Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 20STCV04124, Date: 2022-09-29 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV04124 Hearing Date: September 29, 2022 Dept: A
20STCV04124
Sarah Muniz v. Compton Community College District, et al.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The First Amended Complaint
alleges that that Defendant, Compton Community College District (“the
District”), employed Defendant, Thomas Mullen, (“Mullen”) as an instructor for a
certification class in which Plaintiff was enrolled. Plaintiff alleges that the
District failed to screen Mullen’s criminal history. Mullen allegedly made
unwanted sexual advances toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges claims for
negligent hiring, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual battery,
and violation of Civ. Code, § 51.9 (sexual harassment).
II.
ARGUMENTS
The District demurs to the first
cause of action for negligent hiring since Plaintiff failed to allege a
statutory basis for liability, which is required for claims against government
entities. The fourth cause of action for
sexual harassment under Civ. Code, § 51.9 fails because public school districts
are exempt from liability under the Unruh Civil Rights Act as they are not
“persons” and are not traditional commercial enterprises. The court should deny
leave to amend.
Defendant timely served Plaintiff
with the demurrer on August 24, 2022. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
A demurrer
tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only
questions of law. Schmidt v.
Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706. In testing the
sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the
properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred
from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.
The court may
not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. Moore v.
Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638. Because a demurrer
tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the
complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of
action. Rakestraw v.
California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43. Where the complaint
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should
sustain the demurrer. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); Zelig v.
County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.
Sufficient
facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and
with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the
nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” Gressley v.
Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644. Whether the
Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. Stevens v.
Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.
A demurrer
may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a
complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing, they do not sufficiently
apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. Williams v.
Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185
Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f). A pleading is
required to assert general allegations of ultimate fact. Evidentiary facts are
not required. Quelimane
Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 47; Lim v. The.TV
Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 684, 690. However, unlike
federal courts, California state courts are not a notice pleading jurisdiction,
and notice alone is not a sufficient basis for any pleading. California is a fact pleading
jurisdiction. Merely putting an opposing party on notice is not sufficient. Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 561; see Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 250.
Defendant complied with its obligations
to meet and confer with Plaintiff prior to filing the demurrer. Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.41; Declaration of Sohin S. Gautam.
IV.
DISCUSSION
A public
entity is not liable for an injury “[e]xcept as provided by statute.” Gov. Code § 815.
Plaintiff
must allege sufficiently detailed facts to support an inference that each of
the statutory elements of liability is satisfied. General allegations are
regarded as inadequate. Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1,
5.
Moreover, “[s]ince the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by
statute or ‘enactment,‘ the statute or ‘enactment‘ claimed to establish the
duty must at the very least be identified." Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d
792, 802. The first cause of action for negligent hiring is
defective as it is alleged only against the District and does not allege a
statutory basis for liability.
The
fourth cause of action for sexual harassment in violation of Civ. Code, § 51.9
is also defective. The statute imposes liability against “persons” identified
as individuals in various business capacities. Civ.
Code, § 51.9 subd. (a)(1). Teachers are included within
the list of “persons”, but not school districts. Id. Liability is
imposed for unwanted and pervasive sexual advances made by a “person”. Id.
subd. (a)(2). There must be a business, service, or professional relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant. Id. subd. (a)(1). A “business
establishment,” for purpose of Section 51, et seq., is "limited to
entities acting as private business establishments." Brennon
B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 678.
Public school districts do not fall within this definition. Id. at 682. The
court concluded that "the Unruh Civil Rights Act as currently
written cannot reasonably be interpreted to encompass public school
districts in situations such as this one." Brennon
B. at 696 [italics in original].
V.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the
District’s demurrer to the first and fourth causes of action is well taken. Leave to amend is
ordinarily given if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be
cured. However, “it is the Plaintiff’s burden to show how and in what manner he
can amend the complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of
his pleading".” Association of Community Organizations
for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th
298, 302.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition showing how these defects can be cured.
Therefore, the court SUSTAINS demurrer without leave to amend.