Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00340, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CMCV00340    Hearing Date: December 8, 2022    Dept: A

22CMCV00340 City of Compton v. San Pedro Mo, et al.

Thursday, December 8, 2022 at 8:30 a.m.

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING SEPARATE DEMURRERS OF DEFENDANT, SAN PEDRO MO, LLC, AND MIKEL HAGHNAZARZADEH

 

I.            BACKGROUND

The complaint filed on September 28, 2022, alleges that Defendant, San Pedro Mo, LLC, (“San Pedro”) whose manager is Mikel Haghnazarzadeh, owns real property in San Pedro. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are operating a marijuana business at the property without a license. Plaintiff alleges claims for (1) abatement, (2) public nuisance, (3) violation of Municipal Code Chapter 9-24.3, (4) violation of Municipal Code Chapters 30-33, (5) Violation of Unfair Competition law, and (6) violation of Bus. and Prof. Code §26000.

II.            ARGUMENTS

A.      Demurrers filed on November 1, 2022

Defendants, San Pedro and Haghnazarzadeh, filed separate demurrers. San Pedro demurs to the sixth cause of action only for violation of the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (“the Act”) on grounds the tenant is not using the property for the purpose intended under the lease, San Pedro is actively attempting to remove the tenant, and the complaint fails to state facts showing San Pedro knowingly allowed its property to be used for commercial cannabis activity.

Haghnazarzadeh demurs to all six causes of action because Plaintiff did not allege any actionable facts against him since he is not the owner of the property as shown by the deed to the property. Defendant contends he is not a proper party to this action.

B.      Oppositions filed November 23, 2022

Plaintiff argues that San Pedro challenges the veracity of the complaint which is not a demurrable issue. Regardless, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts showing that San Pedro repeatedly issued citations regarding the illegal use of the property, sufficient to give the property owner notice of the illegal use, and San Pedro continued to rent the property with full knowledge of such use.

As to Haghnazarzadeh, Plaintiff argues that the complaint alleges his active role in the illegal use of the real property and his knowledge of such use, as well as his conduct facilitating the use of the property for that purpose. Plaintiff alleges he is an accomplice of the illegal narcotics activities at the property.

The court’s file does not reflect that either Defendant filed a reply brief.

III.            LEGAL STANDARDS

      A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706. In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.

      The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638. Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43. Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.

      Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644. Whether the Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.

      A demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing, they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).

      A pleading is required to assert general allegations of ultimate fact. Evidentiary facts are not required. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 47; Lim v. The.TV Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 684, 690. However, unlike federal courts, California state courts are not a notice pleading jurisdiction, and notice alone is not a sufficient basis for any pleading. California is a fact pleading jurisdiction. Merely putting an opposing party on notice is not sufficient. Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 561; see Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 250. The alleged facts are “sufficient in precision to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.

      Defense counsel, Lee J. Petrohilos complied with his obligations to attempt to meet and confer with opposing counsel, who did not respond. Petrohilos Declaration, Code Civ. Proc., § 410.40.

IV.            DISCUSSION
A.     The sixth cause of action against San Pedro adequately alleges facts to support violation of the Act.

 

The complaint alleges that San Pedro violated Section 26038 of the Act, which imposes civil penalties against persons engaging in and aiding and abetting in an unlicensed commercial cannabis activity. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26038 subd. (a) (1) and (2). Liability is also imposed against a person with management or control of a commercial property “either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgage, who knowingly leases, or makes available for use … the commercial property, building” for the purpose of the unlicensed commercial distribution or sale of cannabis. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26038 subd. (a)(3).

The complaint alleges that San Pedro owns the real property at issue and that Haghnazarzadeh is the manager of San Pedro. Complaint, ¶ 6.  San Pedro allegedly permitted Haghnazarzadeh and Loud 20 to control the real property. Complaint, ¶ 61. Haghnazarzadeh, its manager, knew that the narcotics activities were unlicensed, and provided a substantial assistance to further such activity. Complaint ¶ 61. These facts adequately alleged San Pedro’s knowledge of the illegal activity occurring on its property by way if its agent/manager, Haghnazarzadeh.

San Pedro’s dispute of the allegation that the property is being used for illegal purposes is not an issue to be resolved at the pleading stage. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their truth, the Plaintiff’s ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof. Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 840. Moreover, San Pedro’s attempt to remove the tenant is irrelevant to whether the Complaint adequately alleges a claim against San Pedro.  Accordingly, San Pedro’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

B.     
The complaint adequately alleges facts implicating Haghnazarzadeh in each cause of action of alleged.

 

The complaint alleges that Haghnazarzadeh, as manager of San Pedro, oversees the real property. Complaint ¶ 6. Haghnazarzadeh is alleged to be an accomplice in the distribution of the illegal narcotics at the property. Complaint, ¶ 7.  Plaintiff alleges that all defendants, including Haghnazarzadeh has not shown any intention of abating the narcotics nuisance at the property. Complaint ¶ 17.

Plaintiff alleges that all defendants as property owner, mortgagee, or operator of the business are responsible for the illegal business and that Defendants encouraged the illegal sale for the last four years. which supports the claims for abatement and nuisance. Complaint ¶¶ 31, 32.  The foregoing allegations also implicate Haghnazarzadeh to support a violation of Compton Municipal Code Chapter 9-24.4, which prohibits commercial marijuana activity within the City. Complaint ¶ 46.

Municipal Code Chapter 30-33 prohibits the occupancy of a building without a valid certificate. This claim is alleged against all defendants who “continue to have concurrent control and dominion over the property.” Complaint ¶ 52.

All the foregoing violations are the predicate facts supporting the claim for violation of Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200, which provides for injunctive and other relief against any person engaged in “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.  Since Plaintiff alleges Haghnazarzadeh’s involvement in and facilitation and operation of an illegal marijuana business, this claim is adequately stated against him.

Finally, the sixth cause of action for violation of the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act expressly alleges that Defendants, including Haghnazarzadeh, are engaged in commercial marijuana activity without a license in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 26038. Complaint, ¶ 60. All the foregoing allegations do not turn on whether Haghnazarzadeh is the owner of the property. Accordingly, evidence of the deed is for the real property at issue not dispositive.

V.            CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the demurrers of Defendants, Haghnazarzadeh and San Pedro,  are OVERRULED. Defendants are ordered to answer within 10 days. Cal Rules of Court, Rule 3.1320.