Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00214, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must:

1. Contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling.

2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and

3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service.

If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on. 

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Case Number: 22CMCV00214    Hearing Date: March 8, 2023    Dept: A

22CMCV00214 Santander Consumer USA, Inc., dba Chrysler Capital v. Meifang Yao, et al.

Tuesday, March 8,  2023 at 8:30 a.m.

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION

 

I.                    Background

The complaint, filed on January 8, 2022, alleges that Defendant, Meifang Yao (Yao), purchased a vehicle from Plaintiff’s assignor pursuant to a written contract. Plaintiff, Santander Consumer USA Inc., dba Chrysler Capital, now has legal title to the vehicle. Yao failed to make regular monthly payments and now owes $38,986.62. Defendant Yao transferred the vehicle to Defendants, Tan-Ing Chou, FCC Logistics, Inc, (collectively, the Body Shop), who applied to the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) for approval to conduct a lien sale, which Plaintiff has opposed. Plaintiff alleges claims for claim and delivery of personal property and writ of possession, conversion, quiet title, and declaratory relief.

II.                  Arguments

On September 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for writ of possession of the vehicle against all Defendants. Defendant, FCC Logistics, Inc. (FCC) opposes the application because Defendant Yao has not been served with summons or this application. Defendant Chou was dismissed on August 31, 2022.

The Court previously continued the hearing on Plaintiff’s application at the parties’ request because the lack of service on Defendant Yao curable. (M.O. 1/11/23).

In supplemental papers, Plaintiff contends it has title to the vehicle at issue based on its perfected security interest. FCC contends it has a superior warehouse lien with the right of auction to recover storage fees incurred by Defendant Yao. FCC also argues that Plaintiff did not cure the defects stated in the Court’s tentative ruling posted on January 12, 2023. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s evidence.

In reply, Plaintiff argues that the supplemental declarations filed establish Plaintiff’s right to possession since it arose before FCC’s interest in the vehicle. Yao was served with the summons and complaint.

III.                Legal Standards 

To obtain a writ of possession, a plaintiff must establish by affidavit the right to immediate possession of tangible personal property, and that the property is being wrongfully withheld by the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010). The application shall be signed under oath, show the basis of plaintiff’s claim, the written instrument upon which it is based, that the property is being wrongfully detained, by whom, in what manner, and the reason for its detention. (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (b)).

A plaintiff must show the probable validity of the claim to possession of the property. A claim has “probable validity where it is more likely than not that plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.090). The application for writ of possession must include “[a] statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there.” Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010  subd. (b)(4).

IV.                Discussion

Plaintiff personally served Defendant, Meifang Yao, with the summons and complaint on January 15, 2023. (Arden Decl., Ex. B, .pdf page 7). Plaintiff also submitted a legible copy of the lease agreement showing the lessor assigned the lease to “CCAP Auto Lease LTD” under the terms of the Chrysler Capital Non-Recourse Master Deal agreement in effect. (Supp. Jaimes Decl., Ex. B, .pdf page 13). Defendant’s objection No. 2 is overruled.

The Certificate of Title previously submitted, identifies “CCAP Auto Lease, LTD” as the lienholder and lessor. (Jaimes Decl., Ex. B, .pdf page 9). Felicia Jaimes submits a notarized affidavit of fact signed by her, which shows that Santander has the rights to service, secure, or release the interest on a vehicle, including repossession of a vehicle, involving a number of creditors, including “CCAP Auto Lease, LTD.” (Supp. Jaimes Decl., Ex. A, .pdf page 3.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has shown its right to repossess the vehicle. Defendant’s objection No. 1 is overruled.

Defendant’s lien arises from storage fees incurred totaling $19,245.  (Decl. of Jeremy Wong filed 12/27/22, Ex. B). Defendant does not operate as a “body shop.” Its only interest is the accumulated storage fees. Id.  Defendant has a lien for storage fees in the amount set forth by statute. (Civ. Code, § 3068). The lien arose on May 6, 2019, the date Defendant received the vehicle. (Decl. of Jeremy Wong filed 12/27/22, Ex. A).  Plaintiff does not address the value of Defendant’s interest in the vehicle incurred for storage fees or what Defendant is statutorily entitled to recover. If the request for release of the vehicle is made more than 24 hours after the vehicle is placed in storage, “charges may be imposed on a full, calendar-day basis for each day, or part thereof, that the vehicle is in storage.” (Civ. Code, § 3068(c)).

Plaintiff must post an undertaking prior to the Court’s issuance of a writ of possession. (Code Civ. Proc., § 515.010). The amount of the undertaking "shall be in an amount not less than twice the value of the defendant's interest in the property or in a greater amount. The value of the defendant's interest in the property is determined by the market value of the property less the amount due and owing on any conditional sales contract or security agreement and all liens and encumbrances on the property, and other factors necessary to determine the defendant's interest in the property." Code Civ. Proc., § 515.010, subd. (a).

Plaintiff previously submitted evidence of the Kelley Blue Book value of the vehicle at issue showing a listing price of $35,004. (Jaimes Decl. filed 9/1/22, Ex. D.). Accordingly, the Court calculates Plaintiff’s undertaking as follows:

FMV

$35,004.00

Amt of Defendant’s Lien

-19,245.00

Total

15,759.00

X 2

$31,518.00

 

V.                  CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the application is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to post an undertaking in the amount of $31,518.00