Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: BC700688, Date: 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC700688    Hearing Date: August 22, 2022    Dept: 34

SUBJECT:                 Motion For The Appointment Of Counsel Due To Incarceration; Mental Impairment(s); And, Hampering By Prison Official’s.

 

Moving Party:          Plaintiff Marcus R. Ellington, Sr.

Resp. Party:             Sheriff Alex Villanueva

 

 

 

        Plaintiff Marcus Ellington Motion is DENIED.

 

 

I.           PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

 

Mr. Ellington is incarcerated, serving what is most likely a life-sentence.  This case has been pending for over 4 years.  Mr. Ellington believes he was wrongly sentenced and has been mistreated in prison.  The Court has held at least 15 hearings in this matter. Throughout that time, Plaintiff Marcus Ellington has been ably representing himself.

 

The Court understands why Mr. Ellington would request appointment of counsel, the use of a laptop computer, to be transferred to another facility or program, or to be released from custody.  As to those areas over which this Court has discretion (e.g., appointment of counsel), the Court denies Mr. Ellington’s motion.  As to the remaining areas of Mr. Ellington’s concern (e.g., being transferred to another facility or being released from custody), this Court denies the motion without prejudice, because this Court is not the proper forum for those issues.

 

 

II.        BACKGROUND

 

On April 2, 2018, Plaintiff Marcus R. Ellington in propria persona, commenced this action against Defendants State of California, City of Los Angeles, J. McDonnell, Wallace, Ruiz, Zolnouni, Wilmore, Kionian, Banquelos, Negretti, Osegura, and Chin for general negligence, intentional tort, premises liability, slander, fraud, defamation, legal malpractice, and state and federal constitutional violations, seeking damages in the amount of $10.7 million dollars.

 

On November 14, 2019, Ellington filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants Men’s Central Jail, A. Villanueva, J. Wallace, N. Ruiz, P. Zolnouni, E. Wilmore, K. Konian, Megan’s Law, American Sex Offender.com, and homefacts.com.

 

On June 15, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel. 

 

On October 21, 2021, Ellington filed a Second Amended Complaint against Defendants Men’s Central Jail, A. Villanueva, J. Wallace, N. Ruiz, P. Zolnouni, E. Wilmore, K. Konian, Megan’s Law, American Sex Offender.com, homefacts.com, Banquelos, and Pangalini.

 

On March 1, 2022, Ellington filed a Third Amended Complaint against Defendants Men’s Central Jail, A. Villanueva, J. Wallace, N. Ruiz, P. Zolnouni, E. Wilmore, K. Konian, Megan’s Law, American Sex Offender.com, homefacts.com, Banquelos, Pangalini, Chin, and Thomas.

 

On May 20, 2022, the remaining Defendant’s demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.

 

On April 29, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Request to Reinstate/ Reconsider the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and his Alternative Motion for Release for Good Cause.

 

        On July 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed the current Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

 

 

   I.        Motion for Appointment of Counsel

 

A.          Legal Standard

 

“A prisoner has a statutory right to initiate civil actions. (Pen.Code, § 2601, subd. (d).) ‘In the case of an indigent prisoner initiating a bona fide civil action, this statutory right carries with it a right of meaningful access to the courts to prosecute the action.’” (Jameson v. Desta (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [citing Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 792].)

 

“Under California law, the appointment of counsel for an indigent prisoner pursuing a civil action is an aspect of the right of access to the courts.” (Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 465.)  “California decisions identify the appointment of counsel as one of the measures available to a trial court to assure an indigent prisoner is provided meaningful access to the courts.” (Id. at p. 468.) “However, neither the California Constitution nor Penal Code section 2601, subdivision (d) have been interpreted to require the appointment of counsel for indigent plaintiff litigants as a matter of right.” (Ibid., emphasis in original.) “Instead, the choice of measures to safeguard a prisoner’s right, as a plaintiff or defendant, to meaningful access to the courts to prosecute a civil action is committed to the trial court’s discretion.” (Ibid.)

