Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22LBCV00495, Date: 2024-05-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22LBCV00495 Hearing Date: May 21, 2024 Dept: A
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING ANTI-SLAPP
MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY DEFENDANTS, LAW OFFICES OF YOSHIDA & GARCIA, T.
MAE YOSHIDA, AND SHOGO J. GARCIA; REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING
ANTI-SLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE FILED BY DEFENDANT, LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL
CENTER; REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
[TENTATIVE] ORDER TAKING OFF
CALENDAR DEMURRER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT BY BY DEFENDANT, LONG BEACH
MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
The
second amended complaint (“SAC”) alleges that Plaintiff, Maria Parize, incurred
expenses for medical services provided by Defendant, Long Beach Memorial
Medical Center (“LBMC”) totaling $28,853.26. Plaintiff alleges she was insured
for health coverage by Medicare and Blue Shield PPO. Plaintiff sought care from
Community Hospital Long Beach (“CHLB”) for personal injuries suffered in an
auto accident and was later transferred to LBMC. Defendants billed Medicare and
Blue Shield for services rendered at CHLB but did not bill Plaintiff’s health
insurers for three days of care provided by LBMC.
Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants contracted with Defendant, Law Offices of Yoshida &
Garcia (collectively, “Garcia”), to collect payments for health care services
rendered. Defendants allegedly conspired to avoid the contract rates required
by Plaintiff’s health insurance providers, failed to bill those providers, and asserted
a lien against Plaintiff’s personal injury settlement for the full amount of
expenses incurred at LBMC. Plaintiffs allege one cause of action for abuse of
process.
Defendants, LMBC and the Garcia
Defendants separately move to strike the SAC as it arises from Defendants’
assertion of hospital liens, which is protected by the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs cannot show a probability of prevailing on the
merits as the claims are barred by the litigation privilege and res judicata.
The SAC fails to allege a claim for abuse of process.
In opposition to both motions, Plaintiffs
argue that Defendants did not identify a right of free speech or petitioning
activity implicated by the SAC. A final
judgment was entered in the interpleader action, Case No. 20LBCV00068 Michael
Parize, et al v. Long Beach Memorial Center, declaring that LBMC has no lien
rights whatsoever. Defendants are
attempting to assert a lien after billing and receiving Medicare benefits,
which constitutes unlawful balance billing prohibited by federal and state law.
Plaintiffs contend they can meet their burden of demonstrating a probability of
prevailing.
In reply, LBMC argues that the
alleged misconduct falls within two separate categories of protected acts under
the anti-SLAPP statute: a written
statement made in a judicial proceeding or in connection with an issue under
review by an official proceeding. Plaintiffs cannot seek leave to amend. The
Court’s file does not reflect that Garcia filed a separate reply brief.
The anti-SLAPP statute[1] codified at Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides that any act of a person “in
furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that the plaintiff
will prevail on the claim." (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b).) The statute provides a
procedure for "weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity."(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
As the moving party, Defendant bears
the initial burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “arise
from protected activity in which the defendant has engaged." (Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1009.) To that end, courts are to “consider the elements of the
challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and
consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063.) The
defendant's burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and
to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of
protected activity." (Id at 1064.)
The court must
identify the alleged wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the
foundation for the claim. (Finton
Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 200, 209.) The action must be
based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity. (Finton at 209-210.)
If the
defendant establishes the first prong, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show a probability of prevailing on the merits by demonstrating that "the
complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff is credited.” (Finton at 211.) Plaintiff must produce evidence that would be
admissible at trial. (Id.)
As both
anti-SLAPP motions raise identical issues implicated by the same acts of
misconduct alleged in the SAC, the Court will address both motions in this
tentative ruling.
The SAC alleges
one cause of action for abuse of process. The claim requires Plaintiffs to
prove two elements: an ulterior purpose and a willful act in the use of the
process that is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. The claim
requires “some definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed
at an objective that is not legitimate in the use of that process.” There is no
liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process
to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.’” (Maleti
v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181, 229.) Abuse of process "concerns
the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a
lawsuit (regardless of whether there was probable cause to commence that
lawsuit in the first place). (Bidna
v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 40.)
