Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 21STCV21246, Date: 2025-02-03 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - MICHAEL J. SHULTZ  - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. 



Case Number: 21STCV21246    Hearing Date: February 3, 2025    Dept: 40

21STCV21246 S.C. an incompetent, by and through her Guardian ad Litem Sergio Cardenas. v. County of Los Angeles, et al.

 

Monday, February 3, 2025

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER TO THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT BY LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

 

                                                        I.          BACKGROUND

       The third amended complaint (“TAC”) alleges that Plaintiff is under the jurisdiction of Los Angeles Juvenile Dependency Court. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants collectively caused Plaintiff to be placed in improper care settings without an adequate case plan and deprived Plaintiff of access to services, culminating in an over three-year abandonment at College Hospital, a locked psychiatric setting, because Defendants allegedly refused to fund an appropriate residential and educational placement.

       The allegations pertinent to Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD” or “Defendant”) assert that while Plaintiff was placed at College Hospital in December 2017, LAUSD, who was allegedly responsible for the educational portion of Plaintiff’s services, received written notice from the County of Los Angeles (“County”) who was responsible for the costs of Plaintiff’s residential care, that Plaintiff was medically ready for discharge from College Hospital to a residential facility in Texas. (TAC ¶ 206.) Plaintiff alleges LAUSD refused to collaborate with the County and take any responsibility to plan, prepare, and fund the educational portion of Plaintiff’s services. (TAC ¶ 206-207.) LAUSD’s failure to coordinate with County deprived Plaintiff of access to an appropriate educational program.

       Of the five causes of action alleged, Plaintiff alleges one claim for negligence against LAUSD (third cause of action).            

                                                         II.         ARGUMENTS

       LAUSD argues that the  negligence claim fails because LAUSD did not owe a legal duty pursuant to Government Code § 7579.1. The court sustained demurrer to the second amended complaint because Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support the claim that LAUSD owed a duty to Plaintiff. At the time Plaintiff presented a government claim to LAUSD, Plaintiff was not a student of LAUSD. LAUSD also argues that it was absolved of responsibility by an administrative law judge.

       In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is no authority for the proposition that Plaintiff must be within LAUSD’s geographical boundaries in order for liability to attach. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had notice of Plaintiff’s impending discharge from College Hospital but did nothing to provide educational services to Plaintiff, which contributed to Plaintiff’s confinement for over three years.

       In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not cure the defect found by Justice Richardson when she sustained demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiff is not addressing that issue but attempts to fashion a new duty based on other statutes that are not the alleged basis for the negligence claim against LAUSD. Plaintiff improperly cites a federal court ruling issued in this case which addresses different theories of liability and legal issues.           

                                              III.        LEGAL STANDARDS

       A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the complaint’s sufficiency, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations as well as facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded facts. The court may also consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

       The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)

       Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case “with reasonable precision and with particularity that is sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.)  Whether the Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)

       A demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing, they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).)

       A pleading is required to assert general allegations of ultimate fact. Evidentiary facts are not required. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 47; Lim v. The.TV Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 684, 690.)

                                                         IV.        DISCUSSION

A.      Judicial notice

       The court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the ruling on demurrer to the second amended complaint issued August 27, 2024. (LAUSD RJN Ex. A.) (Evid. Code, § 452(d).) Notice is taken of the existence of the document but not of facts stated therein as the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113–114.)

       The court denies Defendant’s request for judicial notice of an administrative opinion issued July 21, 2020 as it is not relevant for purposes of this demurrer.

       The court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of an earlier federal court ruling issued in this case as it is not relevant.

B.      Alleged bases for a duty of care

       A public entity is not liable for an injury “[e]xcept as provided by statute.” (Gov. Code § 815.). The negligence claim against the County is based on a number of statutes that allegedly impose liability on LAUSD, a public entity: Government Code § 815.2 (vicarious liability for acts or omissions of employees); section 815.4 (for acts or omissions of an independent contractor);  § 820 subd. (a) (imposes liability on a public entity to the same extent as a private person); Civil Code § 1714 (duty of reasonable care); section 815.6 (mandatory duty of care).  (TAC ¶ 272-276.)

       Plaintiff also alleges statutes imposing a duty under various sections of the Education Code, Government Code § 7579.1 (hereafter, “Section 7579.1”), a federal statute, and the Code of Federal Regulations. (TAC ¶ 281.) Plaintiff alleges these statutes relate to school stability; special education programs, and interagency collaboration for students in special education; to facilitate transition of individuals with exceptional needs; and to ensure residency laws, practices, and policies do not act as a barrier to enrollment of homeless youth. (TAC ¶ 281a-c – 282a.-g.)