 

“The exercise of a trial court’s discretion is guided by a three-step inquiry established in published appellate decisions.” (Id. at p. 458.) “First, the trial court determines whether the prisoner is indigent.” (Ibid.) “Second, the court determines whether the lawsuit involves a bona fide threat to the inmate’s personal or property interests.” (Ibid.) “If both conditions are satisfied, the trial court must consider the measures available to protect appellant’s right of meaningful access to the courts, including the appointment of counsel.” (Ibid.)

 

“[A] trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances when making the discretionary determination of whether an inmate’s access is being impeded.” (Id. at p. 470.) “It follows that the relevant circumstances include, without limitation, the factors listed in the federal decisions for determining whether exceptional circumstances exist in a particular case.” (Ibid.) The factors considered by federal district courts in determining the existence of exceptional circumstances include “‘(1) the type and complexity of the case; [¶] (2) whether the indigent is capable of adequately presenting his case; [¶] (3) whether the indigent is in a position to investigate adequately the case; . . . [¶] (4) whether the evidence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of evidence and in cross examination’ and (5) ‘whether appointed counsel would aid in the efficient and equitable disposition of the case.’” (Id. at p. 469, quoting Jackson v. Dallas Police Dept. (5th Cir. 1986) 811 F.2d 260, 262.)

 

 

B.          Discussion

 

Plaintiff, a prisoner who is representing himself, requests that the Court appoint counsel due to what he claims is his mental illness, which impairs his ability to concentrate, think and do the work involved in litigating this case. Plaintiff asserts that he suffers with post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar condition with severe depression with psychotic features, which affect Plaintiff’s brain function. Plaintiff also explains that he suffers from Severe Spinal Stenosis, with Disc extrusions in his Neck, which causes him severe sciatic nerve pain in his neck, arms, hands, legs, feet, and back.  Plaintiff states that “many times the Plaintiff is so depressed that He is unable to get out of bed. He is unable to do anything including eat. Due to depression.”  (Motion, p. 3.)

 

Plaintiff argues that these physical and mental impairments render him incapable of accessing the court and doing the work necessary to bring this claim to completion.  He also claims that his incarceration “hampers his ability to bring his action.”  (Motion, p. 3.)

 

The Court has no difficulty finding that Plaintiff is indigent. While Plaintiff fails to provide evidence of such in support of his request, the Court notes that Plaintiff has applied for and the Court has granted a fee waiver. (See 04/02/2018 Order on Court Fee Waiver.)

 

In the original complaint, Plaintiff alleged causes of action for general negligence, intentional tort, premises liability, slander, fraud, defamation, legal malpractice, and state and federal constitutional violations against multiple defendants, seeking damages in the amount of $10.7 million dollars.   Demurrers have been sustained to all causes of action in Plaintiff’s trice-amended complaints.

 

Plaintiff asks for several forms of relief.  None of his requests are availing.

 

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel.  (Motion, pp. 2, 4.)  The appointment of counsel is a last resort that the Court can adopt.  The Court also does not doubt that Mr. Ellington’s disabilities –not to mention the mere fact that he is incarcerated – make it more difficult for him to bring his claims to Court. 

 

Mr. Ellington has adequately – indeed ably – represented himself during the 15 hearings held by this Court over the past four years.  The Court has already denied Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel; there are no new facts adduced in Plaintiff’s latest motion that suggests that the Court should reconsider its previous decision. 

 

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint.  Plaintiff has already filed a Complaint (on 4/2/2018), a First Amended Complaint (on 11/14/2019), a Second Amended Complaint (on 10/21/2021), and a Third Amended Complaint (on 3/10/2022).  As indicated above, a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint.  This case was filed over four years ago.   Plaintiff Ellington has had meaningful access to the Court.  Enough is enough.  “Somewhere along the line, litigation must cease.” (In re Marriage of Crook (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1613.)

 

Plaintiff has requested that the Court order that he be given a laptop computer.  (Motion, p. 6, § 8.)  The Court declines this request. 

 

Plaintiff has requested that this Court transfer him to a more appropriate facility or program  (Motion, p. 5, §7.)  Plaintiff has also requested that this Court release him from custody. (Motion, p. 6, §8.) These requests are not within the power of this civil Court to grant.

 

II.        CONCLUSION

 

Mr. Ellington’s Motion is DENIED.