Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00304, Date: 2023-11-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CMCV00304 Hearing Date: November 30, 2023 Dept: A
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The
first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges that Plaintiff was a victim of child
sexual abuse perpetrated by Defendant’s employee, Robert Crumb, while a
Plaintiff was a student at Samuel Gompers Middle School. Plaintiff alleges various
claims for negligence.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School
District (LAUSD) moves for judgment on the pleading. The legislation enacting
Civil Procedure § 340.1 (“AB 218”) retroactively and impermissibly revived
claims previously barred, and the amendment effectively stripped Defendant of
immunity. AB 218 removed a substantive element of Plaintiff’s claim, which was
to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act (“GCA”). The legislation
constitutes an impermissible gift of public funds. The Contra County Superior
Court sustained demurrer on these grounds in Jane Doe #1 et al v. Acalanes
Union High School District (the “AUHSD” action).
Plaintiff argues that Section 340.1’s
retroactive elimination of claims filing presentation requirements for cases
seeking damage from childhood sexual assault has been declared constitutional,
nor does it constitute a gift of public funds. The statute serves a public
purpose and cannot constitute a gift. The Court should review other trial court
decisions.
In reply, Defendant argues that whether AB
218 has a public purpose or even a moral imperative is not the determining
factor. This analysis nullifies the prohibition against gifts of public funds. The
threshold determination is whether the Legislature made a gift of funds.
III.
LEGAL
STANDARDS
A party can move for judgment on the
pleadings on grounds the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438 subd. (c)(B).) The motion performs the same function as a general
demurrer and attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by
matters subject to judicial notice. (Burnett
v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) For the purposes of this motion, all properly alleged
material facts are deemed true. (Fire
Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
The Court declines both parties’ request
to take judicial notice of other Superior Court orders addressing the same
issue as they are not relevant to the Court’s disposition of Defendant’s
motion. While the Court may take judicial notice of Court records, judicial
notice is proper as to those facts that are not reasonably subject to dispute.
(Sosinsky
v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th
1548, 1564.) The trial
courts’ orders referred to by each party each arrive at opposition conclusions
of law, which are not subject to judicial notice.
Plaintiff commenced this action on August
8, 2022, alleging claims based on sexual assault that occurred between 1968 and
1972, when Plaintiff was approximately 12 through 17 years old. (SAC ¶¶ 30-31.)
The version of the statute in effect at the time of filing provided that any
claim not litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of
January 1, 2020 “because the applicable statute of limitations, claim
presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and
these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1 (q).)
As the Court understands the argument as
further clarified in Defendant’s reply, Defendant contends that AB 218 is not unconstitutional
“in its entirety,” but only “as applied to public entities” because the
legislation retroactively removes a necessary element that requires claims
presentation. (Reply, 8:1-7.) The principle has support “where … it is apparent
that the Legislature would want the act to prevail where it constitutionally
may.” (Stork
v. State of California (1976) 62
Cal.App.3d 465, 473.) The
principle has no application here, where the statute “indicates a clear
legislative intent to maximize claims of sexual-abuse minor plaintiffs for as
expansive a period of time as possible. The public policy is manifest from the
text of the law.” (Liebig v. Superior Court (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.) Eliminating
the requirement to present a claim from both Government Code § 905 and Civil
Procedure § 340.1 reflects the Legislature’s intent.
Defendant
next contends that the revival of otherwise stale claims for childhood sexual
assault violates the constitutional prohibition against gifting public funds,
regardless of whether the Legislation had a valid public purpose, which
Defendant does not question. (Reply, 7:19-23.)
Defendant
unpersuasively argues that the “public purpose” analysis for the expenditure is
not determinative and “would essentially nullify the gift prohibition.” (Reply,
2:21-27).
The California Constitution provides that
the Legislature has no power “to make any gift or authorize the making of any
gift * * * of any public money or thing of value to any individual * * *;
provided, that nothing in this section shall prevent the Legislature granting
aid pursuant to Section 21 of this article … .” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5
Cal.3d 730, 745 (the
“Gift Clause”).) The term “gift” is
not limited to the transfer of personal property without consideration, but
includes all appropriations of public money, for which there is no authority or
enforceable claim. (Conlin
v. Board of Sup'rs of City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21.)
