Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00295, Date: 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CMCV00295 Hearing Date: May 16, 2023 Dept: A
22CMCV00295 Julian Israel Guzman Zarate, et al. v.
General Motors, LLC
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES AND PRODUCTION TO
PLAINTIFFS’ DOCUMENT REQUEST
I.
BACKGROUND
The
complaint alleges that Plaintiffs bought a vehicle made by Defendant that
developed defects in the electrical, transmission, and braking systems. Defendant
failed to repair or repurchase the vehicle. Plaintiffs allege violations of the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs request an
order to compel Defendant to respond to document requests to which Defendant
made meritless objections that are routinely made in these cases and are made
in bad faith. The requests sought records relating to Defendant’s knowledge of
the defect in Defendant’s 2020 GMC Sierra 1500. Plaintiffs met and conferred
with Defendant to resolve the issues without success.
Defendant contends that
it has timely responded to all discovery requests and produced documents. Plaintiffs
do not need more documents. Plaintiffs failed to meet and confer.
In reply, Plaintiffs
contend that Defendant has not produced the vast majority of documents
requested. Plaintiffs made numerous attempts to meet and confer, but Defendant
stands by its objections. The discovery is relevant and discoverable. Plaintiffs
object to defense counsel’s declaration which contains conclusory statements
that lack foundation.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A
motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents is
proper where Plaintiffs believe Defendant’s statement of compliance is
incomplete, or a representation of inability to comply is inadequate,
incomplete, or evasive and/or an objection in the response is without merit or
too general. Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310.
The parties have met and conferred informally and with the Court without
resolution.
The
scope of discovery is liberally construed in favor of disclosure “as a matter
of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.”
(Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court of Merced County (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355, 377-378.) The broad scope of permissible
discovery includes “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion
made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
To
prevail on a claim for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
(“the Act”) Plaintiffs’ burden is to establish that “(1) the vehicle had a
nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the
use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the
vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of
the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or
his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number
of repair attempts (the failure to repair element). Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)
In
response to the discovery, Defendant is obligated to make affirmative
representations of whether the specific documents requested exist and that a
diligent search and inquiry was made and what if any documents were withheld as
specifically identified in a privilege log, whether the inability to comply is
because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed,
has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the
possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall
set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or
believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or
category of item. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.230, 2031.240.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendant’s
evidence.
·
No. 1. Declaration of Ryan Kay,
Defendant’s counsel. Sustained. Whether Defendant timely served full and
complete responses is argumentative not factual.
·
No. 2. Kay Declaration. Sustained.
Lacks foundation as to Plaintiffs’ positions.
·
Nos. 3, 4, Ex. A and B to the Kay
declaration. Sustained. A trial court’s minute order in another action is
irrelevant.
·
Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, Ex. C, and
Declaration of Huizhen Lu, Defendant’s Senior Technical Consultant. Sustained. Lacks
foundation, irrelevant. The Lu declaration provides generalized, conclusory
statements about purported trade secret and confidential information which
“may” be contained in the requested discovery, none of which is identified specifically
in a privilege log as required by statute. It is also dated October 25, 2018, nearly
four years before Plaintiffs filed this action. Therefore, the declaration
cannot be based on the “subject vehicle” in this action as the declarant
asserts, the specific defects at issue, or the specific requests made by
Plaintiffs.
B.
At issue are Requests Nos. 16, 19,
20, and 21.
Plaintiffs
generally categorize these requests as documents concerning internal analysis
or investigation of the transmission defect at issue in vehicles of the same
year, make, and model, including other consumer complaints relating to the
transmission defect. The request is relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegation that
Defendant was aware of the defect and that it was unable to service or repair the
vehicle to conform to express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts.
Complaint, ¶ 23.
The
request is not vague or ambiguous as Defendant contends. Nor is it improper, as
Defendant asserts, for Plaintiffs to “assume” that there are alleged defects;
this is Plaintiffs’ central allegation. (See Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt. 3:16-19.
To
the extent that Defendant objects to the production of “other vehicle
evidence,” the objection is without merit. The scope of documents extending to
vehicles of the same make and model is relevant because Plaintiffs must
establish Defendant’s knowledge of the transmission defect at issue in the same
vehicle. The Act requires that "the manufacturer [] maintain or [] designate
and authorize service and repair facilities in the state (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd.
(a)(1)(A)); i.e., usually, automobile dealerships with service departments
thereby making a manufacturer capable of becoming aware of every failed repair
attempt.” (Krotin
v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 303
[“Computerized record keeping at dealership service depts could easily
facilitate this task…”; Donlen v. Ford Motor Co.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 [Testimony about a defective transmission
installed in plaintiff’s truck and other trucks and what the manufacturer did
to notify dealers and technicians about problems with this transmission model
was “certainly probative and not unduly prejudicial."].) Therefore,
Defendant’s knowledge of the alleged defects in the subject vehicle and in
vehicles of the same year, make, and model and Defendant’s attempts to comply
with its statutory obligations to repair and/or replace are relevant.
The
extent of Defendant’s knowledge of the defect and an acknowledged failure to
repair it is also relevant to the recovery of civil penalties if the buyer can
show that “the manufacturer's failure to comply was willful. The penalty is
important ‘as a deterrent to deliberate violations. Without such a provision, a
seller or manufacturer who knew the consumer was entitled to a refund or
replacement might nevertheless be tempted to refuse compliance in the hope the
consumer would not persist, secure in the knowledge its liability was limited
to refund or replacement.’” (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136.) To establish this violation,
the jury can consider whether “(1) the manufacturer knew the vehicle had not
been repaired within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of
attempts, and (2) whether the manufacturer had a written policy on the
requirement to repair or replace. (Id.)
Defendant
has not established that compliance with the request will be unreasonably
burdensome and oppressive.
Defendant’s remedy is to move for a protective order, not refuse to
respond or unilaterally impose limitations on Plaintiffs’ discovery. To support
an objection of oppression, there must be some showing by the opposing party
either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate
effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417. Oppression must not be equated with
burden; “[t]he objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence
showing the quantum of work required, … .”(Id.) The Lu declaration does not satisfy this
burden, mainly because it predates Plaintiff’s complaint.
Defendant
refuses to produce documents that it determines constitutes trade secret or
proprietary information or is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Defendant is required to provide a privilege
log of all the documents at issue and the specific objection so that the court
can determine whether or not any privilege applies. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240
subd. (b). The privilege log must contain clear descriptions of the documents
as set forth in the statute.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for
Production of Documents is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to serve verified,
code-compliant responses, and production of documents within 10 calendar days
of the Court’s order. Where applicable, Defendant is ordered to provide a
privilege log in the form set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.240
subd. (b). Plaintiffs did not request
imposition of sanctions; therefore, none is awarded.