Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 21CMCV00076, Date: 2022-10-25 Tentative Ruling
INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must:
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If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on.
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Case Number: 21CMCV00076 Hearing Date: October 25, 2022 Dept: A
21CMCV00076
Anthony Martin, Samuel Martin v. Jarvis Martin
Tuesday,
October 25, 2022, 8:30 a.m.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES (MODIFIED)
I AFA I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action arises from
Defendant’s alleged failure to repay a loan extended to him by his father, Plaintiff,
Samuel Martin (“Samuel”). Plaintiff, Anthony Martin (“Anthony”), alleged that
Defendant refused to return his personal property. On July 28, 2022, the court
heard and granted Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleading as to the
first, second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action alleged by Plaintiff
Samuel as the claims were barred by the parties’ settlement agreement in an earlier
action on the same claims and issues. The case bearing Case No. 19CMCV00072
Jarvis Martin v. Samuel Martin, Jr. (the “2019 Action”) was dismissed with
prejudice.
II.ARGUMENTS
Defendant
asks for an award of attorney’s fees totaling $26,184.73 as well as fees and
costs incurred to prepare this motion. Defendant entered into an agreement with
Samuel to settle the 2019 action. The agreement permits recovery of attorney’s
fees by a prevailing party stemming from any dispute concerning the settlement
agreement. As the prevailing party, Defendant is entitled to reimbursement of
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code, section 1717.5 and Code of
Civil Procedure, section 1032.
Plaintiffs’
opposition, untimely filed on October 17, 2022, argues that there is no
prevailing party since Plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal on August 23,
2022. Defendant’s fee motion was not filed until after the dismissal was filed.
Plaintiffs
also argue that the amount of fees requested is unreasonable. Defendant has not
established that $695 per hour is reasonable in this case. Defendant’s
purported time spent is also excessive.
In
reply, Defendant argues that the opposition was untimely filed as it was due on
October 12, 2022. Plaintiffs served the opposition five days later. The court
should disregard the opposition. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs did not
address that Defendant prevailed on the first motion for judgment on the
pleading of the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action against
Samuel. The request for dismissal filed on August 23, 2022, was stricken by the
court in any event.
Plaintiffs
do not dispute that the requested fees fall within the scope of the parties’
settlement agreement. The fees are reasonable as supported by Defendant’s
evidence.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant has not established that
Plaintiffs’ late opposition resulted in prejudice.
Plaintiffs’
opposition was due on October 14, 2022, nine court days before the hearing
date. Code Civ. Proc., § 1005 subd. (b). Although untimely filed on October 17,
2022, Defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the late
filing. The court has discretion to consider late papers in favor of the strong
policy favoring disposition of the case on the merits. Kapitanski v. Von’s
(1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 29, 32. [“Judges are well aware of the unnecessary
burdens placed on courts and counsel when strict compliance with local
procedural rules results in the expenditure of unnecessary time and money for
the preparation of later section 473 motions.”]. Defendant was able to file a
reply brief, which the court has considered.
B. The terms of the parties’
settlement agreement provide for recovery of attorney’s fees.
A prevailing party on an action on a
contract is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs incurred to enforce the
contract if specifically provided for in the contract. Civ. Code, § 1717 subd. (a).
The prevailing party on the contract “shall be the party who recovered a greater
relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there
is no party prevailing on the contract.” Id., subd. (b)(1). An “action
on a contract” is liberally construed “to extend to any action ‘[a]s long as an
action ‘involves’ a contract and one of the parties would be entitled to
recover attorney fees under the contract if that party prevails in its
lawsuit....’" In re Tobacco Cases I (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601. Additionally, "it is irrelevant if the fees were incurred
offensively or defensively." Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1990) 219
Cal.App.3d 97, 107.
Defendant
denied every allegation in the complaint on grounds that the claims were
precluded by the parties’ settlement agreement in the 2019 Action that arose
from the same facts alleged here. Answer filed 5/11/22, 1:24—2:2.
The parties’ settlement agreement in the Small
Claims Action states as follows:
“If any legal action or other proceeding is brought for the enforcement
of this Agreement, or because of an alleged dispute, breach, default, or misrepresentation
in connection with any of the provisions of this Agreement, the successful or prevailing
Party or Parties shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and
other costs incurred in that action or proceeding, in addition to any other
relief to which it may be entitled.” Declaration of Ryan D. Kashfian, Ex. 1,
page 6, ¶ 8.11.
