Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case Number: 23STCV30852, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 23STCV30852, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV30852 Hearing Date: February 26, 2024 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Demurrer

Moving Party: Defendants Onni Management California, Inc. and Onni Real Estate IX, L.L.C.

Resp. Party: Plaintiffs Marquis Crosby, Daniel Boghossian, Saleema Naitaqi, Carlos Machado, Pearl Hernandez, Martha Hernandez, Chibugo Udechukwu, Jiahao Lu, Wenhao Shou, Min Kim, Sung Kim, Brianna Barnes, Abai Dunbar, Paris Dunbar, Caplon Mu, Youssef Atlam, Jesse Reyes, Natalia Morales, Axel Gonzalez, Robert Yang, Joshua Oler, Mable Oler, Elysha Puga, Allen Felahy, Khalida Bradford, Omar Aniff, Tamara Hall, Emerson Striveson, Priyank Ahir, Zeyel Nash, Monet Smith, Morris Smith, Jesus Luevanos, Kervin Voyard, Alanna Morris, Junwoo Lee, Tri-Neli Houston, Jessica Heins, Erik Heins, Jonathan Campillo, and Xuanshan Cai

SUBJECT: Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendants Onni Management California, Inc. and Onni Real Estate IX, L.L.C.

The Demurrer is OVERRULED.

The Motion to Strike is DENIED.

BACKGROUND:

On December 18, 2023, Plaintiffs Marquis Crosby, Daniel Boghossian, Saleema Naitaqi, Carlos Machado, Pearl Hernandez, Martha Hernandez, Chibugo Udechukwu, Jiahao Lu, Wenhao Shou, Min Kim, Sung Kim, Brianna Barnes, Abai Dunbar, Paris Dunbar, Caplon Mu, Youssef Atlam, Jesse Reyes, Natalia Morales, Axel Gonzalez, Robert Yang, Joshua Oler, Mable Oler, Elysha Puga, Allen Felahy, Khalida Bradford, Omar Aniff, Tamara Hall, Emerson Striveson, Priyank Ahir, Zeyel Nash, Monet Smith, Morris Smith, Jesus Luevanos, Kervin Voyard, Alanna Morris, Junwoo Lee, Tri-Neli Houston, Jessica Heins, Erik Heins, Jonathan Campillo, and Xuanshan Cai filed their Complaint against Defendants Onni Management California, Inc. and Onni Real Estate IX, LLC. The Complaint pleads causes of action for violations of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, invasion of privacy, and declaratory relief.

On January 19, 2024, Defendants filed: (1) Demurrer; and (2) Motion to Strike. With each of these filings, Defendants concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Ava Claypool; and (2) Proposed Order.

On February 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Oppositions to the Demurrer and the Motion to Strike.

On February 16, 2024, Defendants filed their Replies in support of the Demurrer and the Motion to Strike.

ANALYSIS:

I. Demurrer

A. Legal Standard

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of” various grounds listed in statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)

“A demurrer to a complaint or cross-complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or cross-complaint or to any of the causes of action stated therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.50, subd. (a).)

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)

B. Discussion

Defendants demur to the second and third causes of action in the Complaint.

1. Second Cause of Action — Invasion of Privacy

a. Legal Standard

“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)

“In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 [26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633] (Hill), this court established a framework for analyzing constitutional invasion of privacy claims. An actionable claim requires three essential elements: (1) the claimant must possess a legally protected privacy interest (id. at p. 35); (2) the claimant's expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable (id. at pp. 36–37); and (3) the invasion of privacy complained of must be serious in both its nature and scope (id. at p. 37). If the claimant establishes all three required elements, the strength of that privacy interest is balanced against countervailing interests. (Id. at pp. 37–38.) In general, the court should not proceed to balancing unless a satisfactory threshold showing is made. A defendant is entitled to prevail if it negates any of the three required elements. (Id. at p. 40; see Pioneer Electronics, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 373.) A defendant can also prevail at the balancing stage. An otherwise actionable invasion of privacy may be legally justified if it substantively furthers one or more legitimate competing interests. (Hill, at p. 40.) Conversely, the invasion may be unjustified if the claimant can point to ‘feasible and effective alternatives’ with ‘a lesser impact on privacy interests.’ (Ibid.)” (Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Cnty. Emp. Rel. Comm. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926.)