A.
Defendants have established that the SAC alleges
conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
The SAC arises from Defendants’ commencement, prosecution, and service of
statutory hospital liens “in order to obtain moneys to which they were not
entitled” and which prevented Plaintiffs from accessing settlements funds
obtained in a personal injury action. (SAC ¶¶ 26 -28.) Defendants allegedly
lacked probable cause to pursue the liens that were based on improper and false
billings. (SAC ¶ 29.)
Plaintiffs
allege that the liens were filed pursuant to Civ.
Code, § 3045.1 of the Hospital Lien Act (“HLA”) which authorizes a hospital
furnishing emergency and ongoing medical services to assert a lien upon damages
recovered by the person injured because of an accident or another’s negligent
conduct. Plaintiffs allege they commenced a personal injury lawsuit (“Injury
action”) on January 13, 2016. (SAC ¶ 24). As part of that lawsuit, Defendants sent
Plaintiffs’ counsel in the injury litigation a letter and lien to collect
$21,674.10 for medical services rendered. (SAC ¶ 25.) Statements, writings, and
pleadings made in connection with civil litigation are covered by the
anti-SLAPP statute. (Feldman
v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1478.) Accordingly,
Defendants have established that SAC arises from protected activity.
B.
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing
a probability of prevailing on the merits of the abuse of process claim.
Plaintiffs cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits as
Defendants’ assertion of a hospital lien in connection with the Injury Lawsuit
is protected by the litigation privilege codified by Civil Code, section 47. The statute defines
a “privileged communication” as one made in "any (1) legislative
proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding
authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding
authorized by law … ." (Civ. Code, § 47(b).) The privilege
applies if the alleged conduct was communicative. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th
1048, 1058.) The privilege does not apply to a course of conduct. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1133 fn. 12 [“Thus, while it could be argued that
an exhortation to sue might be privileged, financing and otherwise promoting
the litigation would not be.”].)
C.
The SAC is barred by collateral estoppel.
In its primary aspect, res judicata, or “claim preclusion” prevents
relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties
or their privities where the claim was finally litigated. (DKN
Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) The second aspect of
res judicata known as collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the
relitigation of issues decided in a prior proceeding. Issue preclusion applies
"(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated
and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was
a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party." (DKN Holdings LLC
v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 825.) Collateral estoppel applies even if the
second lawsuit alleges different causes of action. (Id.)
The Court grants LBMC’S request for judicial notice of the
complaint in 20LBCV00068 Maria Parize and Marco Parize v. Community Hospital of
Long Beach et al. (the “Interpleader Action”). (Evid. Code, § 452(d). (RJN Ex. 1.) That action involved a disputed
distribution of funds pursuant to a personal injury action reached in BC606992
(the “Injury Action”) which Plaintiffs dismissed after settlement. (Id.) Defendant LBMC operated CHLB as a
“dba.” (RJN, Ex. 1, 1:28.)
The Hon. Mark Kim issued a judgment
providing in pertinent part that the statutory hospital liens relating to
charges for medical expenses incurred and charged by Defendants, LBMC, Law
Offices of T. Mae Yoshida, and T. Mae Yoshida were “disallowed and expunged.”
(RJN Ex.2, 2:22-28.) Defendants were enjoined from further litigation relating
to the hospital charges for accounts relating to either Maria or Marco Parize. (Id.,
3:4-9.)
While the action at bar alleges a different claim for abuse of
process, it could have been raised at the time Plaintiffs commenced the Interpleader
Action since it involved the same issue alleged here: whether LBMC was entitled
to pursue liens against the Plaintiffs personally although Plaintiffs were
covered by other insurance for their injuries. Judge Kim affirmatively and
finally adjudicated that issue on the merits in favor of Plaintiffs.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs
have not met their burden of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits
of the SAC which asserts a single claim for abuse of process. Accordingly, both
anti-SLAPP motions to strike are GRANTED. Defendants are entitled to mandatory
attorney’s fees which may be reached by separate motion.
As the claims are not viable, the
demurrer to the SAC filed by LBMC on grounds of the litigation privilege, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel, is taken off calendar as rendered moot by this
ruling.