Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22STCV16143, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV16143 Hearing Date: October 24, 2023 Dept: A
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
Plaintiff
commenced this action on May 16, 2022. The second amended and operative complaint
alleges that Plaintiff suffered injury because of childhood sexual abuse and
repeated assault by Defendant’s employee when Plaintiff was fifteen years old. Plaintiff
alleges claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant,
Compton Unified School District, demurs to all claims on grounds Assembly Bill
218 which attempted to retroactively revive claims such as Plaintiff’s is
unconstitutional. This Court never had jurisdiction over this lawsuit. The
imposition of liability for a past act of negligence is construed as giving a gift
of public funds (“the Gift Clause.”) At the time incident occurred in 1986 or
1987, Plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim because she did not file a
tort claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act (GCA), which law was in effect
until 2009 which exempted claims presentation requirements for sexual abuse claims
occurring on or after January 1, 2009.
Plaintiff argues
that California courts have rejected Defendant’s arguments. There is no basis
for the assertion that the revival of stale claims violates the Gift Clause.
Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is constitutional and clearly permits revival of
any claim that would otherwise be barred by a plaintiff’s failure to file a
government tort claim.
In reply,
Defendant argues that the trial court decisions cited by Plaintiff have no
bearing on the issues raised. Defendant contends that “appropriations” for
unenforceable claims serves no public purpose. Plaintiff did not have an
enforceable claim for 30 years prior to the passage of AB218 because Plaintiff
did not have an enforceable claim.
A party can move for
judgment on the pleadings on grounds the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 438 subd.
(c)(B)). The motion performs the same function as a general demurrer and
attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters
subject to judicial notice. (Burnett
v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064). For the purposes of this motion, all properly alleged
material facts are deemed true. (Fire
Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)
Plaintiff
commenced this action on May 16, 2022, and alleged she was exempt from claims
filing requirements pursuant to Civil Procedure, section 340.1. The version of
the statute effective on January 1, 2020, provided that any claim not litigated
to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020 “because
the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any
other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced
within three years of January 1, 2020.” (Cal
Code Civ Proc § 340.1.)
Defendant contends
that Assembly Bill 218 (“AB 218”) improperly revived otherwise stale claims for
childhood sexual assault and improperly removed the Government Code’s exemption
from claims filing requirements for conduct arising on or after January 1,
2009. In other words, exclusion from claims filing requirements applied
regardless of when the sexual assault occurred. Defendant contends these
amendments violate the prohibition against gifting of public funds.
The California
Constitution states that the Legislature has no power to make a gift of any
public money or thing of value to any individual. (Cal.
Const., art. XVI, § 6.) The term “gift” is not limited to the transfer of personal
property without consideration, but includes all appropriations of public
money, for which there is no authority or enforceable claim. (Conlin
v. Board of Sup'rs of City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17,
21.)
Defendant cites Bourn
v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, which held that a “legislative
appropriation” made to an individual in payment of a claim for personal injury
damages for which the state is not responsible, “is a gift within the meaning
of the Constitution.” (Bourn
v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, 328.) This case does not involve a
legislative appropriation of money.
Defendant contends
that imposing liability for a past act of negligence constitutes a “gift of
public money or other thing of value to any person.” (Chapman
v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 694.) Chapman is distinguishable
because the plaintiff alleged negligence against the State based on a statute
enacted after plaintiff’s claims arose. In Chapman, the plaintiff sued
the state for the loss of its coal when a large part of the wharf where the
coal was stored broke away from the wharf due to the State’s alleged negligence.
(Id. at 692.) At the time the incident took place, the State
was not liable for damage absent a statute voluntarily assuming such
liability. The court acknowledged that to “create” liability for a past act of
negligence violated the constitutional prohibition against gifts of public
money. (Id. at 693.) Here, the legislature did not create
liability by virtue of AB218 where none existed. Statutory liability against a
public entity is conferred by the Government Code which existed at the time of
the alleged acts. (Gov.
