Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22CMCV00727, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CMCV00727 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: A
22CMCV00727 M.C. v. Doe 1, et al.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH DEFENDANT’S DEPOSITION SUBPOENA ISSUED TO THE LOS
ANGELES SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT (WITH MODIFICATIONS)
I.
BACKGROUND
The
complaint alleges that Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual assault from
1982 through 1990 beginning when Plaintiff was eight years old. Defendant Doe 1
is alleged to be a religious non-profit corporation that conducted substantial
religious and affiliated programs and supervised Doe 2, who was alleged to be Plaintiff’s
abuser, pastor, employee, and/or agent of Doe 1. Defendant Doe 1 (“Defendant”) filed
its answer on August 22, 2023.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff
moves to quash a subpoena served by Defendant on the L.A. County Sheriff’s
Department for production of Plaintiff’s police records. Plaintiff contends the
subpoena is overbroad in time and scope, infringes on Plaintiff’s privacy
rights and those of third parties, and should be quashed. Despite efforts to
meet and confer, the parties could not resolve their disputes.
In
opposition, Defendant contends Plaintiff disclosed in interrogatory responses that
he was convicted of a felony in 1992 for grand theft auto, for which he was
incarcerated. This evidence is relevant to determine whether the conviction was
an alternative cause for Plaintiff’s emotional distress claim arising from the
alleged abuse. The records are also relevant to Plaintiff’s credibility. The
documents do not infringe on any privacy interest; if it does, the interest is
waived since Plaintiff placed his emotional distress at issue by filing this
action. The request is not overbroad since Defendant tailored the request to
the jurisdiction where the arrest and conviction arose.
Plaintiff
did not file a reply brief by Tuesday, March 12, 2024 (five court days before
the hearing). (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1005 subd. (b).)
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The
court can quash a subpoena to protect a party from unreasonable or oppressive
demands including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy. The court
has discretion to modify the subpoena, or direct compliance upon terms or
conditions as the court declares, including issuing protective orders. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
The documents sought shall be
specifically described, or each category of documents sought must be
“reasonably particularized.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.410 subd. (a).) Generalized categories unsupported by evidence
showing "at least the potential evidentiary value of the information
sought, are not permitted." (Calcor
Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 218.)
The party claiming a privacy interest
bears the burden of proof on the issue.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3
Cal.5th 531, 531. [“The party
asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest,
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances,
and a threatened intrusion that is serious.”].)
IV.
DISCUSSION
The subpoena at issue requests production
of following:
“Any and all DOCUMENTS relating to
[Plaintiff (date of birth)] including but not limited to police reports, case
reports, supplemental reports, notes, status logs, correspondence, diagrams,
photographs, statements, interviews, audio or video records collected
pertaining to [Plaintiff].” (Paulina H. Jaafar, Ex. A.)
Plaintiff generally argues
that criminal history records are protected by Plaintiff’s constitutional right
of privacy. The issue was more specifically addressed in Westbrook
v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 157 which determined
that “the state constitutional right of privacy extends to protect defendants
from unauthorized disclosure of criminal history records as the records are
compiled without the consent of the subjects and disseminated without their
knowledge.” (Id. at 165.) Therefore, the Westbrook court determined that the custodian of records had a duty to resist
attempts to disclose the records, and the subject of the records was entitled
to expect his right would be asserted. (Id. at 166.)
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s privacy interests do not fall within the scope of
“central autonomy-based privacy rights” involving areas of “free expression and
association, procreation or government-provided benefits of basic human need.”
(Opp. 7:25-27.) However, the case on
which Defendant relies cited as examples of personal autonomy, "freedom
from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual familial
relationships.” (Lewis
v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th
561, 572.) Plaintiff’s privacy interests in their “rap
sheet” do not implicate “personal autonomy” which recognizes a “measure of
personal control over the individual's autonomy, dignity, and serenity." (Hernandez
v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
272, 286.)
The
United States Supreme Court recognized a person’s privacy interests in
“rap-sheet” information and determined "as a categorical matter that a
third party's request for law enforcement records or information about a
private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen's privacy,
and that when the request seeks no ‘official information’ about a Government
agency, but merely records that the Government happens to be storing, the
invasion of privacy is ‘unwarranted.’" (U.S.
Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee For Freedom of Press (1989) 489 U.S. 749, 780.)
Where
privacy rights are implicated, the requesting party must make a threshold
showing that the records sought are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and
are essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit. (Davis
v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014). An order compelling disclosure must be
narrowly tailored so as not to infringe on constitutional rights. Speculation
that an answer may recover something helpful does not meet that threshold
burden. (Fults
v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 899, 901.)
Even if such a privacy interest is
proven, discovery may still be ordered if a sufficient need for the information
is shown. Moreover, an implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights
encompasses “only discovery directly relevant to the
plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.) The scope
of permitted disclosure “must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow
specificity, and must proceed by the least intrusive manner.” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.)
As
Plaintiff has established a privacy interest in Plaintiff’s criminal history
records, the court must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party
identifies. (Id.) The court considers the purpose of the
information sought, the effect that disclosure will have on the affected
persons and parties, the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting
disclosure, and whether there are less intrusive means for obtaining the requested
information. (SCC
Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243
Cal.App.4th 741, 755.)
Defendant
has established that Plaintiff has implicitly waived his right to privacy with
respect to the 1992 felony conviction for grand theft auto disclosed in
response to form interrogatory 2.8. (Opp. Ex. B, 5:22-6:12.) Felony convictions
are probative of a witness’s credibility. (Evid.
Code, § 788.) Moreover, convictions for robbery, grand theft, and receiving
stolen property involve moral turpitude.
(People
v. Gray (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 635, 641.)
However,
the subpoena is overbroad in scope as it is not limited to the specific
conviction. Rather, Defendant requests “any and all” police records pertaining
to Plaintiff regardless of time or subject matter. (Paulina H. Jaafar, Ex. A.) Defendant has not established the “direct
relevance” of Plaintiff’s entire criminal history. An order compelling
disclosure must be narrowly tailored so as not to infringe on constitutional
rights. Speculation as to what the records may contain is not enough. (Fults v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 899, 901.)
V.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion but elects to modify the
subpoena and to direct compliance limited to the production of records relating
to the 1992 felony conviction for grand theft auto. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)