       Of the approximately nine separate statutory bases for liability alleged (ie., whether a duty is owed), LAUSD focuses on one: namely, Government Code § 7579.1 and the intricacies of that statute which Defendant argues requires that LAUSD receive a discharge notice from College Hospital before LAUSD was duty-bound to act.

       The existence of a duty owed may properly be challenged at the demurrer stage, as it is generally a question of law. (Osornio v. Weingarten (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 304, 316.) Notwithstanding Judge Richardson’s analysis of whether Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to trigger application of Section 7579.1, one of the nine statutory bases for a duty, this leaves the other bases for liability that were not the subject of demurrer to the SAC.  (Dem. SAC 4/26/24, p. 2.) Justice Richardson did not expressly rule on them. (RJN, Ex. A.)

       With respect to the specific acts (or nonfeasance) by LAUSD when Plaintiff was allegedly medically ready for discharge, Plaintiff alleges LAUSD violated California Education Code § 48852.7, 56195.7(j) 56205, 56325(a), 42 USC 11431, et seq., and Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations. (TAC ¶ 288.)

       A general demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action. (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167.) If there are sufficient allegations to entitle plaintiff to relief, other allegations cannot be challenged by general demurrer. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) The remaining statutory bases for liability on which the negligence claim is based are not successfully challenged; the court is obligated to accept as true that Defendant breached a duty imposed by those statutes.

       Defendant glosses over the applicability of Education Code Education Code sections 48852.7, 56195.7 (j), 56205, 56325 (a), Government Code section 7579.1, McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 USC § 11431, et seq. and Title 34 CFR § 300.115(a) contending without any reference to the specific statutes or case law interpreting those statutes and its proper application, that they do not apply to prospective or potential students. (Dem. 14:20-24.) Defendant relies on C.A. v. Williams S. Hart (2012 53 Cal.4th 861, which discussed a school district’s duty owed to students for negligent hiring, retention and supervision. The case did not discuss the application of the specific mandatory duties owed under the particular statutes cited by Plaintiff.

       Thus, even if Plaintiff failed to plead facts to support application of a specific statute, the defect would not be fatal and would not dispose of the cause of action, given the other bases of duty alleged by Plaintiff and that survive demurrer. This is an independent basis for overruling demurrer.

       Given that Justice Richardson’s ruling was confined to the requirements of section 7579.1, the court examines the allegations of the third amended complaint as it pertains to this statute.  Section 7579.1, requires the operator of the hospital or medical facility (College Hospital) to notify the local educational agency of the impending discharge at least 10 days prior to discharge to ensure proper educational placement. (Gov. Code, § 7579.1.) Justice Richardson’s ruling stated that the SAC “does not allege that LAUSD was given notice of discharge, only that LAUSD had notice that Plaintiff had been accepted at another program.” (M.O. 8/27/24, p. 5, 3.)

       The SAC adequately alleges that LAUSD received written notice from County that Plaintiff was medically ready for discharge, but LAUSD refused to collaborate with County in the preparation of Plaintiff’s educational services.  (TAC ¶ 206.) Between December 2017 through February 16, 2021, LAUSD received written notice from College Hospital that Plaintiff was medically ready for a discharge, however, LAUSD refused to take any responsibility over Plaintiff’s educational services or placement.” (TAC ¶ 207.) In short, the defect articulated by Justice Richardson has been cured.

C.      Government claim.

       Plaintiff alleged a government claim was presented to LAUSD and others on November 6, 2020. (TAC ¶ 22.) On December 8, 2020, LAUSD denied Plaintiff’s claim. (TAC ¶ 23.)

       Defendant contends the government claim was not valid because Plaintiff was still at College Hospital and a student of Defendant ABCUSD at the time the claim was presented.   College Hospital discharged Plaintiff on February 16, 2021. Therefore, by operation of law, LAUSD contends Plaintiff was not a student of LAUSD at the time the claim was presented.

       The complaint alleges malfeasance on the part of LAUSD specifically on April 20, 2020 (preceding Plaintiff’s presentation of the government claim), when Defendant did not appear at an IEP meeting attended by Plaintiff’s IEP team that included County. (TAC ¶ 159.) LAUSD refused to take responsibility for Plaintiff’s educational services (TAC ¶ 160.) Defendant argues that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff because Plaintiff was a resident of an out-of-state hospital and had not been discharged.

       Defendant has not persuasively argued that Plaintiff’s physical location determines whether a duty is owed. Defendant restricts the parameters of its duty to Plaintiff through the limitations of Section 7579.1, which requires a duty to act upon Plaintiff’s discharge. Again, there are other bases for a duty owed to Plaintiff all of which survive demurrer. Whether the application of those statutes depend on the geographical location of Plaintiff is not established.

V.   CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing, demurrer to the third amended complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant, Los Angeles Unified School District, is ordered to file its answer in 30 days.