Case authority holds that the public
purpose analysis is the primary question for consideration. Funds expended for
a public purpose does not constitute a “gift” although private persons may
benefit. (Id. at 746.) The existence of a gift is determined by the
Legislature although the courts can infer the public purpose from other
legislation or the way the legislation is enacted. (Scott v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604; Jordan
v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 [“It is well settled that the primary question to be considered in
determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift
is whether the funds are to be used for a public or private purpose. If they
are to be used for a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of
this constitutional prohibition. [Citation.]"].)
Defendant’s case authority does not
provide support. Defendant cites Bourn
v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, which held that a “legislative
appropriation” made to an individual in payment of a claim for personal injury
damages for which the state is not responsible, “is a gift within the meaning
of the Constitution.” (Bourn
v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, 328.) This case, however, does not involve a
legislative appropriation of money.
Defendant contends that “creating”
liability for a past act of negligence constitutes a “gift of public money or
other thing of value to any person.” (Chapman
v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 694.) Chapman is distinguishable because
the plaintiff alleged negligence against the State based on a statute enacted
after plaintiff’s claims arose. In Chapman, the plaintiff sued the state
for the loss of its coal when a large part of the wharf where the coal was
stored broke away from the wharf due to the State’s alleged negligence. (Id.
at 692.) At the time the incident took place, the State was not liable for
damage absent a statute voluntarily assuming such liability. The court
acknowledged that to “create” liability for a past act of negligence violated
the constitutional prohibition against gifts of public money. (Id. at
693.) Here, the legislature did not create liability by virtue of AB 218 where
none existed. Statutory liability against a public entity is conferred by the
Government Code which existed at the time of the alleged acts. (Gov. Code, § 815.) Creation of liability is not at issue. To reiterate, the retroactivity provision
of section 340.1 “indicates a clear legislative intent to maximize
claims of sexual-abuse minor plaintiffs for as expansive a period of time as
possible. The public policy is manifest from the text of the law.” (Liebig at 834.)
Conlin is generally instructive on
the principles of a “gift” under the Constitution; however, it is otherwise
factually distinguishable. There, the Legislature passed a statute authorizing
the City & County of San Francisco to pay $54,015 to a contractor for work
done upon public streets pursuant to a contract that remained unpaid. It
involved a personal benefit, not a public purpose. (Conlin
at 20.). Defendant also cites Powell
v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, which is not particularly instructive as
it did not consider whether newly enacted legislation for the purpose of giving
money to certain jurors in criminal cases they were otherwise not entitled to
was for a public purpose. (Powell at 274.)
Defendant also cites Heron
v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 which rejected the argument that the
appropriation of funds to pay judgments against the State constituted a gift.
The court held that application of such funds are not gifts of public money as
the judgments were obtained after due process requirements were met. (Heron at 517.) The court distinguished the legislation at issue by stating the
"legislature has not attempted to create a liability against the state for
any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or
employees—something it could not do, and the doing of which would, in effect,
be the making of a gift—but has provided that ‘hereafter it shall be liable for
certain things done which cause damage to its citizens, its liability to be
first determined by an appropriate action at law." (Id.) As applied
to the facts of this case, liability against a public entity must also be first
determined in an action.
The gift clause "was intended to
prevent the giving of a bonus and was not intended to apply to the
settlement of claims, whether they had great or little merit, or no merit at
all." (Bourn
at 322.) Used in its popular sense, a “gift” is a
“gratuitous donation without consideration, and without any reasonable claim to
it.” (Id.) Section 340.1 does not involve giving of a bonus.
Citing Rubenstein
v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th
903, Defendant argues that
a plaintiff claiming childhood sexual abuse was required to comply with claims
filing requirements until the Legislature exempted claims requirements in a
subsequent amendment to Government Code, section 905 subd. (m), but only for
claims arising from conduct after 2009. (Rubenstein
at 914.) As in Rubenstein, the subsequent
amendment to Government Code, section 905 subd. (m) do not apply here. Plaintiff
did not present a tort claim because the statute did not require it. The 2020
version of Civil Procedure 340.1, expressly revived claims “not litigated to
finality that would otherwise be barred because of the statute of limitations
or claims presentation deadline or any other time limit had expired, … .” (Cal Code Civ Proc § 340.1 (q).)
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleading is DENIED.