Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00278, Date: 2024-10-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CMCV00278    Hearing Date: October 15, 2024    Dept: A

22CMCV00278 Pedro Mauricio Mendoza v. General Motors, LLOC

Tuesday, October 15, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

I.        BACKGROUND      

       This action arises from alleged violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “Act”) in connection with Plaintiff’s purchase of a vehicle manufactured by Defendant. On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed Notice of Settlement on May 14, 2024.   

       On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s Code Civ. Proc., § 998 offer of settlement of $95,000 plus pre-judgment interest.  

II.      ARGUMENTS

       Plaintiffs requests an award of statutory attorney’s fees of $33,777.00 with a multiplier of 1.5 additional fees to prepare and reply to this motion and to appear at the hearing. Plaintiff argues he is entitled to attorney’s fees under the Act and is the prevailing party. Plaintiff argues that this action was heavily litigated because of Defendant’s obstruction and delay tactics.

       In opposition, Defendant argues this case did not present any unique issues and did not require special skill. This case is identical to the hundreds of matters litigated against Defendant. Plaintiff propounded recycled discovery requests, filed virtually identical briefs and motions, created unnecessary litigation, and otherwise wastes resources. This case apparently required 17 different timekeepers although the litigation spanned one year and eight months. The request should be reduced to $13,009.86, a 20% deduction of billed hours.

       In reply, Plaintiff argues that the proposed award is reasonable given the recovery obtained by counsel. Plaintiff was forced to file discovery motions

III.    LEGAL STANDARDS

       A prevailing buyer in an action under the SBA “shall be allowed by the court” to recover the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, “including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794 subd.(d).) A prevailing buyer has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.
(Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 396, 405.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (Id.)

       A reasonable fee can be measured by the marketplace by analyzing the quality and necessity of services and then comparing that cost with what other attorneys with similar experience and ability charge for the same services. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 1002.)

       In Song-Beverly cases, the court applies the lodestar method in calculating attorney’s fees, including the use of fee multipliers where applicable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818.) The court determines a lodestar figure “based on a careful compilation of the actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney.” (Robertson at 819.) The lodestar may be augmented or diminished “by taking various relevant factors into account including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the  fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” (Robertson at 819.) The multiplier is a risk enhancement based on the probability of loss. (Robertson at 821.)  

       The court has considered these relevant factors. While Defendant argues redacted items should be stricken in their entirety, the substance of any communication between counsel and client is not material to the court’s motion. Plaintiff’s counsel asserts these are tasks connected to the litigation.

       The prevailing party is entitled to “’compensation for all the hours reasonably spent” in litigating the action to a successful conclusion. (Ibid., italics in original.) ‘Reasonably spent’ means that time spent ‘in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394.)

       The court may rely on his or her own experience and is given broad discretion in calculating reasonable attorney’s fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 ["The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”].)

IV.    DISCUSSION

       Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of fees incurred by founder and managing partner, Jessica Anvar; senior partner, Carey B. Wood; an associate, Lara Rogers; senior associate, Erik Whitman, and paralegals, Virginia Walls, Elaine Astorga, David Gomez, and Clarence Serrano for a total of 98.7 billable hours not including time spent in connection with Plaintiff’s fee motion.

        The Court finds that the nature of the case, which in the Court’s view, is a relatively routine Song-Beverly claim did not involve novel or difficult questions of law or fact. The matter resolved relatively quickly with little motion practice. The case required minimal discovery. The Court also considers the outcome of the case which resolved with an acceptance of Defendant’s statutory 998 offer of settlement. Plaintiff’s request for a lodestar multiplier is DENIED.

       The Court has reviewed the billing record and finds that a number of the itemized tasks are unreasonable, inefficient, and at times duplicative among two partners, two associates, and four paralegals. Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to reasonable compensation; however, “‘padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation." (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

       The Court is permitted to make “across the board cuts and apply a negative multiplier” where it determines that the case was not complex, as well as the experience of counsel in this area. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41 [permitting a negative multiplier of 33% to the lodestar fee request of $351,055.26, resulting in a fee award of $115,848.24].)

       The Court has discretion to apply a reduction in hours for duplicative and/or excessive billing. Proper factors to consider in applying a negative reduction are the lack of complexity, that the matter did not go to trial, that name partners were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys, and that all the attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals, thus applying a 39% reduction in the lodestar. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.) These factors are applicable here.

       The court finds that Anvar’s billing tasks were largely duplicated by senior partner Wood, who oversaw the work of associate Rogers, who did the bulk of the work. The court deducts Anvar’s duplicative work. A review of the time records reveal that the work of Wood’s supervision of Rogers and a second associate, Whitman, are inefficient, duplicative, and excessive.

       The work of four paralegals for a non-complex Song-Beverly case that did not require trial is excessive, duplicative, inefficient and over-billed for relatively simple tasks. The court reduces Plaintiff’s total billed hours of 112.97 hours to 90.38. The court determines that the following hourly fee is reasonable.