Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case Number: 24STCV01118, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 24STCV01118, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01118 Hearing Date: March 5, 2024 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Motion to Strike Portion of the Complaint

Moving Party: Defendant Continental Currency Services, Inc.

Resp. Party: Plaintiff Dwain Lammey

The Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

The Motion to Strike is GRANTED. The phrase “and the Unruh Civil Rights Act” is STRICKEN from page 9, lines 6–7 of the Complaint.

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:

Plaintiff claims in his opposition that “[t]his motion is wasteful, as even arguendo, if Defendant’s claims were valid, it would have no impact on this litigation.” (Opposition, p. 8:5.) Plaintiff reiterates this point by stating that “[i]t is unclear what value the instant motion provides to a defendant. . . leaving plaintiff to wonder if it was automatically filed. . . .” (Opposition, p. 8:7-19.) If Plaintiff is correct that granting this motion would not affect his litigation, then why did Plaintiff spend hours preparing and filing an opposition instead of just stipulating to the striking of the six words at issue in this motion?

BACKGROUND:

On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff Dwain Lammey filed his Verified Complaint against Defendants Numero Uno Acquisitions, LLC and Continental Currency Services, Inc. regarding violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA).

On February 5, 2024, Defendant Continental Currency Services, Inc. (“Defendant”) filed its Motion to Strike Portion of the Complaint (“Motion”). In support of its Motion, Defendant concurrently filed Request for Judicial Notice.

On February 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Opposition to the Motion. In support of his Opposition, Plaintiff concurrently filed Declaration of Dennis Price.

On February 26, 2024, Defendant filed its Reply in support of its Motion.

ANALYSIS:

I. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of various statutes and certain legislative history.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice.

II. Legal Standard

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

“(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

“(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a).)

III. Discussion

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant moves the Court to strike Plaintiff’s request for affirmative injunctive relief pursuant to the UCRA. (Motion, pp. 1:18–24, 19:6–14.)

Plaintiff disagrees, arguing: (1) that the semantics of the statute indicate that injunctive relief should be broader, not narrower; and (2) that UCRA is a remedial statute, citing various statutory sections and cases. (Opposition, pp. 2:8, 3:14.)

In its Reply, Defendant argues: (1) that none of the cases cited by Plaintiff addresses the meaning of preventive relief in Civil Code section 52, subdivision (c); (2) that a liberal interpretation of the relevant section cannot rewrite the statutory scheme; (3) that the UCRA does not incorporate federal procedural law regarding injunctive relief; and (4) that Civil Code section 55.56 does not imply mandatory or affirmative injunctive relief in the UCRA. (Reply, pp. 2:11–12, 3:12–13, 4:22–23, 6:6.)

B. The Relevant Statutes

“This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (a).)

“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).)

“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any construction, alteration, repair, structural or otherwise, or modification of any sort whatsoever, beyond that construction, alteration, repair, or modification that is otherwise required by other provisions of law, to any new or existing establishment, facility, building, improvement, or any other structure, nor shall anything in this section be construed to augment, restrict, or alter in any way the authority of the State Architect to require construction, alteration, repair, or modifications that the State Architect otherwise possesses pursuant to other laws.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (d).)

“A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (f).)

“Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6.” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a).)

“Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in conduct of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights described in this section, and that conduct is of that nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of those rights, . . . any person aggrieved by the conduct may bring a civil action in the appropriate court by filing with it a complaint. The complaint shall contain the following: . . . (3) A request for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for the conduct, as the complainant deems necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights described in this section.” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (c)(3).)

“This section does not require any construction, alteration, repair, structural or otherwise, or modification of any sort whatsoever, beyond that construction, alteration, repair, or modification that is otherwise required by other provisions of law, to any new or existing establishment, facility, building, improvement, or any other structure, nor does this section augment, restrict, or alter in any way the authority of the State Architect to require construction, alteration, repair, or modifications that the State Architect otherwise possesses pursuant to other laws.” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (g).)

