Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00610, Date: 2023-08-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CMCV00610 Hearing Date: August 17, 2023 Dept: A
22CMCV00610 C.B., an individual v. Doe 1, a
California Non-Profit Corporation, et al.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
I.
BACKGROUND
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was
a member of Defendant Doe 1’s church, where she was sexually assaulted, abused,
and molested by Doe 2, who was an employee or agent of the church. Doe 1 and
Doe 3 are alleged to be church entities. Plaintiff alleges claims for sexual
assault on a minor, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention of Doe 2, negligent supervision of a minor,
and negligence.
II. ARGUMENTS
Defendant Doe 1, sued as Greater Faith Missionary
Baptist Church of Los Angeles (“Church”), demurs to the entire complaint on
grounds all claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The third cause of
action for negligent supervision fails to allege facts against Doe 1, rendering
the complaint uncertain as to that Defendant. The fourth cause of action for
negligent supervision of a minor is redundant and duplicative of the third
cause of action.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues the
claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, because her claims were
expressly revived by statute. The third and fourth causes of action are
adequately alleged and are not uncertain as to Doe 1. The fourth cause of
action is not duplicative of the third cause of action since negligent
supervision of a minor depends on the duty of care owed directly to the
minor. The third cause of action alleges Defendants’ negligence in supervising their
employee. If the Court sustains demurrer, Plaintiff asks for leave to amend.
In supplemental briefing as requested by
the Court, Plaintiff argues that the plain language of the statute expressly
revives Plaintiff’s claims as they had been previously barred by the statute of
limitations in effect at the time. Plaintiff had not litigated her claims to
finality. Plaintiff commenced her claims within three years of January 1, 2020,
and therefore, her claims are not barred. Subdivision (a) of Civil Section
340.1 does not apply, because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise in the context of
the delayed discovery of her claims. Subdivision (q) provides for a different
window within which Plaintiff can assert previously barred claims.
In reply, the Church argues the claims
are still barred because Plaintiff did not allege childhood sexual assault
under Civil Procedure § 340.1(q). This
is a new action, not a previously filed action that was not litigated to
finality. Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support when the Church knew or
should have known of the sexual assault by Doe 2. The fourth cause of action
remains redundant.
In supplemental briefing, Defendant contends
that the complaint does not assert Section 340.1(q) as the reason for why her
claims survive. Defendant agrees, however, that subdivision (a) of 340.1 and
subdivision (q) of the same statute each provide “separate or alternative
statutes of limitation.” (Supp. Reply, 2:11-13.) Defendant contends that
Plaintiff must allege facts that bring her within subdivision (c) to avoid the
statute of limitations. Plaintiff must have commenced this action on or after
the Plaintiff’s 40th birthday and allege that the non-perpetrator
Defendant, such as Doe 1, was on notice of misconduct that created a risk of
childhood sexual assault.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARDS
The bases for
demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained for reasons including
failure to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and uncertainty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) A demurrer
“tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only
questions of law.” (Schmidt v. Foundation Health
(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) The court must assume the truth of (1) the
properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred
from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7
Cal.4th 634, 638.)
Defense
counsel has complied with the obligation to meet and confer with Plaintiffs’
counsel prior to filing the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41.)
If the
complaint discloses that complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, “the
general demurrer has long been held an appropriate means to assert such a
facial defect.” (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers
Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 299, fn. 2.) To
sustain
a demurrer to the complaint based on the statute of limitations, the defect
must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint. A demurrer
will not lie where the action may be but is not necessarily barred. (Citizens
for a Responsible Caltrans Decision v. Department of Transportation
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1117.)
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiff
has alleged facts to support that her claims are not barred by the statute of
limitations pursuant to the plain meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1(q).
The
complaint alleges that Plaintiff, over the age of 40, sustained injury in
1973-1974 when the incidents took place during Church-sponsored activities.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 18, 20.) The complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s claims are
revived by Civil Procedure section 340.1. (Complaint, 1:24-25). Plaintiff’s opposition argues more
specifically that her claims were expressly revived by Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.1(q). That statute states:
“Notwithstanding any other law a claim
for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision
(a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred
as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim
presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and
these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020. A
plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this
subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that
added this subdivision. (Code Civ. Proc., §
340.1.)
Notwithstanding that Plaintiff did not
expressly argue that the statute of limitations was avoided by subpart (q),
Defendant cannot contend it is not on notice of the Plaintiff’s theory that her
claims remain viable under that subpart given the initial and supplemental briefing.
Subpart (a) does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims.
In pertinent part, subpart (a) extended the statute of
limitations to 22 years after the plaintiff reaches majority, i.e.., at age 40.
