Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 21CMCV00079, Date: 2022-10-11 Tentative Ruling
INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must:
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2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and
3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service.
If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on.
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Case Number: 21CMCV00079 Hearing Date: October 11, 2022 Dept: A
21CMCV00079
Alfred Zuniga, et al. v. Micaela Plata
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs
own real property as joint tenants. Plaintiff, Alfred Zuniga (“Zuniga”),
conveyed his 50 percent interest to Plaintiff, Rodrigo Cuevas (“Cuevas”), who
later conveyed his interests to Defendant, Micaela Plata, as joint tenants. In
exchange, Defendant purportedly promised to refinance the existing mortgage and
give $75,000 from the proceeds to Plaintiffs. Defendant allegedly failed to
refinance the mortgage and refused to re-convey Cuevas’ interest in the
property. Plaintiffs allege claims for promissory estoppel, fraud, and breach
of contract.
II. ARGUMENTS
A. Motion filed July 18, 2022
Defendant argues that she is
entitled to judgment in her favor on the entire complaint. Both Plaintiffs
testified that Defendant did not make any promises to them in connection with
the transfer of their interests in the property to Defendant. Without evidence
of a promise, the first cause of action fails. Given Plaintiffs’ admissions, there
is no evidence that Defendant made any misrepresentation to Plaintiffs, which
negates the fraud claim.
The claim for breach of contract
fails because Zuniga denied any knowledge of the written agreement attached to
the complaint. Cuevas testified he had never the seen the agreement before and
never discussed it with Defendant.
B. Opposition filed September 27,
2022
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s
evidence is based on an uncorrected copy of the Cuevas’ deposition testimony.
Cuevas states he did not understand the questions at the time of the deposition
and thought the questions referred to the present time and not the past.
Defendant agreed
to pay Cuevas $75,000 once she refinanced the existing mortgage. Cuevas
testified this was an oral agreement.
C. Reply filed October 6, 2022
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’
factual assertions are not supported by evidence. Plaintiffs admitted all facts
material to the motion. Plaintiffs’ purported corrections to their deposition
testimony were untimely made 71 days after the date of the deposition and
should be ignored.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper “if all
the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Code Civ. Proc. §437c subd. (c).
In pertinent part, a party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more
claims for damage if that party contends that there is no merit to the claim as
specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code governing imposition of punitive
damages. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it
completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for
damages, or an issue of duty.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (c).
Where a defendant seeks summary
judgment or adjudication, defendant must show that either “one or more elements
of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established,
or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” Id. at §437c subd. (p)(2). The moving
party can satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established”
because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 583. Once the defendant meets this
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one
or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense
thereto.” Id.
Until the moving party has
discharged its burden of proof, the opposing party has no burden to come
forward with any evidence. Once the moving party has discharged its burden as
to a particular claim, however, the opposing party may defeat the motion by
producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action. Code
Civ. Proc., §437c subd. (p)(2).
The court strictly construes the
moving party's supporting evidence while the opposing party’s evidence is
liberally construed. Doubts as to the propriety of the motion should be
resolved against granting the motion. D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20. The court does not evaluate the credibility of testimony. Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1999) 75 Cal. App. 4th 832, 840.
The court applies the three-step
analysis to motions for summary judgment or adjudication: (1) identify the
issues framed by the pleading, (2) determine whether the moving party
established facts which negate the opponents’ claim, (3) if a defendant meets
its threshold burden of persuasion and the burden shifts, determine whether the
opposing party has controverted those facts with admissible evidence. Torres v. Reardon (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 831, 836.
IV.
DISCUSSION
To establish a claim for
promissory estoppel, Plaintiff must prove the existence of “(1) a promise clear
and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is
made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) and
the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945.
The first cause
of action is alleged on behalf of Plaintiff Cuevas only. Cuevas alleges that
Defendant asked him to transfer his interest in the property to her so that she
could refinance the mortgage loan with her credit. Complaint, ¶ 21. She agreed
to pay Cuevas $75,000, when the lender funded the loan and then transfer title
back to Cuevas and herself as joint tenants. Complaint, ¶ 21. Cuevas alleges
that he relied on the promise and conveyed his interests, however, Defendant failed
to re-convey title or refinance the mortgage. Complaint, ¶ 23.
The parties do
not dispute that Cuevas signed a grant deed transferring his interest to
Defendant on July 26, 2019 (UF 8). Cuevas admitted in response to requests for
admissions verified on March 31, 2022, that he transferred his interest to
Defendant as a “bona fide gift.” Defendant’s Ex. 3, 3:1-9. Cuevas admitted the
truth of the representation on the Grant Deed that he received nothing in
return for the transfer of ownership to Defendant. Defendant’s Ex. 3, 3:11-16. Cuevas also admitted at his deposition that
Defendant never made any promises to him about the property, and never broke
any promises to him about the property. Defendant’s Ex. 9, 19:18-20, 20:23-25 [“It’s
just that she never promised me anything.”] Cuevas testified that he is not
claiming that Defendant owes him money. Defendant’s Ex. 9, 24:23 – 25:2. He
denied the contention that Defendant promised to put him back on title after
she refinanced. Defendant’s Ex. 9,
25:4-8.