Plaintiffs do not challenge Defendant’s contention that the
scope of the attorney’s fees provision includes the fees incurred to defend
against Plaintiffs’ claims. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is not
entitled to fees because Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal on August 23,
2022. However, the court struck the dismissal on September 1, 2022, as
improperly filed. Regardless, the court had already granted Defendant’s first
motion for judgment on the pleading against Samuel on July 28, 2022.
Declaration of Kashfian, Ex. 5.
The remaining fourth cause of action was alleged by Anthony for
conversion of personal property. On September 1, 2022, the court granted that
motion for judgment on the pleading because Anthony had previously litigated
that claim in the 2019 Action resulting in a non-jury verdict against Anthony. Therefore,
the conversion claim was barred by res judicata. Anthony was not a party to the
Settlement Agreement in the 2019 Action. Declaration of Kashfian, Ex. 1, page
7. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to fees incurred to defend against
the claim for conversion brought by Anthony as it was not based “on a
contract.” Civ. Code, § 1717.
C. Reasonableness of fees asserted
against Plaintiff Samuel.
A prevailing party
“shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the
contract.” Civ. Code, § 1717, subd
(b)(1). Plaintiffs did not recover any relief on their claims. A prevailing
party is also defined as "a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do
not recover any relief against that defendant.” Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd.
(a)(4). Therefore, Defendant is the prevailing party.
To determine whether fees are reasonable,
the court "begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably
expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. California courts have
consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable
value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate
attorneys' fee award.’”
PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. The court considers a number of factors including " the
nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill
required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success
or failure, and other circumstances in the case.’” PLCM Group at 1096.
Defendant seeks recovery of fees incurred
for the entire case against both Plaintiffs. However, Defendant has not
established a basis for recovery of fees against Plaintiff Samuel for
litigation fees incurred to propound discovery against Plaintiff Anthony. The court has considered Defendant’s billing
statement. Motion, Ex. 7. Time incurred for general tasks that were not
allocated between Plaintiffs were reduced by half. After removing entries
incurred with respect to Anthony leaving only discovery propounded on Samuel,
and adding the reduced fees incurred for general tasks, the hours incurred are
as follows:
The court can reduce the award based on evidence showing
duplicative efforts. Defendant is entitled to reasonable compensation; “‘padding”
in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to
compensation." Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132. The time incurred by Mr. Kashfian to draft, prepare, and review
discovery are duplicative of the Mr. Wang’s efforts. The court permits recovery
of the fees incurred by the associate only totaling 4.45 hours. The court finds
that the fees incurred by the legal assistant and law clerk totaling 4.5 hours
are equally duplicative.
The time spent by Mr. Kashfian to prepare for the motion for
judgment on the pleadings (4.30) are equally duplicative of the associate’s
efforts (23 hours). Only the Mr. Wang appeared at the hearing. Accordingly, the
court declines to award the 4.30 hours incurred by Mr. Kashfian. A motion for
judgment on the pleading is essentially a demurrer. The court finds that 23
hours incurred to prepare the motion is excessive. Accordingly, the court
permits 10 hours for the motion incurred by Mr. Wang.
To determine which market rate applies, "the courts will look
to equally difficult or complex types of litigation.” Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
691, 700. The “market rate” is generally
based on the rates prevalent in the community where the court is located. Id. Defendant relies on the “Laffey Matrix” used
in Syers to establish reasonable hourly rates for partners and
associates. The Syers court stated that the trial court was in the best
position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her
courtroom for the type of litigation at issue. The court has discretion to
consider the Laffey Matrix but is not required to do so. The court also has
discretion to determine that the actual rate charged is the reasonable rate for
the type of services rendered. Syers at 702.
Mr. Kashfian’s hourly rate of $695 per hour to prepare this motion
is not reasonable. The court reduces his rate to $400. The court finds that the
hourly rate of $395 incurred by Mr. Wang, who has been licensed to practice for
19 months is excessive. The court reduces the hourly rate to $300 for this type
of case.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED but
modified. The court awards fees incurred by Mr. Wang for discovery and general
tasks (4.45 hours) and for the motion for judgment on the pleading (10 hours)
for a total of 14.45 hours at $300 per hour for a total fee award of $4,335.00
against Plaintiff, Samuel Martin, incurred by Mr. Wang. The court awards
reduced fees and costs incurred by Mr. Kashfian to prepare the fee motion and
reply (2 hours x $400 per hour) and costs of $61.65 for a total award of
$861.65. Accordingly, total fees and
costs awarded are $5,196.65.