“This part shall be known, and may be cited, as the Construction-Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provisions of this part shall apply to any construction-related accessibility claim, as defined in this part, including, but not limited to, any claim brought under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55.” (Civ. Code, § 55.51.)

“‘Construction-related accessibility standard’ means a provision, standard, or regulation under state or federal law requiring compliance with standards for making new construction and existing facilities accessible to persons with disabilities, including, but not limited to, any provision, standard, or regulation set forth in Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55 of this code, Section 19955.5 of the Health and Safety Code, the California Building Standards Code (Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations), the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq.), and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (Appendix A to Part 36 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations).” (Civ. Code, § 55.52, subd. (a)(6).)

“Statutory damages under either subdivision (a) of Section 52 or subdivision (a) of Section 54.3 may be recovered in a construction-related accessibility claim against a place of public accommodation only if a violation or violations of one or more construction-related accessibility standards denied the plaintiff full and equal access to the place of public accommodation on a particular occasion.” (Civ. Code, § 55.56, subd. (a).)

“This section does not alter the applicable law for the awarding of injunctive or other equitable relief for a violation or violations of one or more construction-related accessibility standards, nor alter any legal obligation of a party to mitigate damages.” (Civ. Code, § 55.56, subd. (h).)

C. Discussion

The Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”) has “broad preventive and remedial purposes” and “must be construed liberally in order to carry out its purpose.” (White v. Square, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1019, 1025, quotations and internal quotation marks omitted; see also Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 666; Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 167.)

The issue before the Court is whether the UCRA require the relief requested by Plalintiff, which include the “remov[al of] all presently existing architectural barriers” that Plaintiff faced, including the “[i]nstallation of a compliant sales and service counter to allow wheelchair users to conduct their transactions at a compliant height”?

The answer is “no.”

There are two relevant statutory provisions that involve injunctive relief: Civil Code section 52, subdivision (c)(3) and Civil Code section 55.56, subdivision (h).

The phrase “preventive relief” in Civil Code section 52, subdivision (c)(3) is important. While injunctive relief is available in various contexts in Civil Code sections 51 through 55.57, this is the only time the word “preventive” is used to qualify injunctive relief in those statutes. (See, for example, Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b) [injunctive relief in the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act]; Civ. Code, §§ 52.45, subd. (a) and 52.5, subd. (a) [injunctive relief in contexts where individuals have been subjected to sexual orientation violence and human trafficking, respectively]; Civ. Code, § 54.3, subd. (b) [injunctive relief in contexts where individuals have been denied or interfered with admittance to or enjoyment of public facilities].) If the Legislature had intended for the injunctive relief in Civil Code section 52 to be available for violations that had already occurred, the Legislature could have left out the word “preventive.” It obviously chose not to do so.

Furthermore, Civil Code section 55.56, subdivision (h) does not broaden the availability of injunctive relief. Rather, by its own terms, it “does not alter the applicable law for the awarding of injunctive or other equitable relief” for cases that involve at least one violation of construction-related accessibility standards. In other words, Civil Code section 55.56, subdivision (h) requires another statute — like Civil Code section 52, subdivision (c)(3) — in order for there to be any injunctive relief for cases like this, where the primary allegation is that there has been a violation of construction-related accessibility standards.

The Legislature has given explicit clarifications as to what type and manner of injunctive relief is available.

In summary, the UCRA does not authorize the removal of presently existing architectural barriers, unless such removal is “required by other provisions of law.” It might be that other laws (like the ADA, the Building Standards Code, or specific sections in the Health and Safety Code) require such removal as a requirement and/or remedy. (Civ. Code, § 55.52, subd. (a)(6).) And it is notable that “[a] violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] shall also constitute of violation of [the UCRA].” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (f).) But while the UCRA itself has broad preventive and remedial purposes, as well as broad preventive and remedial requirements and remedies, the UCRA does not require or allow affirmative injunctive relief that would remove “presently existing architectural barriers.”

IV. Conclusion

The Motion to Strike is GRANTED. The phrase “and the Unruh Civil Rights Act” is STRICKEN from page 9, lines 6–7 of the Complaint.