Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 19STCV17793, Date: 2024-05-01 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV17793 Hearing Date: May 1, 2024 Dept: A
19STCV17793 Josefa
Uriostegui v. American Iron & Metal, et al.
Wednesday, May 1, 2024
Continued
from
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on August 17, 2019, alleges that from
1988 through 2017, while in the course of employment with Elite Optical Company
(“Elite Optical”) as a lab technician, Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals
made and/or supplied by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges she sustained serious
injuries to her internal organs and other related and consequential injuries
including the amputation of her finger as a result of the exposure. The FAC
alleges claims for (1) negligence, (2) strict liability for warning defect, (3)
strict liability for design defect, (4) fraudulent concealment, and (5) breach
of implied warranties.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant,
Essilor of America, Inc., (“Essilor”), filed this motion on January 2, 2024, to
bifurcate the issue of whether all of Plaintiff’s claims against it are barred
by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”). The
Court has discretion to try special defenses first. Essilor contends that “Essilor
Labs of America, operating as Elite Optical,” is a subsidiary of Essilor, who
funded the settlement of Plaintiff’s worker's compensation claim. (Mot. 4:16-18.)
Plaintiff
filed an opposition on April 19, 2024, arguing that this motion should have
been brought earlier in the litigation. Bifurcating trial on the worker's
compensation exclusivity issue would be an unnecessary waste of time. The Court
denied Essilor’s motion for summary adjudication of this issue. Essilor
conceded that its supply of the products allegedly causing harm to Plaintiff
are at the heart of the case and is a discrete issue that cannot be “parceled
out.” (Opp. 2:12-16.)
Essilor
filed its reply on April 24, 2024, arguing that the trial court has discretion
to consider bifurcation at any point of the litigation. The Court’s ruling on
Essilor’s Motion for Summary has no bearing on bifurcation.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
As the moving
party, Defendant’s
burden is to establish that bifurcation will promote the ends of justice or the
economy and efficiency of handling the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 598.) Bifurcation is appropriate in cases where the
“liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff and bifurcation will avoid
the waste of time and money caused by the unnecessary trial of damage
questions.” (Trickey v. Superior Court In and For
Sacramento County (1967) 252
Cal.App.2d 650, 653.)
The statute’s primary purpose is to “avoid
wasting court time in cases where the plaintiff loses on the liability issue,
to promote settlements where the plaintiff wins on the liability issue, and to
afford a more logical presentation of the evidence, thus simplifying the issues
for the jury.” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 888, fn. 8.) Whether a single action should be bifurcated is
a matter within the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be
disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. (Downey Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1072, 1086.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
Liability
against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employee arising out
of and in the course and scope of employment is limited to the remedies
provided for in the WCA, in lieu of any other liability and without regard to
the employer’s negligence where the “conditions of compensation occur.” (Lab.
Code, § 3600(a).)
Where
such “conditions of compensation” exist, recovery of compensation under the Act
is the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents. (Labor
Code §3602 subd. (a).) Such conditions include circumstances where “at the time
of the injury, the employee is performing service growing out of and incidental
to his or her employment and is acting within the course of his or her
employment.” (Lab. Code, § 3600 subd. (a)(2).)
An
“employee” for purposes of the WCA means every person in the service of an
employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express
or implied, oral, or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed," (Lab.
Code, § 3351.)
Essilor
filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment with other Defendants, arguing that “where
all subsidiaries or divisions of a parent company are merely smaller parts of
an integrated whole, the parent company, and all of its subsidiaries are
entitled to assert worker’s compensation exclusivity as a defense to a civil
action for tort damages” citing Colombo
v. State of California (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 594. (MSJ
filed 4/11/22, 12: 17-23.) The Colombo court noted that "with
the advent of multiunit enterprises, discrete business entities have been
concentrated under the umbrella of large conglomerates. However, the mere fact
that a company may fall within the holdings of a parent corporation does not, as
a matter of law, make the parent an employer of all the workers of those
companies under its umbrella.” (Colombo
at 597.) The court further stated:
“A company's separateness from or oneness with the parent
corporation depends upon the unique factual relationships in each case. The
degree of separation between the parent and the subsidiary entity, whether a
true subsidiary or simply a division of a larger integrated whole, is again a
factual matter.’ (Id., at p. 602.) The pertinent factor as to whether an
employer- employee relationship exists is the right of control. (Id., at p.
599.) Defendants here have not proffered any evidence of their right of control
over Plaintiff’s employment or any admissible evidence of the degree of
separateness between the Defendants and Plaintiff’s employer.” (Id.)
Essilor
also relied on Waste
Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 105 for
the proposition that if the parent corporation “completely and absolutely”
controlled the subsidiary, then the corporations must be viewed as a single,
indistinguishable economic entity" entitled to exclusivity. (Id. at
112–113.)
Essilor did not
proffer any evidence of its “complete and absolute” control over Elite Optical
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. Essilor relied on the
declaration of Richard Hughes, President of Satisloh, who attempted to
establish, based on his review of corporate records, that “E-International” was
the “direct parent” of Optisource. Satisloh was an “affiliate of the “direct
parent.” Plaintiff’s employer, Elite Optical, dba Essilor Labs, was “ultimately”
owned by E-America. E-America,
OptiSource, and Elite Optical are all subsidiaries of the “global company,”
E-International. (Hughes
Decl. filed 4/11/2022.)
Essilor does not
make any argument here to support the claim that bifurcating the WCA
exclusivity issue, which presents a “unique factual” matter of the degree of
control of a parent over a subsidiary, will promote efficiency where Essilor was
unable to proffer relevant evidence in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment. Based on the foregoing, Essilor’s Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED.