Judge Michael Shultz, Case 19STCV03420 2023-02-09 Tentative Ruling

INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must:

1. Contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling.

2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and

3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service.

If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on.

TENTATIVE RULINGS -- http://www.lacourt.org/tentativeRulingNet/ui/main.aspx?casetype=civil

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SEAL UNREDACTED MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

The complaint alleges that on February 3, 2017, Plaintiff, Jonathan Rojas, sustained injury while working at Defendant, Orion Plastics Corporation’s facilities (Orion). Plaintiff allegedly sustained an injury to his arm while attempting to remove an obstruction in equipment he was using at the time. Plaintiff alleges claims for negligence, products liability and related warranty claims against Gloucester Engineering, Co., Inc., and BW PTI Holdings (Doe 1), and negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and training against Orion.

Defendants, Gloucester Engineering Co., Inc., and BW PTI Holdings (Settlors) settled Plaintiff’s claims for an undisclosed amount. Settlors move to redact portions of the Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement and the parties’ settlement agreement relating to the terms of settlement and the amount. Settlors argue that the parties agreed to a confidential settlement which has no relevance to the public. No opposition has been filed.

An agreement not to disclose can constitute an “overriding interest” where there is specific showing of serious injury. McNair at 35–36 [“specificity is essential. [Citation.] Broad allegations of harm, bereft of specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient.’ [Citation.] We have been unable to find any appellate court decision which construes Publicker to permit sealing of court documents merely upon the agreement of the parties without a specific showing of serious injury.”]. Once the moving party identifies an overriding interest, the moving party must show “a substantial probability that it will be prejudiced absent closure or sealing." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1283.

Settlors have identified a compelling interest to support redacting the settlement terms and amounts, namely to protect Plaintiff’s financial privacy. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268 ["In any event we are satisfied that the protection of one's personal financial affairs and those of his (or her) spouse and children against compulsory public disclosure is an aspect of the zone of privacy which is protected by the Fourth Amendment and which also falls within that penumbra of constitutional rights into which the government may not intrude absent a showing of compelling need and that the intrusion is not overly broad."]. Publication of a person’s assets "can be expected to bring unwanted solicitation from a variety of salesmen and others, could well encourage harassment lawsuits or demands of like nature, and could expose the public officer and family to various criminal elements in our society." City of Carmel-By-The-Sea at p. 270.

Settlors have shown a substantial probability that Plaintiff’s financial privacy interest will be prejudiced absent redaction of any references to the settlement terms and the agreement itself. The proposed order is narrowly tailored to serve Plaintiff’s privacy interests, and there is no less restrictive means of protecting that interest.

Settlors also assert that their privacy interests constitute a compelling interest, however, corporations do not have a fundamental right of privacy. The constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution “does not apply to corporations; it protects the privacy rights of people.” Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1263. While Ameri-Medical Corp recognized that corporations have “some right of privacy” depending on the circumstances, Settlors have not proffered evidence supporting the entities’ protectible privacy interests.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Settlors have met their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff’s financial privacy is compelling and supports sealing the record. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

Defendants, Gloucester Engineering Co., Inc., and BW PTI Holdings (Settlors) move for an order determining that their settlement with Plaintiff was made in good faith. The parties are entitled to a hearing on that determination. Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1). The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue. Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).

The Court considers several factors to determine whether a settlement is made in good faith. Those factors are: an approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and settlor’s proportionate liability; the amount paid in settlement; the recognition that the settlor should pay less in settlement; the allocation of the settlement proceeds; the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; evidence of collusion, fraud or tortious conduct between the settlor and plaintiff; and whether the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settlor’s share of liability. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499. The court must avoid “rigid” application of the factors since “all that can be expected is an estimate, not a definitive conclusion." North County Contractor's Assn. v. Touchstone Ins. Services (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090.

Settlors contend that they had a complete defense to Plaintiff’s claims based on Plaintiff’s misuse of the equipment, however, they have agreed to settle to avoid additional litigation costs and expenses. The parties settled the matter after attending a mediation and engaging in arm’s length negotiation. Decl. of Brian Cadigan, ¶ 2. Settlors did not collude with any other party. Id. at ¶ 5.

All other parties have been served with the motion, and none have filed an opposition. Where the motion is not opposed, a “barebones” motion and declaration setting forth the background and grounds for good faith is sufficient. City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. The determination shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the Settlors for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6.