In contrast, subpart (q) applies to revive claims “not litigated to finality” that
would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the statute of
limitations expired. In construing subpart (q), the Second Appellate District
Court of Appeal said “[t]he Legislature intended to preserve and revive all
nonfinal claims. Plaintiffs filed their lawsuits before their 40th birthdays
and their cases remain pending on appeal, so they have not reached finality.
(See Perez, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 179.) The extended
limitations period therefore applies to render their claims timely.” (Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc. (2020)
43 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100 [257 Cal.Rptr.3d 229].)
The
Court construes the language of a statute according to its plain an ordinary
meaning. (People
v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.) Defendant
contends that “not reached finality” means that the case had been filed but was
pending on appeal at the time the statute was amended. While it’s true that was the context in which
Safechuck was decided, Safechuck did not construe that limitation
in the language of the statute.
Defendant’s contention that subpart (q) is limited to cases
against public entities is not supported. The Legislature included revival of
claims otherwise barred by a public entity’s claims presentation requirements
not to make it exclusive to government claims, but to include the revival of
claims against both private and public entities.
"In Assembly Bill 218, the Legislature
has again attempted to balance the competing concerns of protecting public
entities from stale claims and allowing victims of childhood sexual abuse to
seek compensation. This time, the Legislature came to a different conclusion,
with an express revival provision for claims against public entities as well as
those against private defendants." (Coats at 429.)
Defendant contends that subpart (c)
applies, and Plaintiff is required to allege facts that fall within the
exception provided therefor. That subpart permits commencement of an action on
or after the plaintiff’s 40th birthday if the “entity” knew or had reason to
know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood
sexual assault by an employee, etc. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1 (c).)
This is not the context in which
Plaintiff’s claims allegedly arose. As Defendant acknowledges in its
supplemental briefing, subpart (q) allows for a separate revival of the
statute, permitting a three-year “look-back window” allowing all survivors of
sexual abuse to file a civil lawsuit within three years of January 1, 2020.
(Supp. Reply, .pdf p. 8:16-19; Code of Civ. Code, §. Proc. § 340.1(q).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims, previously barred, were expressly revived by
subpart (q), as the action was commenced on December 2, 2022, before the
three-year limitations period expired.
B.
The third cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision,
and retention is adequately alleged.
An employer can be liable to a third person
for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee.
California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable
to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit
employee. (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.)(Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.) Liability is
based on facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the
employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm
materializes. (Id.)
This claim arises from Defendants’
alleged negligence in supervising, managing, or controlling Doe 2 in Doe 2’s church
participation. The entity defendants,
which includes the Church, allegedly knew or were on notice that Doe 2 had previously
engaged in and presented the risk of sexual assault of Plaintiff and other
minors. (Complaint, ¶ 58.) The Entity
Defendants knew or should have known that Doe 2 was committing inappropriate behavior
with minor children as Doe 2 was isolating minor children, including Plaintiff,
for extended periods of time without justification or without other adult
supervision at the Church. (Complaint, ¶ 22.) Defendants failed to warn
Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s parents, and other members of the church of the
propensity and risk that Doe 2 would sexually assault, abuse, and/or molest
minor children. (Complaint, ¶ 55.)
The foregoing allegations adequately
allege Defendants’ prior knowledge of Doe 2’s conduct which created a
particular hazard that materialized. These allegations are not made on
information and belief.
C.
The fourth cause of action adequately alleges a
claim for failure to supervise a minor.
This claim arises from Defendants’ duty
to supervise and protect minor students entrusted to them, including Plaintiff.
(Complaint, ¶ 64.) Defendants allegedly
had a duty to monitor and protect Plaintiff from known and knowable dangers
including those presented by Doe 2. (Complaint ¶ 65.)
This claim is not duplicative of the
third cause of action because “[a] special relationship between the defendant
and the victim is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from
the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the
dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to control [the third
party's] conduct.’" (Doe
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 670.)
The features of a special relationship "include ‘an aspect of dependency
in which one party relies to some degree on the other for protection’ and the other
party has ‘superior control over the means of protection.’” (Doe at 670.) California recognizes “special relationships between children and
their adult caregivers that give rise to a duty to prevent harms caused by the
intentional or criminal conduct of third parties.” (Doe at 671.)
Defendants owed Plaintiff a special duty of care which is distinct from their
duty to supervise their employee/agent. (Conti
v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1233 ["We likewise conclude under the special
relationship doctrine and the Rowland factors that defendants had a
legal duty to exercise due care to prevent [plaintiff] from being molested
during her church-sponsored field service."].)
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES
Defendant’s demurrer to the entire complaint. Defendant is ordered to answer
within 10 days.