Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00240, Date: 2023-11-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CMCV00240 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Dept: A
22CMCV00240
Jane Doe v. Doe #1, a public entity, and Doe #2, an individual
Tuesday,
March 12, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
I.
BACKGROUND
The
complaint alleges that Plaintiff was the victim of sexual abuse while a student
at the Alain LeRoy Locke College Preparatory Academy (“Locke Academy”) during
the 1996 to 1997 school year. Defendant, Los Angeles Unified School District
(“Defendant” or “District”) allegedly maintained, operated, and employed
teachers at Locke Academy. Plaintiff alleges claims for childhood sexual abuse,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision,
failure to report child abuse, and negligence.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on grounds the enacting
legislation, AB 218, that revived Plaintiff’s claims, is unconstitutional
because it strips statutory governmental immunity from public entities. The
legislation removed a necessary element of a claim against a public entity
(requirement to present a tort claim) which constitutes an impermissible gift
of public funds. The act of providing retroactive relief from claims filing
requirements is unconstitutional as the trial court found in a Contra Costa
County case of which Defendant requests judicial notice. The legislature has no
power to create “new liability” against a government entity for past acts of
negligence.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues the District cannot cite any
authority declaring that Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1 is unconstitutional. The Court
of Appeal held to the contrary. The District relies on cases that are over 120
years old and have no bearing on this case. The legislature is entitled to
revive stale claims. There has not been any “appropriation” of public funds. The
statute serves a public purpose.
In reply, the District argues that the statute does not state a
public purpose, however, this is principle is not the relevant analysis since all
legislation has a public purpose. The court must first determine whether a
violation of the gift clause occurred.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A party
can move for judgment on the pleadings on grounds the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 438 subd.
(c)(B)). The motion performs the same function as a general demurrer and
attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters
subject to judicial notice. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064). For the purposes of this motion, all properly
alleged material facts are deemed true. (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior
Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)
As with
demurrers, the court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions
of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994)
7 Cal.4th 634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to
establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians
Service (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
Defendant has not established
that AB 218 is an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The interpretation of
a statute and whether it is constitutional are questions of law. (Valov v. Department of Motor
Vehicles
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.) The District contends that AB 218 which enacted
Civil Procedure § 340.1 reviving childhood sexual abuse claims and eliminating
the requirement that the plaintiff present a tort claim prior to filing suit
against a government entity are unlawful gifts of public funds in violation of
the California Constitution.
The California Constitution
provides that the legislature has no power “to make any gift or authorize the
making of any gift * * * of any public money or thing of value to any
individual * * *; provided, that nothing in this section shall prevent the
Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 21 of this article … .” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745 (the “Gift Clause”).) The
term “gift” is not limited to the transfer of personal property without
consideration, but includes all appropriations of public money, for which there
is no authority or enforceable claim. (Conlin v. Board of Sup'rs of
City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21.)
Defendant cites Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, wherein, the Legislature
passed a special act to compensate a prison guard who had been injured while in
the State’s employment, although the state was not previously liable. (Id.) The court held that if the state desired to
make itself liable, it had to enact a general law to embrace all cases coming
into its provisions.
In contrast, AB 218 does not
address one person’s injury claim, but rather applies generally to victims of
childhood sexual assault that meet the requirements of statute. Bourn is
distinguishable. (Id.) at 328 [“A legislative appropriation made to an
individual in payment of a claim for damages on account of personal injuries
sustained by him while in its service, and for which the state is not
responsible, either upon general principles of law or by reason of some
previous statute creating such liability, is a gift within the meaning of the
constitution. The appropriation made to petitioner was a mere gratuitous
assumption of an obligation from which the state was and is exempt." (Bourn at 328.)
The District also cites Conlin v. Board of Sup'rs of
City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21 for the same proposition. Conlin
is equally distinguishable. There, the
Legislature passed an act authorizing the City & County of San Francisco to
pay John Conlin, specifically, $54,015 to a contractor for work done upon
public streets pursuant to a contract that remained unpaid. That case involved
appropriation of public funds to a particular person’s benefit, not for a
public purpose. (Conlin at
20.)
The District next cites Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271 and Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 both of which are inapposite.
At the time of a particular juror’s completion of jury service in Powell
, jurors did not have legal entitlement to payment for such service.
Thereafter, the Legislature passed a law providing for the payment of juror
fees in all counties, which the Powell Court determined was
unconstitutional because it created liability, and therefore, resulted in an
impermissible gift of public funds. (Powell 213.) The court held that the gift clause did not
allow “any room for moral considerations.” (Powell at 274.) Heron recognized the
same principle, that the legislature cannot create liability for past acts of
negligence as doing so would be an impermissible gift of public funds. (Heron at 517.)
The statute on which
Plaintiff relies for government entity liability was enacted in 1963. (Gov.
Code § 815.2.) AB 218 did not “create” an entirely new liability; it enacted a
“revival provision expressly and unequivocally encompassing claims of childhood
sexual abuse previously barred for failure to present a timely government
claim.” (Coats v. New Haven Unified
School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 430–431.) Coats determined that the retroactive
application of the legislation was constitution. (Id.)
The District then argues that
the claims presentation requirement under the Government Claims Act is a
substantive element of a claim against a public entity. The statute ultimately
removed that requirement and made it retroactive. Defendant argues that the
Legislature cannot excuse a substantive element of any claim against a public
entity. (Shirk v. Vista Unified School
Dist.
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 ["Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural
requirement, but is, as this court long ago concluded, ‘a condition precedent
to plaintiff's maintaining an action against defendant’ [citations omitted],
and thus an element of the plaintiff's cause of action."].)
In response to Shirk,
the Legislature enacted Government Code, section 905, subd. (m) which
eliminated the claims presentation requirement for claims pursuant to Civil
Procedure, section 340.1 for damages for childhood sexual abuse. (A.M. v. Ventura Unified School
Dist.
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1258.) The enacting legislation, S.B. 640, was
“intended to address the Shirk decision by expressly providing that
childhood sexual abuse actions against public entities are exempted from
presentation requirements, but only for claims arising out of conduct occurring
on or after January 1, 2009.” (Id.) Therefore, the District’s reliance
on Shirk for the proposition that AB 218 unconstitutionally gifts public
funds by removing an element of a cause of action (claims presentation
requirements) is misplaced, given the Legislature’s passage of Gov Code,
section 905 subd. (m) in response to Shirk.
Moreover, the exemption for
claims presentation requirements applicable to claims arising on or after
January 1, 2009, was subsequently eliminated by the passage of AB 218 and provided
that the changes were retroactive. (Gov Code § 905 subd (p). Plaintiff filed
this action on July 26, 2022. The version of the statute in effect at the time
of filing provided that any claim not litigated to finality and that would
otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020 “because the applicable statute of
limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired,
is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1,
2020.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1 (q).) Accordingly, this action
falls within the scope of section 340.1’s revival provisions.
The Court grants Defendant’s
request for judicial notice of court records filed in Contra Costa County
Superior Court Case No. C22-02613 Jane Doe #1 v. Acalanes Union High School
District. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).) This Court does not find the trial court’s
determination in Contra Costa to be persuasive.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.