Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00501, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22CMCV00501 Hearing Date: October 10, 2023 Dept: A
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
OVERRULING DEMURRER BY LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (DOE 1) TO
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
The complaint
alleges that Plaintiff, now 53 years old, was a victim of sexual assault by a
male teacher employed by Defendant, Doe 1, when Plaintiff was a student at
Woodcrest Elementary. Plaintiff alleges claims for childhood sexual abuse, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring/supervision/retention,
violations of the Government Code, and negligence.
Defendant, Los
Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”), demurs to all claims on grounds
Plaintiff did not present a timely government tort claim prior to filing the
complaint in 1978. Assembly Bill 218 which attempted to retroactively revive
claims such as Plaintiff’s is unconstitutional as gifts of public funds are
prohibited. This Court never had jurisdiction over this lawsuit.
Plaintiff
argues that there are no cases that interpret the revival of stale claims as a
“gift” of public funds. Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is constitutional and
clearly permits revival of any claim that would otherwise be barred by a
plaintiff’s failure to file a government tort claim.
In
reply, Defendant argues that the issue raised by Defendant is one of first
impression, and no precedents exist to date. None of Plaintiff’s case authority
discuss the issue of public funds. Plaintiff’s opposition is irrelevant.
A demurrer tests the
sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law.
(Schmidt
v. Foundation Health (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) The court must assume the truth of (1) the properly
pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from
those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court
may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore
v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th
634, 638.)
Plaintiff
must allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of
action. (Rakestraw
v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the
demurrer. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); (Zelig
v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) The Plaintiff is required to allege
facts "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently
specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his
cause of action.” (Gressley
v. Williams (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) Whether the Plaintiff will be able to prove the
pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens
v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)j
A
demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty
exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing, they do not
sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams
v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10 subd. (f).)
Plaintiff
commenced this action on November 4, 2022. Effective January 1, 2020, the
statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims exempts childhood
sexual abuse claims from the claims filing requirements of Government Code §
910. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 340.1.) Defendant contends that Assembly Bill 218 (“AB 218”)
revived otherwise stale claims for childhood sexual abuse and retroactively lifted
the Government Code’s claims filing requirements violates the prohibition on
gifting public funds. Defendant contends that the 2009 amendment exempted the
claims presentation requirement prospectively (claims that accrued on or after
January 1, 2009) is an unconstitutional gift of public funds to the plaintiff.
The
California Constitution states that the Legislature has no power to make any
gift of any public money or thing of value to any individual. (Cal.
Const., art. XVI, § 6.) The term “gift” is not limited to the transfer of
personal property without consideration, but includes all appropriations of
public money, for which there is no authority or enforceable claim. (Conlin
v. Board of Sup'rs of City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17,
21.)
Defendant
cites Bourn
v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, which held that a “legislative
appropriation” made to an individual in payment of a claim for personal injury
damages for which the state is not responsible, “is a gift within the meaning
of the constitution.” (Bourn
v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, 328.) This case does not involve a
legislative appropriation of money.
In
Conlin, the state legislature passed an act authorizing the City &
County of San Francisco to pay $54,015 to a contractor for work done upon
public streets pursuant to a contract that remained unpaid. (Conlin
at 20.) Conlin is equally inapposite. In Powell
v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, the passing of legislation to pay
fees to jurors in criminal cases for services that were gratuitous when
rendered was an unconstitutional gift. (Powell
at 274.)
Defendant
also cites Heron
v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 which rejected the argument that the
appropriation for purchase of insurance was a gift of public funds. In Heron,
the legislature passed section 1714 ½ of the Civil Code which imposed liability
against a state for negligence on the part of its agents and employees and its
political subdivisions. The statute authorized the issuance funds to obtain insurance
liability coverage for such negligence. (Heron
512.) At issue was the constitutionality of the statute’s title
(whether it was misleading).
The
Court held that application of public funds to pay judgments against a state
are not gifts of public money as such judgments were obtained after due process
requirements were met. (Heron
at 517.) The Court distinguished the Act stating the "legislature has
not attempted to create a liability against the state for any past acts of
negligence on the part of its officers, agents or employees—something it could
not do, and the doing of which would, in effect, be the making of a gift—but
has provided that ‘hereafter it shall be liable for certain things done which
cause damage to its citizens, its liability to be first determined by an
appropriate action at law." (Id.) Section 340.1
revives stale claims, but claimants are still required to establish liability for
their damage claims. Heron did not discuss whether retroactive
application of a revival statute constituted a gift of public funds.
The
constitutional provision prohibiting gifts of public funds "was intended
to prevent the giving of a bonus and was not intended to apply to the
settlement of claims, whether they had great or little merit, or no merit at
all." (Bourn
at 322.) Used in its popular sense, a “gift” is a “gratuitous donation
without consideration, and without any reasonable claim to it.” (Id.)
Defendant has not established that the revival provisions of Section 340.1 can
be regarded as a gift of public funds in violation of the constitution. Moreover, the statute does not involve
appropriation of public funds.
Plaintiff
cites Coats
v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415
which is equally inapposite as it concerns whether Section 340.1 violated the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Based on the
foregoing, demurrer to the complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to
answer within 10 days.