Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 19STCV17793, Date: 2023-03-28 Tentative Ruling
INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must:
1. Contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling.
2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and
3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service.
If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on.
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Case Number: 19STCV17793 Hearing Date: March 28, 2023 Dept: A
19STCV17793 Josefa Uriostegui v. American
Iron & Metal, et al.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on August 17, 2019, alleges that from 1988
through 2017, while in the course of Plaintiff’s employment with Elite Optical
Company (“Elite”) as a lab technician, Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals
made and/or supplied by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges she sustained serious
injuries to her internal organs and other related and consequential injuries
including the amputation of her finger as a result of the exposure. The FAC
alleges claims for (1) negligence, (2) strict liability for warning defect, (3)
strict liability for design defect, (4) fraudulent concealment, and (5) breach
of implied warranties.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendants, Satisloh North America, Inc. (“Satisloh”);
OptiSource International, Inc. (“OptiSource”), and Essilor of America, Inc.
(“Essilor”) (collectively “Defendants”) request a protective order precluding
disclosure of Defendants’ tax records for December 31, 2001, and December 31,
2017, absent a protective order and appropriate redactions.
Plaintiff argues that the tax records are relevant to
Defendants’ defense that they employed Plaintiffs, and therefore, her claims
are precluded by the exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Act.
The terms of the proposed protective order are unnecessarily burdensome.
In reply, Defendants contend that even if the evidence
is dispositive to a claim or defense, Defendants are still entitled to protect
their privacy interests.
III.
DISCUSSION
Where an inspection of documents
is demanded, the responding party or any other party affect may promptly move
for a protective order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060(a)). The motion shall be
accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith
attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Id.)
If good cause is shown, the court
may make any order that justice requires to “protect any party or other natural
person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression, or undue burden and expense.”(Id.) The
protective order may preclude the disclosure of certain documents or items of
documents or that a “trade secret or other confidential research, development,
or commercial information not be disclosed, or be disclosed only to specified
persons or only in a specified way.” (Id.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
Defendants
cite Roberts
v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770,
which held that corporations do not enjoy a fundamental right of privacy under
the California constitution, but do retain a "retain a general right to
privacy under the United States Constitution via some combination of the Fourth
Amendment.” (Roberts
v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 795). Corporations
enjoy a “lesser right to privacy than human beings.”
Tax returns are privileged from
forced disclosure in civil proceedings unless the privilege is waived. (Schnabel
v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 719). Additionally,
the privilege is not absolute, "but may yield in the furtherance of
compelling state interests.’ (People
v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 563.) ‘[C]ourts must balance the
right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy
interests of persons subject to discovery.’ (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987)
43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)’” (SCC
Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th
741, 754–755). The Court must consider the purpose of the
information sought, the effect that disclosure will have on the affected
persons and parties, the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting
disclosure, and whether there are less intrusive means for obtaining the
requested information. (SCC at 755).
Defendants collectively asserted
the same affirmative defense, namely that Plaintiff’s remedies are exclusively
the Worker's Compensation Act. (Essilor’s
Ans., ¶ 15; Satisloh’s
and Optisource’s Ans., ¶ 15). Defendants concede the documents’ relevance which
will “support the corporate relationship amongst these entities, [and] which go
to one of the affirmative defenses asserted on behalf of the Essilor
defendants, specifically worker’s compensation exclusivity.” (Motion 13:17-21).
In other words, Defendants intend to rely on these documents at trial, but will
not produce them without a protective order. Defendants’ have not established
why Plaintiff is required to sign a protective order in order to protect Defendants
from “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and
expense” if Defendants intend to rely on the same documents in any event.
Defendants have also not shown why
any redactions of these documents are required to protect Defendants nor have
Defendants addressed what they propose to redact based on their unilateral
determination that the information is not relevant.
V.
CONCLUSION
Defendants have not met their
burden of establishing that the Court should require Plaintiff to sign a
protective order or to permit undisclosed redactions. Therefore, the motion is
DENIED.