Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00552, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CMCV00552 Hearing Date: January 25, 2024 Dept: A
22CMCV00552
Raul Nevarez v. Danielle MacKenzie
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND FOR COSTS AND
FEES.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
verified complaint seeks an order quieting Defendant’s title to real property owned
by Plaintiff’s living trust. Defendant contended that she owned the property
through an assignment, which Plaintiff denies. Plaintiff subsequently amended
the complaint substituting “Started from the Bottom” and Paul Raymond Argueta
Sr., in place of fictitious defendants #1 and #2, respectively. On March 10,
2023, the clerk entered default against Defendant MacKenzie.
On July
25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of conditional settlement between Plaintiff
and the remaining Defendants.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff
seeks an order enforcing the settlement agreement between the parties wherein Defendants
agreed to pay Plaintiff $150,000 and Plaintiff agreed to withdraw the lis
pendens recorded against the property. Defendants have not satisfied their
obligations under the settlement agreement. Plaintiff requests reimbursement of
attorney fees and costs, which is permitted under the settlement agreement.
In
opposition, Defendants request a continuance until March 8, 2024. The title company requires an uninsured
affidavit signed by Danielle MacKenzie, who has a default judgment in her favor
and against Plaintiff. Therefore, title is not yet clear.
In
reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are raising issues unrelated to
Plaintiff’s motion for an order enforcing judgment. Defendants’ payment of
settlement funds is not subject to any warranties with respect to any liens. Neither
party was required by the settlement agreement to provide clear title.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A party can move for entry of judgment
pursuant to the terms of the settlement. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 664.6.) The court’s power is limited to
determining the existence of the agreement and to enforce its settlement. (Corkland
v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 994.) The court
may receive oral testimony or may determine the motion upon declarations alone.
(Id.)
The
court applies general contract principles when interpreting a settlement
agreement. (Leeman
v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374.) The mutual intent of the parties
and interpretation of the contract are based on the language of the agreement
alone. (Id.) The court
may not rewrite the agreement, “no matter how toothless the agreement may seem
in retrospect, [as] it is not the province of the trial court to rewrite it and
put in the teeth the complaining side now thinks it should have had.” (Viejo
Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 207.)
IV. DISCUSSION
The terms of
the parties’ settlement required Plaintiff to deliver a recorded release of the
notice of pendency of action. (Motion, Ex. 1.) In exchange, Defendants were
required to pay Plaintiff $150,000 through WFG Title. (Motion, Ex. 2, p. 1, ¶ A.1.)
Plaintiff delivered the withdrawal notice to Defendants. (Motion, Ex. 3.) The
payment of $150,000 was not contingent upon Defendant MacKenzie’s signature on
any document relating to a judgment lien against Plaintiff. Defendants’ request
for a continuance of the hearing is DENIED.
The agreement
provides that a party obtaining enforcement of the agreement under Civil
Procedure, section 664.6 shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.
(Motion, Ex. 2, p. 2, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff requests a total of $4,275 in attorney’s
fees plus costs of $60.00. To determine whether fees are
reasonable, the court begins with the “lodestar”, which is the number of hours
reasonably spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM
Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The court
considers a number of factors including "the nature of the litigation, its
difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the
skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other
circumstances in the case.’” (PLCM
Group at 1096.) The lodestar figure can be adjusted based on the
factors specific to the case. (Id.)
To determine a reasonable market rate,
"the courts will look to equally difficult or complex types of
litigation.” (Syers
Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 700.)
The “market rate” is generally based on the rates prevalent in the community
where the court is located. (Id.) The trial court is in the best
position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her
courtroom for the type of litigation at issue. The prevailing party is entitled
to “’compensation for all the hours reasonably spent’ in
litigating the action to a successful conclusion. (Ibid., italics in
original.) ‘Reasonably spent’ means that time spent ‘in the form of inefficient
or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.’” (Horsford
v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
359, 394.)
The Court finds that an hourly rate of
$375 per hour for a fee motion lacking in any complexity or defense in
enforcement is reasonable (reduced from counsel’s request of $575.00.) A total
of three hours to prepare the motion, reply, and to appear is reasonable
(reduced from six hours.).
V. CONCLUSION