Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 21CMCV00036, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling
INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must:
1. Contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling.
2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and
3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service.
If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on.
TENTATIVE RULINGS -- http://www.lacourt.org/tentativeRulingNet/u
Case Number: 21CMCV00036 Hearing Date: February 16, 2023 Dept: A
21CMCV00036 Ronald Hills v. TRSTE, Inc., et al.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
This is an action
to quiet title and for declaratory relief against Defendant lienholders, who
allegedly recorded “unauthorized” judgment liens on Plaintiff’s real property.
Defendant, TRSTE,
Inc., demurs to the complaint on grounds Plaintiff failed to join a necessary
party, namely the beneficial owner of the Deed of Trust at issue, who is
Wachovia Bank, the original lender. The claims are barred because Plaintiff should
have filed these claims as a compulsory cross-complaint in CV17-3373 Ronald
Hills v. Wells Fargo Bank, et al, filed May 4, 2017 in the United States
District Court. (RJN Ex. 2). Defendant
also argues that the claims fail to state causes of action.
Plaintiff’s
counsel filed an untimely opposition on February 16, 2023, asking for a
continuance of the hearing so that Plaintiff can obtain new counsel and provide
a response. Alternatively, if the Court sustains the demurrer, the Court should
grant leave to amend. The Court’s file also reflects that on February 2, 2023,
non-party, Rory D. Hills, filed a letter identifying additional defects in the
pleading.
A reply brief has
not been filed.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The bases for
demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained where there is a defect or
misjoinder of parties, or the pleading fails to state a cause of action (among
other grounds). (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10). A demurrer
“tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only
questions of law.” (Schmidt v. Foundation Health
(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706). The court assumes the truth of (1) the
properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred
from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318). The plaintiff must show that the pleading alleges facts
sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw
v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Whether Plaintiff’s claims are barred by prior litigation.
The Court does not consider the
letter of Rorey Darnell Hills as he is not a party to this action. , Although
filed tardy, the Court has considered the opposition filed on February 10, 2023. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b) [oppositions are due nine court days before the hearing]). The
court has discretion to consider late papers in favor of the strong policy
favoring disposition of the case on the merits. (Kapitanski
v. Von’s (1983) 146 Cal. App. 3d 29, , 32).
Plaintiff
concedes that an amended complaint can cure the defects regarding prior actions
filed by Plaintiff, which Defendant contends should have been brought as a
compulsory cross-complaint. (Opp. 2:25-28). The Court
takes judicial notice of the district court complaint filed on May 14, 2017,
and the state court action filed on July 13, 2018. (RJN Ex. 2 and Ex. 5); (Evid. Code, § 452 subd. (d)).
The person
against whom a complaint has been filed must raise related claims by way of a cross-complaint
at the same time as the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30). Plaintiff
initiated both prior actions, therefore, Defendant’s argument is without merit.
Defendant does not argue that the claims are barred by res judicata/collateral
estoppel, which precludes relitigation of claims or issues decided in prior
actions. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824). Accordingly, demurrer is not sustained on that ground.
B.
The complaint does not join a
necessary party.
Joinder of a
party is required where that party claims an interest in the subject matter of
an action, but complete relief cannot be accorded without the inclusion of that
party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 389). A complaint
for quiet title must include the adverse claims to the plaintiff’s title against
which a determination is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020).
The complaint alleges that Wachovia Bank is the alleged owner of a lien secured
against the real property at issue. Complaint, ¶ 2. The Deed of Trust states
that Bank (Wachovia) has a security interest in the property. (RJN Ex. 1, .pdf page 8). Defendant
TRSTE is identified as “Trustee” of the deed of trust who “is not a true
trustee and owes no fiduciary obligations; he merely acts as a common agent for
the trustor and the beneficiary of the deed of trust.” (Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
497, 508). Accordingly, Wachovia and/or or
its successor-in-interest appears to be a necessary party to this action.
C.
The first cause of action fails to
state a claim.
The complaint is
not verified as required in quiet title actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020).
Tender of the debt is not required where the borrower attacks the validity of
the underlying debt since it would constitute affirmation of the debt. (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 112). It is not clear whether Plaintiff is attacking the debt as
Plaintiff alleges only that the lien was “unauthorized” but does not allege the
reasons therefor. (Complaint, ¶ 17.) The allegation is vague and ambiguous as it
does not clearly allege “the title of the plaintiff as to which a determination
is sought and the basis for that title.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020).
Accordingly, the first cause of action fails to state a claim.
D.
The claim for declaratory relief
is defective as alleged.
The second cause
of action incorporates prior allegations. (Complaint, ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that
the parties dispute their rights to the real property with respect to the lien
claims. Thus, the claim for declaratory relief is derived from the first cause
of action which is defective. If the statutory claim does not state sufficient
facts to support it, demurrer is also properly sustained as to the claim for
declaratory relief which is “wholly derivative” of the statutory claim." (Ball v. FleetBoston Financial Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 794,
800).
IV. CONCLUSION
Leave to amend is
proper where Plaintiff has not had a fair opportunity to amend, and the defect
is capable of being cured. (Colvig v. RKO General, Inc. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 56, 69–70). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days leave to amend.