third cause of action for loss of
boat enjoyment, with 30 days leave for Plaintiff to amend the Complaint. The
Demurrer is OVERRULED as to all else.
The Motion to Strike is DENIED.
BACKGROUND:
On November 17, 2023, Plaintiff Jose Angel Manaiza, Jr., who is
litigating this matter in propria persona, filed his Complaint against
Defendant State Farm General Insurance Company (sued as State Farm Automobile
Insurance Company) on causes of action of breach of contract, insurance bad
faith, loss of boat enjoyment, general discrimination, unequal compensation,
failure to honor contract equally, and failure to prevent discrimination.
On February 27, 2024, Defendant filed: (1) Demurrer to the Complaint;
and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint.
No opposition or other response has been filed regarding the Demurrer
and Motion to Strike.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Demurrer
A. Legal Standard
“The party
against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by
demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or
more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
“When any ground
for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face
thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take
judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the
pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)
“A demurrer to a
complaint or cross-complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or
cross-complaint or to any of the causes of action stated therein.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.50, subd. (a).)
“In reviewing the sufficiency
of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules.
We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially
noticed. Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985)
39 Cal.3d 311, 318, citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)
B. Discussion
Defendant demurs to the entire Complaint and each of its causes of
action, arguing: (1) that the entire Complaint is uncertain because there are
no factual allegations within any claim; (2) that Plaintiff does not allege the
terms of any contract or facts to allege a claim for breach of contract; (3)
that Plaintiff does not allege unreasonable conduct necessary to allege a claim
for bad faith; (4) that Plaintiff does not allege facts to state a cause of
action for “loss of boat enjoyment,” which is uncertain and ambiguous; and (5)
that Plaintiff’s Unruh causes of action do not allege any cause of action.
(Demurrer, pp. 7:9–10, 8:5–6, 8:23–24, 10:4–5, 10:21–22.)
Plaintiff, who is litigating this matter in propria persona,
does not oppose or otherwise respond to the Demurrer.
The Court disagrees with most of Defendant’s arguments.
(1)
The Complaint has sufficient factual allegations to be certain,
both as a whole and for each of the causes of action. (Complaint, pp. 2:4,
2:24–27, 3:1–17.)
(2) “In an action based on a written contract, a
plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise
language.” (Constr. Protection Servs., Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198–199.) Here, Plaintiff alleged that he has an
insurance contract with Defendant regarding a boat. (Complaint, p. 2:24–27.)
That allegation is sufficient to plead a cause of action for breach of
contract.
(3)
Among other things, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant prolonged the insurance claims process for multiple years,
issued a check and then cancelled it, left Plaintiff uncompensated, and
discriminatorily (on the basis of race) relied on false testimony in order to
deny Plaintiff’s insurance claim. (Complaint, pp. 3:4–14.) These allegations
are sufficient for both claims of bad faith and discriminatory conduct in
violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
However, the Court is unaware of a cause of action for “loss of boat
enjoyment.” Because there may be other causes of action that more accurately
describe what Plaintiff alleges to have suffered, it would be appropriate to
sustain the demur to this cause of action with leave to amend the Complaint.
C. Conclusion
The Demurrer is SUSTAINED in part.
The Demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the third cause of action for loss of
boat enjoyment, with 30 days leave for Plaintiff to amend the Complaint. The
Demurrer is OVERRULED as to all else.
II.
Motion to Strike
A. Legal Standard
“Any party,
within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of
motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall
not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd.
(b)(1).)
“The court may, upon a motion made
pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper:
“(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading.
“(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §
436.)
“The grounds for
a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from
any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
“A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must
quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to
strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications
in a notice must be numbered consecutively.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1322(a).)
B. Discussion
Defendant moves the Court to strike Plaintiff’s allegations and prayer
for punitive damages, arguing that they are not supported by a factual showing
of malice, oppression, or fraud. (Motion to Strike, p. 4:21–23.)
The Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument.
Plaintiff is allowed to allege that Defendant acted with malice,
oppression, or fraud. Plaintiff is also allowed to pray for relief on that
basis. It will ultimately be Plaintiff’s burden to prove that he is entitled to
the relief that he seeks.
C. Conclusion
The Motion to Strike is DENIED.