b. Discussion

Defendants demur to the second cause of action for invasion of privacy, arguing: (1) that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim because they admit they consented to the release of their information and thus cannot allege they had a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) Plaintiffs do not allege a serious invasion of privacy. (Demurrer, pp. 6:6–11, 7:4–9.)

The Court disagrees with these arguments.

Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they consented to the investigative consumer reports. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “required Plaintiffs to complete an ‘Application’ and to consent to a release of information” but that Defendants did not have Plaintiffs fill out a “consent form” or provide Plaintiffs with any means “by which Plaintiffs could indicate that he or she wished to receive a copy of any report prepared in connection with the application.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 56, 62.) Whether the “consent” given here was applicable to the investigative consumer reports, sufficient to waive an invasion of privacy cause of action, or knowingly given all involve questions of fact. Thus, this issue is not suitable for resolution on demurrer.

As to the seriousness of the invasion, a trier of fact could reasonably determine that obtaining an investigative consumer report on a prospective tenant is a serious violation of the prospective tenants’ privacy rights. Indeed, the Legislature recognized as much in its findings when it created the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act. (Civ. Code, § 1786.) It is also notable that the Legislature explicitly wrote that “[n]othing in [the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act] shall in any way affect the right of any consumer to maintain an action against an investigative consumer reporting agency, a user of an investigative consumer report, or an informant for invasion of privacy or defamation. (Civ. Code, § 1786.52, emphasis added.)

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the second cause of action for invasion of privacy.

2. Third Cause of Action — Declaratory Relief

a. Legal Standard

“To qualify for declaratory relief, a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909, quotation marks and brackets omitted.)

A cause of action for declaratory relief should not be used as a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues raised in another cause of action. (Gen. of Am. Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.) “The availability of another form of relief that is adequate will usually justify refusal to grant declaratory relief” (Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Super. Ct. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624), and a duplicative cause of action is subject to demurrer (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290).

Further, “there is no basis for declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved.” (Osseous Tech. of Am., Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 366, quotation marks omitted.)

b. Discussion

Defendants demur to the third cause of action for declaratory relief, arguing that there is no actual, present controversy. (Demurrer, p. 8:1–4.)

The Court disagrees with this argument.

Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that a judicial declaration of their rights is important to (a) stop Defendants from violating the law regarding ongoing applications to live in the apartments at issue and (b) stop Defendants from violating the law regarding these Plaintiffs’ lease renewals and recertifications. (Complaint, ¶¶ 87–90.)

If Defendants actually do obtain and/or use investigative consumer reports, whether for new tenant applications or upon renewal and/or recertification of existing tenants’ leases, then this is an ongoing controversy upon which declaratory relief would be appropriate. For the purposes of a demurrer, the Court must assume the truth of the allegations made.

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to the third cause of action for declaratory relief.

C. Conclusion

The Demurrer is OVERRULED.

II. Motion to Strike

A. Legal Standard

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

“(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

“(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a).)

B. Discussion

Defendants move the Court to strike sections of the Complaint that request (1) injunctive relief under the first cause of action, (2) declaratory and injunctive relief with their third cause of action, and (3) punitive damages. Defendants argue that each of these requests for relief is improper and must be stricken. (Motion to Strike, pp. 2:13–14, 2:21–22, 4:6.)

The Court disagrees with these arguments.

These requests for relief are not irrelevant, false, or improper. Plaintiffs are entitled to plead these requests for relief. It will ultimately be Plaintiffs’ burden to provide that they are entitled to the relief they seek.

C. Conclusion

The Motion to Strike is DENIED.