Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00289, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CMCV00289    Hearing Date: January 25, 2024    Dept: A

22CMCV00289 Javier Salazar Casarez, et al v. General Motors, LLC

Thursday, January 25, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE

I.        BACKGROUND

       The complaint alleges that Defendant, General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”), issued a written warranty to Plaintiffs with their purchase of a2021 Chevrolet Tahoe. The vehicle developed defects that Defendant allegedly failed to repair or repurchase in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

II.      ARGUMENTS

       Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s responses to the document request were evasive, non-responsive and contained boilerplate objections. Plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to engage in numerous efforts to meet and confer with defense counsel, who failed to respond in good faith.

       Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to meet and confer in good faith as Plaintiffs did not provide any meaningful substantive reasoning or analysis. The objections are well founded. Plaintiff does not need other vehicle information. Defendant already produced documents sought by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek confidential material.

       In reply, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has yet to provide documents responsive to the request served in September 2023.

III.    LEGAL STANDARDS

       A motion to compel further responses to a document request is proper where Plaintiffs believe Defendant’s statement of compliance is incomplete, or a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive and/or an objection in the response is without merit or too general.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310.) The parties have met and conferred informally and with the Court without resolution.

       The scope of discovery is liberally construed in favor of disclosure “as a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.” (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court of Merced County (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355, 377-378.) The broad scope of permissible discovery includes “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

IV.    DISCUSSION

       This matter is the 58th action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) filed in this Court against GM. This Court has heard 29 discovery motions to date involving GM’s failure to respond to relevant and discoverable requests for documents. As in every discovery motion brought by a plaintiff, GM opposes on the virtually the same grounds: Plaintiffs failed to meet and confer in good faith, the discovery involves irrelevant topics that include vehicles other than Plaintiffs’ (“other vehicle evidence”), the documents are subject to numerous privileges, and/or compliance is unduly burdensome and oppressive.

       The Court has previously articulated its position on these same issues in multiple motions raised in the following cases involving GM:

       In this case, Defense counsel failed to respond in good faith to Plaintiffs’ request to meet and confer especially in light of the 29 discovery motions heard by this Court on the same if not identical issues wherein the Court rejected GM’s objections concerning the relevance and discoverability of information sought by Plaintiffs.  Here, Plaintiffs requests Defendant’s internal investigations and analyses of the “Infotainment” and front bumper defects. (Requests 16-21, 59-64.)

       Contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiffs sent detailed letters concerning Plaintiffs’ issues with Defendant’s objections on October 31, 2023, and November 7, 2023. (Fennell Decl., Ex. 11, 12). Plaintiffs agreed to sign Defendant’s protective order. Defendant twice responded with letters standing by its objections and “maintaining its position.” (Fennell Decl., Exs. 13, 14.) Plaintiffs sent a third letter, fourth letter, and fifth letter to meet and confer indicating how Defendant’s responses were deficient. (Fennell Decl., Ex. 15.) Defendant responded on the latter three occasions that it stood by its objections, that its responses were code compliant, and otherwise refused to produce any information. (Fennel Decl.,  Ex. 16-19.) 

       GM’S opposition again offers no substantive or persuasive argument for failing to produce documents. The Court has previously determined that internal investigation documents fall within the broad scope of discovery in lemon law cases. The Court has conducted informal discovery conferences on other matters with GM’s counsel (Erskine Law Firm) explaining why the discovery is permissible.

       The Court has previously refused to consider the now-five-year-old Declaration of Huizhen Lu, Defendant’s Senior Technical Consultant, submitted in support of GM’s contention that the discovery sought includes trade secret and confidential information. (Declaration, Xylon Quezada, Ex. A.) GM provides a copy of the same declaration signed on October 25, 2018, that contains generalized statements about purported trade secret and confidential information which “may” be contained in the requested discovery. This contention is vague, evasive, and speculative. The declaration predates the filing of this action and the date of manufacture of the vehicle at issue. Defendant’s confidentiality objections are not substantiated.

       Moreover, where Defendant objects to testimony concerning confidentiality, trade secret, attorney-client privilege, work product, or any other privilege, Defendant is required to provide a privilege log of all documents withheld and the specific objection asserted to enable the Court to determine whether any privilege applies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240 subp. (b).) The privilege log must contain clear descriptions of the documents as set forth in the statute. (Id.)

       Plaintiffs are entitled to discover “other vehicle” evidence. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154.) The requests are relevant to Plaintiffs’ burden of establishing Defendant’s non-compliance with its obligations under the Act to reasonably attempt to repair vehicle of the same make and model with respect to the defects at issue. (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

       The discovery of internal investigations and analyses of the “Infotainment” and front bumper defects are also relevant to establish Defendant’s knowledge of the defects and whether it failed to comply with the Act. The discovery is also relevant to the recovery of civil penalties. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136.) To recover civil penalties, the buyer must show that “the manufacturer's failure to comply was willful. The penalty is important ‘as a deterrent to deliberate violations. Without such a provision, a seller or manufacturer who knew the consumer was entitled to a refund or replacement might nevertheless be tempted to refuse compliance in the hope the consumer would not persist, secure in the knowledge its liability was limited to refund or replacement.’” (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136.)

To establish this violation, the jury can consider whether “(1) the manufacturer knew the vehicle had not been repaired within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of attempts, and (2) whether the manufacturer had a written policy on the requirement to repair or replace. (Jensen at 136.) Accordingly, the internal analysis and investigative documents are relevant and discoverable.

       Defendant has not established with any evidence that compliance with the document request will be unreasonably burdensome and oppressive. Defendant’s remedy is to move for a protective order, not refuse to respond or unilaterally impose limitations on Plaintiffs’ discovery. Defendant did not meet its burden of proof on this issue. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)

       To the extent Defendant refers Plaintiffs to documents previously produced, the response is improper. Plaintiffs are entitled to a complete response in the form required by statute. It is not proper to answer, “by stating, ‘see my deposition,’ ‘see my pleading,’ or ‘see the financial statement.’ Indeed, if a question does require the responding party to make reference to a pleading or document, the pleading or document should be identified and summarized so the answer is fully responsive to the question.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne, (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 783-784.)

       Defendant cannot simply object to the production of electronically stored information based on “undue burden or expense.” Rather, "the responding party shall identify in its response the types or categories of sources of electronically stored information that it asserts are not reasonably accessible. By objecting and identifying information of a type or category of source or sources that are not reasonably accessible, the responding party preserves any objections it may have relating to that electronically stored information." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210.)

       In anticipation of GM’s request for more than 10 days to comply because it is overburdened by the number of lemon law cases it must defend and the discovery propounded, the request is denied. Plaintiff served the document request on September 29, 2023, and has not received any valid response. (Fennell Decl., ¶ 15.) Defendants spent nearly five months refusing to produce documents knowing GM’s familiar objections to the same discovery were not well taken by this Court on at least 29 occasions. Defense counsel’s inability to accommodate its case load is not an issue for the Court to resolve, especially where the claim of “undue burden” is not supported by any evidence.

V.   CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.        Defendant is ordered to serve within 10 days, further, verified responses and production of documents to Requests 16-21, 59-64, without objection and in a form that complies with statute within 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, et seq.) As Plaintiffs did not request imposition of sanctions, none is awarded.