Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00594, Date: 2023-12-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CMCV00594 Hearing Date: December 5, 2023 Dept: A
22CMCV00594
John Doe E.H v. Doe 1
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
OVERRULING DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT
I.
BACKGROUND
The complaint alleges that
Plaintiff, currently 53 years old, was the victim of childhood sexual assault
that occurred from 1981 through 1985, when Plaintiff as 12 to 15 years old
attending Defendant’s school. Plaintiff alleges six causes of action for
negligence arising from the alleged incidents.
Defendant, Pacific Union
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists (“PUC” or “Defendant”), sued as Doe 2,
demurs to three of the six causes of action for failure to state a cause of
action and uncertainty. Defendant contends the facts do not support application
of the statute reviving previously barred claims.
Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff is
not required to allege evidentiary facts or the level of detail required by
Defendant. All causes of action are adequately alleged.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a
complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the complaint’s sufficiency, the court must
assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations as well as facts
that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded facts. The court
may also consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.)
The court may not consider
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7
Cal.4th 634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to
establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians
Service (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10(e); (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
Sufficient facts are the essential
facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity that
is sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and
extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) Whether the
Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180
Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant PUC demurs to the claims
for (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, (4) failure to report
suspected child abuse, and (5) negligent supervision of a minor. Contrary to
Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiff’s claims allege Defendant’s direct liability arising
from a duty owed to Plaintiff, not vicarious liability for the conduct of the
alleged perpetrator. (Opp. 4:5-9).
The complaint alleges that
Defendant PUC (Doe 2) is a nonprofit religious corporation that co-owned,
jointly operated, ran, supervised, managed, and/or oversaw Union School.
(Complaint, ¶ 4.). Doe 5, the alleged perpetrator, was a teacher and employee
of all other Doe defendants, including PUC. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) (Complaint, ¶
20.) Doe 4 allegedly operates as a Seventh-Day Adventist private school and
became the successor-in-interest to Union School. (Complaint, ¶ 6.)
As the alleged owner and operator
of Union School, PUC has a “special relationship” with its students. (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869–870
["In addition, a school district and its employees have a special
relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the
mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over
students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the
relationship between parents and their children.’”]
Defendant claims it is not a school
or school district. This is an extrinsic fact that falls outside the complaint
and is irrelevant. The complaint alleges that PUC jointly operated, managed,
and supervised Union School. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) Courts have generally recognized a
special relationship in cases involving minors, “where adults and organizations
acted as ‘quasi-parents’ by assuming responsibility for the safety of [minors]
whose parents were not present.” (Doe
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 671;
Brown
v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 220 ["[A] typical setting
for the recognition of a special relationship is where the plaintiff is
particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly,
has some control over the plaintiff's welfare.”].)"
The complaint also alleges facts
to support direct negligence in hiring, retaining, or supervising Defendant’s employees.
Liability for such negligence “arises from the special relationship [administrators
and supervisors] had with plaintiff, a student under their supervision, which relationship
entailed the duty to take reasonable measures to protect plaintiff from
injuries at the hands of others in the school environment.” (Hart
at 877.)
Defendant contends that it did not
have any knowledge of the perpetrator’s (Doe 5) propensities since Plaintiff
alleges that the perpetrator was an employee of Doe 4, as successor-in-interest
to Union School. (Dem. 11:1-5.) That allegation does not preclude PUC’s
knowledge given the allegation that PUC co-owned, jointly operated, ran,
supervised, managed and/or oversaw Union School. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that Doe 5 was an employee and/or
agent of Does 1 through 4. (Complaint, ¶ 29.) The complaint adequately
supports that Defendants’ collective negligence caused Plaintiff to be subject
to harmful conduct inflicted upon him. (Complaint, ¶ 46.)
Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed
to identify specific defendants responsible for any of the alleged acts.
Identifying individuals by name is not required and does not render the
pleading uncertain. (Hart
at 872 [The claim that Plaintiff was required to identify employees at
the pleading stage was not supported by authority. “To survive a demurrer, the
complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each
evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need
not be alleged.”].)
The allegations supporting a special
relationship between PUC and Plaintiff also satisfies the conditions for
liability under Civil Procedure, section 340.1. The statute imposes liability
against any entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff if the entity’s
negligent act was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault resulting in plaintiff’s
injury. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (a)(2).
Defendant argues that PUC did not
have a special relationship with Doe 5 that would support a duty to control Doe
5’s conduct. As Plaintiff explains, this argument misconstrues Plaintiff’s
theory of relief, which is based on PUC’s duty to plaintiff, arising from a
special relationship. Plaintiff also alleges that Doe 5 was an employee and/or
agent of Does 1 through 4 which infers an ability to supervise and control Doe
5. (Complaint, ¶ 29.)
Therefore, the allegations support
the existence of a special relationship between PUC and Plaintiff, from which a
duty arises, supports all the negligence claims at issue that are asserted in
the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action.
Defendant contends that alleging
all the claims against Does 1-4, collectively, renders the complaint fatally
uncertain because it is “impossible” to determine if facts pleaded are
sufficient to allege a claim against each Defendant. As explained above, the
allegations are sufficiently certain to support liability against Defendant. (Khoury
v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [" A
demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in
some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures."].)
The statute in effect at the time Plaintiff
filed this action provides that this action “shall not be commenced on or after
the plaintiff's 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to
know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of
childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent,
or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement
reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 340.1.) Defendant argues Plaintiff did not allege facts to
support that it knew or had reason to know of any misconduct.
As stated previously, the
complaint alleges that PUC employed Doe 5 and jointly operated, supervised, and
managed the school and owed a mandatory duty to investigate, supervise and
monitor Doe 5. (Complaint, ¶¶ 4-5, 42.) Plaintiff expressly alleges that Doe
2’s administrators knew of Doe 5’s unfitness. (Complaint, ¶ 25.) The claim is
adequately alleged.
Defendant next contends that the
fourth cause of action for failure to report suspected child abuse is defective
because Plaintiff did not allege what facts were known to PUC or who conveyed
information to PUC among other specific facts. (Dem., 13:13-5.) Liability for
this claim is based on a mandated reporter’s failure to report “whenever the
mandated reporter, in the mandated reporter's professional capacity or within
the scope of the mandated reporter's employment, has knowledge of or observes a
child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the
victim of child abuse or neglect.” (Pen.
Code, § 11166.)
The case on which Defendant relies
does not address the requirements of pleading, but rather the propriety of a
preliminary injunction granted by the trial court. (People
ex rel. Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic, Inc. (1988)
203 Cal.App.3d 225.) It is not instructive. Moreover, the answers to
Defendant’s questions are evidentiary facts which are not required at the
pleading stage.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to
answer within 10 days.