Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 21CMCV00194, Date: 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21CMCV00194 Hearing Date: July 28, 2022 Dept: A
21CMCV00194
WILLIAMS SCOTSMAN, INC. V. WILD WEST INVESTMENT GROUP, IN C., ET AL.
Thursday,
July 28, 2022, 8:30 a.m.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The complaint filed on July 26,
2021, seeks recovery of accrued charges owed by Defendants for the rental of a
modular unit from Plaintiff pursuant to a written agreement. Defendants
allegedly failed to return the unit. Plaintiff alleges claims for breach of
contract, common counts, possession of the unit (replevin), and conversion.
Plaintiff amended the complaint on
January 24, 2022, to substitute Defendant, FCC Logistics, Inc. (“FCC”), for Doe
1. On May 20, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed the first and second causes of action
against FCC only for breach of contract and account stated, respectively.
II.
DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT
A.
Demurrer filed on June 20, 2022.
Defendant FCC
demurs to the remaining claims alleged against it because Plaintiff did not
allege an existing contract with FCC to support the third cause of action for
reasonable value of the services and materials rendered at Defendant’s request.
Defendant also demurs to the fourth cause of action for possession of the unit
and the fifth cause of action for conversion since Plaintiff did not allege
that FCC has possession of the unit. The only Defendant alleged to have
contracted with Plaintiff and who has control and possession of the unit is
Defendant, Wild West Investment Group, Inc. (“Wild West”).
B.
Opposition filed on July 13, 2022
Plaintiff
argues that FCC owns the land in Gardena, California where the modular trailer
is being used as an office. Since FCC currently has possession, the third,
fourth, and fifth causes of action are properly alleged. Plaintiff argues that
the trailer is being used by FCC’s current tenant and is likely receiving rent
from the new tenant.
Plaintiff
concedes that the conversion claim does not incorporate the allegations of the
claim for possession, but requests leave to amend at the time of the hearing.
C.
Reply filed on July 21, 2022
FCC argues that
Plaintiff is asserting facts in opposition that are outside the complaint’s
allegations. Plaintiff admits there is no express contract between Plaintiff
and FCC. Plaintiff did not allege that FCC owns the land where the trailer is
being used. Plaintiff admits that the fifth cause of action incorporates the
wrong cause of action. Defendant asks the court to deny Plaintiff leave to
amend.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A motion for judgment on the
pleadings may be granted on grounds the complaint fails to state a cause of
action or the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Code Civ. Proc., §
438(b). A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleading can be made at any
time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. Stoops v. Abbassi
(2002) 100 Cal. App. 4th 644, 650. The motion performs the same function as a
general demurrer and attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the
pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Burnett v. Chimney
Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064. “Judicial notice” is the
recognition and acceptance by the court of the existence of a matter of law or
fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof
of the matter. Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117.
The general rules that apply to
demurrers also apply to motions for judgment on the pleadings. All facts
alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted, the complaint is given a
reasonable interpretation, and is read as a whole. Ludgate v. Lockheed
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 602. The court is “not concerned with a plaintiff's
possible inability to prove the claims made in the complaint, the allegations
of which are accepted as true and liberally construed with a view toward
attaining substantial justice. [Citations.]” Ludgate at 602.
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Third cause of action for common
counts
The claim, identified by Plaintiff
as one for quantum meruit, alleges that Plaintiff performed work, labor,
services, and materials at Defendant’s request and for which Defendant promised
to pay. Complaint, page 5. A common count can be based on an express contract,
an implied-in-fact contract, or a quasi-contract. Ferro v. Citizens Nat.
T&S Bank (1955) 44 Cal.2d 401, 409. Demurrer to a common count is
properly sustained where the plaintiff is not entitled to recover under those
counts in the complaint wherein all the facts upon which his claim is based are
specifically pleaded. The validity of a common count claim is dependent upon
whether a basis of recovery is adequately set forth in the other causes of
action.” Del E. Webb Corp. v.
Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 601.
Plaintiff’s opposition concedes
that the claim for quantum meruit is not based on the previously alleged claims
for breach of contract based on an agreement made with Defendant, Wild West.
Rather, Plaintiff’s opposition describes a separate set of facts on which FCC
is liable for the unpaid rental fees, namely that the trailer was furnished to
FCC’s tenant who vacated the property and is now defunct. Plaintiff contends FCC
is getting free use of the trailer and is benefiting from its possession. See
Opp. 4:9-16.
None of these facts are alleged in
the complaint and does not place FCC on notice of the claims alleged against
it. Accordingly, demurrer is sustained to the third cause of action.
B.
Fourth cause of action for
possession (replevin) of the modular trailer.
Plaintiff
alleges that the trailer sits on land vested to Defendants. Does 6-10. Said vested owners of the land are
in possession of Plaintiff’s trailer. Complaint, page 6, ¶ 4. However,
Plaintiff substituted FCC for Doe 1 who is alleged to have obtained possession
pursuant to a written lease agreement and then defaulted. Complaint, page 6, ¶
3. The new facts on which liability against FCC are based are not alleged.
Therefore, demurrer is sustained to the fourth cause of action.
C.
Fifth cause of action for
conversion.
To support a
claim for conversion, Plaintiff must allege facts showing an ownership interest
or a right to possession of property at the time of conversion, a wrongful act
or dispossession of Plaintiff’s property rights, and resulting damages. Lee
v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240. Plaintiff incorporates allegations
made in the third cause of action, which seeks the balance owing on rental
invoices. Complaint, page 5. Plaintiff concedes that this claim is instead based
on the fourth cause of action for possession. Opp. 7:18-20. As stated above,
both the third and fourth causes of action are defective in that they are based
on facts not alleged in the complaint. Therefore, demurrer to the fifth cause
of action is sustained.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, demurrer
to the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action is sustained. Leave to amend
is proper where Plaintiff has not had a fair opportunity to amend, and the
defect is capable of being cured. Even if the defect is substantive, “a
demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if there is a
possibility that subsequent amendments will supply omitted allegations.” Colvig
v. RKO Gen. (1965) 232 Cal. App. 2d 56, 69 70. Accordingly, the court
grants Plaintiff 10 days leave to amend. Cal Rules of Court, Rule 3.1320.