Code, § 815.) Creation of liability is not at issue.
The issue is
whether AB218’s revival of claims previously barred and the abrogation of
claims filing requirements constitutes a gift of public funds. The California
Constitution states that the Legislature does not have the power “to make any
gift or authorize the making of any gift * * * of any public money or thing of
value to any individual * * *; provided, that nothing in this section shall
prevent the Legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 21 of this article …
.” (County
of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745.)
Funds expended
for a public purpose does not constitute a “gift” although private persons may
benefit. (Id. at 746.) The existence of a gift is determined
by the Legislature although the courts can infer the public purpose from other
legislation or the way the legislation is enacted. (Scott
v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604.)
Here, the retroactivity provision of section 340.1 “indicates a clear
legislative intent to maximize claims of sexual-abuse minor plaintiffs for as
expansive a period as possible. The public policy is manifest from the text of
the law.” (Liebig
v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.)
Conlin, cited
by Defendant, is generally instructive on the principles of a “gift” under the
Constitution, however, it is otherwise factually distinguishable. There, the Legislature
passed a statute authorizing the City & County of San Francisco to pay
$54,015 to a contractor for work done upon public streets pursuant to a
contract that remained unpaid. It involved a personal benefit, not a public
purpose. (Conlin
at 20.). Defendant also cites Powell
v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, which is not particularly
instructive as it did not consider whether newly enacted legislation for the
purpose of giving money to certain jurors in criminal cases they were otherwise
not entitled to was for a public purpose. (Powell
at 274.)
Defendant also
cites Heron
v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 which rejected the argument that the
appropriation of funds to pay judgments against the State constituted a gift.
The Court held that application of such funds are not gifts of public money as the
judgments were obtained after due process requirements were met. (Heron
at 517.) The court distinguished the legislation at issue by stating the
"legislature has not attempted to create a liability against the state for
any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or
employees—something it could not do, and the doing of which would, in effect,
be the making of a gift—but has provided that ‘hereafter it shall be liable for
certain things done which cause damage to its citizens, its liability to be
first determined by an appropriate action at law." (Id.)
Heron did not discuss whether retroactive application of a revival
statute constituted a gift of public funds.
The Gift Clause "was
intended to prevent the giving of a bonus and was not intended to apply
to the settlement of claims, whether they had great or little merit, or no
merit at all." (Bourn
at 322.) Used in its popular sense, a “gift” is a “gratuitous donation
without consideration, and without any reasonable claim to it.” (Id.)
Section 340.1 does not involve a giving of a bonus.
Defendant has not
established that Plaintiff does not have an enforceable claim because she was
required to present a government claim until the Legislature amended the
statute in 2009, abrogating those requirements. The California Supreme Court’s
decision on which Defendant relies was based on a government claim presented by
the Plaintiff in 2012. The effective version of the statute provided that “the
time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the
plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological
injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual
abuse, whichever period expires later, … .”(1999
Cal ALS 120, 1999 Cal SB 674, 1999 Cal Stats. ch. 120, 1999 Cal ALS 120, 1999
Cal SB 674, 1999 Cal Stats. ch. 120.) The statute also did not revive claims
otherwise expired because of a failure to present a timely government claim.
The Rubenstein court acknowledged that “[h]ad the Legislature intended
to also revive in subdivision (c) the claim presentation deadline
under the government claims statute, it could have easily said so. It did not.”
(Rubenstein
v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 907.)
Here, Plaintiff
did not present a tort claim pursuant to the 2020 version of 340.1, which
expressly revives claims “not litigated to finality that would otherwise be
barred because of the statute of limitations or claims presentation deadline or
any other time limit had expired, … .” (Cal
Code Civ Proc § 340.1 (q).) Rubenstein does not apply.
Finally, the
Court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of rulings made by other
trial courts as none are relevant or binding.
V. CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleading is DENIED.
Defendant is ordered to answer within 10 days.