Cuevas
purportedly made changes to his deposition testimony on July 25, 2022,
Plaintiff’s Ex. B. These changes do not affect the testimony specifically
described above. Moreover, these purported corrections appear untimely as the
letter also reflects that Cuevas signed his deposition transcript under penalty
of perjury on June 15, 2022. Id.
Cuevas had 30 days after notice by
the deposition officer to make corrections and sign the transcript. Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.520 subd. (a). He did so on June 15, 2022. Plaintiff’s Ex. B. If the deponent
fails to make changes or approve the transcript within 30 days of the
deposition officer’s notice, the deposition is given the same effect as though
it had been approved, “subject to any changes timely made by the deponent.” Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.520, subd. (f).
Thus, the July 25, 2022, changes were untimely. There is no evidence that
Plaintiff made a motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) to
submit untimely changes to the transcript.
Cuevas attempts to create a
triable issue by contradicting his own deposition testimony. Despite denying
any promises or arrangements with Defendant, Cuevas testified later in the
deposition that he had an arrangement with Defendant to convey his interests to
her “so that we could be given the money.” Plaintiff’s Ex. C, 28:21-25. He
testified that he had a verbal arrangement with Defendant where “we would be getting
the $75,000,” although he earlier testified that he had no arrangements with
Defendant with respect to the property. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, page 30:15-22.
Plaintiff’s internally
contradictory deposition testimony does not create a triable issue of fact. Davis v. Foster
Wheeler Energy Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 731, 736. ["Instead, the issue is whether with Chabot's internally
contradictory testimony plaintiffs established the existence of a triable issue
of fact, and on de novo review (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 936, 939–940, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) we agree with the trial court that
it did not."]. The court observed that where the issue is an “ambiguous
utterance” the task of determining its meaning is a role reserved for the jury.
Id. at 735. The court did not apply that principle because in Davis,
the deponent made internally contradictory statements, not ambiguous
statements, and such statements were insufficient to create a triable issue of
fact. Davis at 736.
Accordingly, there is no dispute
that consistent with Cuevas’ admitted discovery responses and his deposition
testimony, Cuevas conveyed his interest in the property to Defendant as a “bona
fide gift” (UF 9). He agreed that he was not receiving any type of
consideration for transferring his title interest to Defendant (UF 10). Defendant
never made any promises to Cuevas in connection with his execution of the Grant
Deed. (UF 11). He testified that Defendant does not owe him money and never
promised to place him back on title. (UF 16). The undisputed material facts
negate the existence of a promise made to Cuevas.
With respect to Zuniga, there is
no dispute that he transferred his interest to Cuevas to avoid forfeiting the
property to the IRS. (UF 4). He did not make any arrangements with Defendant in
connection with his ownership interest. (UF 6).
Zuniga broke up with Defendant in 2014 and left the property. UF 5.
Defendant did not make any promises or representations to Zuniga and did not agree
to anything relating to the property. (UF 12). Zuniga testified that he had “no
idea” what the purported July 21, 2019, agreement for consideration of $75,000
was about, nor did he see Cuevas sign it. (UF 13).
The same undisputed material facts
negate Plaintiffs’ fraud claim. To prevail on a claim for fraud, Plaintiffs
must show 1) a misrepresentation, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity, (3)
Defendant intended to defraud Plaintiff, i.e., induce Plaintiff’s reliance, (4)
Plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation, (5) causing damage. Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 1262, 1268. Here, Cuevas admitted
in response to Requests for Admission that Defendant did not make any
representations or promises to them with respect to the property at issue. (UF
11-12). Zuniga testified that he did not make any arrangements with Defendant
in connection with any ownership interest in the property. (UF 6). Cuevas never
discussed the purported agreement with either Defendant or Zuniga. (UF 14).
Defendant never promised to place Cuevas back on title. (UF 16). Defendant’s undisputed material facts negate
the first element.
The claim for breach of contract
also fails. To prevail on a contract claim, Plaintiffs must prove (1) the
existence of a valid contract between the parties, (2) Plaintiff’s performance
or excuse for non-performance, (3) Defendant’s breach; and (4) resulting
damage. Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186. The undisputed facts establish that a contract did not exist
between Plaintiffs and Defendant.
The contract attached to the
complaint was purportedly made between Defendant and Cuevas. Complaint, Ex. A. Mr.
Cuevas denied having ever seen it before. Defendant’s Ex. 9, 21:21-23. Cuevas
never discussed the agreement with either Zuniga or Defendant. Id.,
22:5-10. He is not claiming that Defendant owes him money, Id..,
24:23-25:2. Cuevas admitted that the transfer to Defendant was a gift. Although
Cuevas later testified to the contrary that he had a verbal arrangement with
Defendant, internally contradictory statements do not create a triable issue of
fact. Davis at 736.
V.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant has met her
burden of establishing that Plaintiffs’ claims are not viable given the
undisputed evidence. Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd.
(p)(2). Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to controvert any material facts.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary judgment is GRANTED.