Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: BC490644, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC490644 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion to Quash or Modify Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to the Coronado Shores Company, Inc.
Moving Party: Judgment Debtor Paris Rashad Benson
Resp. Party: Judgment Creditor Matthew Loguidice
The Motion to Quash is DENIED.
Attorney’s fees are AWARDED in favor of Judgment Creditor and against Judgment Debtor in the amount of $1,500.00.
BACKGROUND:
On August 22, 2012, Plaintiff Matthew Loguidice filed his Complaint against Defendant Paris Rashad Benson on causes of action regarding business transactions the Parties were engaged in.
On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint.
On November 2, 2020, the Court entered Judgment for Plaintiff (now “Judgment Creditor”) and against Defendants Paris Rashad Benson (a.k.a. Paris Benson), The Alfree Group, Inc., The Alfree Group, and The Altree Investments, LLC (now “Judgment Debtors”), jointly and severally, in the total amount of $374,985.47.
Post-judgment enforcement hearings have been ongoing since 2023.
On February 6, 2024, Judgment Debtor filed his Motion to Quash or Modify Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to The Coronado Shores Company, Inc. (“Motion to Quash”). In support of his Motion to Quash, Judgment Debtor concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Jordan Matthews; and (2) Proposed Order.
On March 20, 2024, Judgment Creditor filed his Opposition to the Motion to Quash.
On March 26, 2024, Judgment Debtor filed his Reply in support of his Motion to Quash. Judgment Debtor concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Paris Benson; and (2) Declaration of Jordan Matthews.
ANALYSIS:
I. Legal Standard
“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)
“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).)
“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.420, subd. (b).)
Courts have considerable discretion in granting and crafting protective orders. (Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.)
II. Discussion
A. The Subpoenas at Issue
On January 12, 2024, Judgment Creditor served Judicial Council Form SUBP-010, Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records (“Deposition Subpoena”) on The Coronado Shores Company, Inc. (Decl. Matthews, Exh. A [actual page 8 of 38].)
The records requested are:
“Any and all
· “Copies of checks/rental payments made for or on behalf of Paris Benson related to the leased property at 6408 La Jolla Scenic Dr. S. La Jolla, CA 92037 from January 1, 2023 to present.
· “Copies of any communications between The Coronado Shores Co., Inc. and Paris Benson from January 1, 2023 to present.
· “Copies of any communications between The Coronado Shores Co., Inc. and Benson Kindness, LLC from January 1, 2023 to present.
· “Copies of any communications related to the leased property at 6408 La Scenic Dr. S. La Jolla, CA 92037 from January 1, 2023 to present.
· “Copy of the current lease/rental agreement for the leased property.”
(Decl. Matthews, Exh. A, Attachment 3 [actual page 9 of 38].)
B. The Parties’ Arguments
Judgment Debtor moves the Court to quash or otherwise modify the Deposition Subpoena. (Motion to Quash, p. 7:5–6.)
Judgment Debtor argues: (1) that Judgment Creditor seeks documents that are entirely irrelevant to this matter; (2) that Judgment Creditor seeks information that violates Judgment Debtor’s and any third party’s right to privacy; (3) that the Deposition Subpoena is overbroad; and (4) that Judgment Debtor is entitled to monetary sanctions for abuse of the discovery process. (Motion to Quash, pp. 5:9, 6:5–6, 6:20, 6:22.)
Judgment Creditor disagrees, arguing: (1) that the documents are relevant to this matter; (2) that the Deposition Subpoena is not overbroad or violative of privacy; and (3) that sanctions should actually be awarded in favor of Judgment Creditor. (Opposition, pp. 3:17, 4:3, 5:22–28.)
Judgment Debtor reiterates his arguments in his Reply.
C. Discussion
1. Relevancy
The documents requested are relevant. Specifically, the lease agreement might show that Judgment Debtor has a contract to receive income; the checks/rental payments might show that the Judgment Debtor is in fact receiving income; and the communications requested might show that Judgment Debtor has had discussions about these potential flows of income.
2. Narrowness
The Deposition Subpoena is not overbroad. The records requested are only for a lease agreement, specific rental payments, and communications with a corporate entity. The Deposition Subpoena does not request bank records or other, more sensitive information. Further, the Deposition Subpoena limits this request to January 1, 2023, which is an appropriate scope of approximately fourteen months of records.
3. Privacy
a. Legal Standard
The California Constitution includes the inalienable right to privacy. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1.)
“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternative that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)
The balancing test outlined in Hill applies whenever lesser privacy interests are at stake. (Williams, supra, at p. 556.) The Court only applies the higher “compelling interest” standard to justify “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” (Ibid.) For example, a party must meet the compelling interest standard to discover an opposing party’s medical information. (Davis v. Super. Ct. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1015, 1020.)
b. Discussion
The records requested require the Court to invoke a balancing test (and not the compelling interest test) because these records do not involve an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy. Put differently, the records requested are business records related to rental transactions, not personal records related to personal autonomy.
On the one side is Judgment Debtor and The Coronado Shores Company, Inc.’s right to privacy in business records. On the other side is Judgment Creditor’s right to obtain information necessary to satisfy a judgment.
Balancing these interests, the Court determines that Judgment Creditor should be able to obtain these records. The limited nature and scope of the request further tilts the balance in favor of Judgment Creditor.
The Court DENIES the Motion to Quash.
D. Sanctions
1. Legal Standard
“Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., §¿1987.2, subd. (a).)
2. Discussion
Judgment Debtor requests $4,500.00 in fees. (Motion to Quash, p. 7:1–2.) Because the Motion to Quash is denied, fees are not appropriate in favor of Judgment Debtor.
Judgment Creditor requests $1,500.00 in fees. (Opposition, p. 6:2–5.) Judgment Creditor prevailed in opposing the Motion to Quash, and the Court has not been provided with evidence that would indicate there was substantial justification for the Motion to Quash. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).) Thus, fees are appropriate here in favor of Judgment Creditor.
It is not uncommon for courts to compare opposing counsel’s fees to help determine whether the moving party’s fees are reasonable. That is because a “comparative analysis of each side’s respective litigation costs may be a useful check on the reasonableness of any fee request.”¿¿(Mountjoy v. Bank of Am., N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 273, 281, quoting Donahue v. Donahue¿(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272.)¿
“[T]here is one particularly good indicator of how much time is necessary [for the purpose of determining reasonableness of attorneys’ fees] . . . and that is how much time the other side’s lawyers spent. . . . [S]uch a comparison is a useful guide in evaluating the appropriateness of time claimed. If the time claimed by the prevailing party is of a substantially greater magnitude than what the other side spent, that often indicates that too much time is claimed. Litigation has something of the tennis game, something of war, to it; if one side hits the ball, or shoots heavy artillery, the other side necessarily spends time hitting the ball or shooting heavy artillery back.” (Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed (9th¿Cir. 2004) 388 F.3d 1281, 1287.)
Here, Judgment Debtor requested $4,500.00 in attorney’s fees and Judgment Creditor requested $1,500.00 in attorney’s fees. Had Judgement Creditor requested higher fees, the Court might have granted them. However, given that Judgment Debtor seems to think that $4,500 in attorney's fees is appropriate here, it is fair to assume that Judgment Debtor would agree that $1,500 is also appropriate.
The Court AWARDS attorney’s fees in favor of Judgment Creditor and against Judgment Debtor in the amount of $1,500.00.
III. Conclusion
The Motion to Quash is DENIED.
Attorney’s fees are AWARDED in favor of Judgment Creditor and against Judgment Debtor in the amount of $1,500.00.