Judge Michael Shultz, Case 20STCV22476 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 20STCV22476, Date: 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV22476 Hearing Date: May 16, 2023 Dept: A

20STCV22476 M.R. a minor v. Watts Learning Center Foundation, Inc., et al.

Tuesday, May 16, 2023 at 8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff attended Watts Learning Center Charter Middle School, operated by Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”). Plaintiff’s mother requested that Plaintiff be excused from physical activities to accommodate Plaintiff’s medical condition (“brittle bone disease”). Defendants allegedly failed to accommodate Plaintiff and required Plaintiff to run during a physical education class. Plaintiff fell and suffered multiple fractures. Plaintiff alleges eight causes of action for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and negligence against Defendants, Watts Learning Center Foundation, Inc. (“Foundation”), LAUSD, and Doe defendants.

LAUSD previously filed its cross-complaint against the Foundation, and third-party, Alliance of Schools for Cooperative Insurance (“Alliance”), on July 1, 2022, however, the Hon. William a Crowfoot, granted Foundation’s motion to strike the cross-complaint as it was not filed at the same time as LAUSD’s answer on October 30, 2020. (RJN Ex. I.)

II. ARGUMENTS

LAUSD requests leave to file a cross-complaint against Foundation and Alliance for breach of contract (the “Charter Petition”) by failing to defend and indemnify LAUSD for the same incident alleged in the complaint.

The Foundation opposes the motion because it is untimely and improper. LAUSD cannot join its contract claim against its insurer, Alliance, in a personal injury action arising from the same facts. LAUSD did not file a government claim against the Foundation and Alliance.

In reply, LAUSD argues that the proposed cross-complaint is permissive, the claims are not barred for failure to file a tort claim, and the cross-complaint is well pleaded.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth either a cause of action against any of the parties who filed the complaint, or any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable, whether or not such person is already a party, if the cause of action asserted in the cross complaint “(1) arises from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him." (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10.)

A proposed cross-complaint is compulsory if it asserts claims against the Plaintiff that arise from the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences alleged in the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30.)

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court grants LAUSD’s request for judicial notice of Court records filed in this action as well as in the Federal District Court before this matter was remanded. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).)

The proposed cross-complaint is asserted against Foundation, a co-defendant, and Alliance, a third party, therefore, it is not a compulsory cross-complaint. The claims for breach of the Charter Petition (first, second, third, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action “the Contract claims”) are not permissive claims because they arise from a different transaction or occurrence, namely the Foundation’s and Alliance’s alleged breach of duty to defend and indemnify LAUSD against Plaintiff’s claims. (Cross-complaint ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff’s claims arise from LAUSD’s and the Foundation’s alleged negligence in failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities resulting in injury. LAUSD’s proposed cross-complaint asserts contract claims (in part), which LAUSD admits are independent of the Plaintiff’s personal injury claims. (Mot., 11:12.). (Cross-complaint, ¶ 11). Therefore, the proposed Contract claims are neither permissive nor compulsory and are improperly asserted by way of a cross-complaint.

LAUSD has not demonstrated a “real potential” that denying the motion as to the Contract claims will result in inconsistent factual findings if litigated before a different trier of fact. (Mot. 4:26-27.) Res judicata bars re-litigation of identical claims or causes of action decided in prior litigation. (Liska v. The Arns Law Firm (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 275, 284.) In its collateral estoppel aspect, the doctrine may preclude a party to prior litigation from disputing issues already decided against that party. (Id.) The complaint does not bear on the Foundation’s purported contractual relationship with LAUSD; rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are joint tortfeasors.

LAUSD contends that Plaintiff’s claims “relate” to the Charter Petition. The complaint refers to the Charter Petition to support liability against the Foundation as an agent for LAUSD. (Complaint, ¶ 8).

The claims for equitable indemnity and contribution (fourth and fifth causes of action, respectively) are properly raised as crossclaims against the Foundation since the claims assert that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the Foundation’s negligence. (Cross-complaint, ¶ 27). These claims arise from the same occurrence that form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims.

Permissive cross-complaints may be filed “at any time before the court has set a trial, however, leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50.). The Foundation has not demonstrated any prejudice that will result from granting LAUSD’s motion to file a cross-complaint as to the fourth and fifth causes of action given that trial is set for October 18, 2023.

Foundation contends that LAUSD was required to present a government claim prior to filing suit. No suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity unless a written claim has been presented and has been acted upon. (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) LAUSD, as Cross-Complainant, must allege compliance with the claims statute or excuse from non-compliance in order to state a cause of action against a public entity or the cross-complaint is subject to demurrer (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243.)

Whether the Foundation or Alliance are “public entities” in the first instance is an issue of fact. Additionally, the sufficiency of the cross-complaint is not a factor to be considered in granting leave to file a permissive cross-complaint. The standard is whether doing so is in the interest of justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50.) For the same reason, Foundation’s contention that the cross-complaint fails to state a claim against Alliance or Foundation or that LAUSD is not entitled to a defense or indemnity is equally improper. The merits of LAUSD’s contentions cannot be resolved at this stage.

Finally, the Foundation has not established that the cross-complaint is precluded as a matter of law. It cites Smith v. Interinsurance Exch. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 301, which states that a plaintiff may not simultaneously file a personal injury action against an insured tortfeasor and the tortfeasor’s insurer for insurance bad faith. (Id. at 304.) LAUSD does not assert any negligence claims in its cross-complaint against an insured; rather, LAUSD alleges it is an additional insured under the policy provided by Alliance. Nor has LAUSD asserted an insurance bad faith claim against Alliance. The rule in Smith would preclude Plaintiff from simultaneously suing LAUSD (the insured) and Alliance (LAUSD’s insurer) for insurance bad faith.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the motion is DENIED with respect to the first, second, third, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action as these claims are neither permissive nor compulsory claims. The motion is GRANTED as to the fourth and fifth causes of action which are permissive claims that bear on the degree of liability to be attributed to joint tortfeasors for Plaintiff’s injuries.