Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 22STCV39091, Date: 2025-05-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV39091 Hearing Date: May 13, 2025 Dept: 40
22STCV39091
LL JANE DOE BC V. DEFENDANT DOE SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANT, LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (DOE 1), OR
ALTERNATIVELY FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
I.
BACKGROUND
The second
amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff attended Los Angeles Unified School
District (“LAUSD”) during the 1977-1978 school year, where was sexually
assaulted by Webster Johnson (“Johnson”), Plaintiff’s track coach, who was
employed by Defendant at the time. Plaintiff alleges claims for negligence and
negligent supervision.
II. ARGUMENTS
Defendant argues
that it is not vicariously liable because Plaintiff cannot identify a school
administrator who had the duty to hire, supervise, or retain Johnson, and that an
administrator knew or should have known of Johnson’s dangerous propensities. Plaintiff
did not report the incidents at the time or even after reaching adulthood. There
is no evidence of discipline against Johnson for sexual abuse.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant had a duty to supervise Plaintiff
and protect her from sexual abuse and a duty to supervise Johnson. Defendant
relies on some facts but not others and does not meet its burden in
establishing entitlement to summary judgment or adjudication.
In reply,
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s evidence is inadmissible and should not be
considered. Plaintiff has not identified any LAUSD employee who supervised
Johnson who had knowledge of his dangerous propensities.
III. LEGAL
STANDARDS
Summary
judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that the material facts
are undisputed and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (c).) The moving party’s burden is to show that based on the undisputed facts
“one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded,
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (p)(2).) If that threshold burden is met,
the burden shifts to the opposing party to show a triable issue of one or more
material facts. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c(p)(1).)
A
party may move for summary adjudication “as to one or more causes of action
within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for
damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of
action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of
action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of
action, [or] that there is no merit to a claim for [punitive] damages.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary
adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of
action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c. subd.(f)(1).)
The
court applies the three-step analysis to motions for summary judgment or
adjudication: (1) identify the issues framed by the pleading, (2) determine
whether the moving party established facts which negate the opponents’ claim,
(3) if the moving party meets its threshold burden of persuasion and the burden
shifts, determine whether the opposing party has controverted those facts with
admissible evidence. (Torres
v. Reardon (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 831, 836.)
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Allegations and relevant duties.
Plaintiff alleges claims for negligence
and negligent supervision. An employer can be liable to a third person for
negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee if the employer
knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or
hazard and that particular harm materializes. (Doe
v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.) Both causes of
action require facts showing foreseeability; in particular negligent
supervision requires proof of LAUSD’s knowledge of the particular risk.
As a school district, Defendant owes a
special duty of care to its students. (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869–870
["In addition, a school district and its employees have a special
relationship with the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the
mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over
students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the
relationship between parents and their children.’”].) A school district may be
held vicariously liable for negligent hiring and supervision if a supervisory
or administrative employee of the school district knew or should have known of
the employee’s propensities and nevertheless hired, retained, and inadequately
supervised. (Hart at 865.) This includes teachers and counselors to the
extent the employee has the responsibility of taking reasonable measures to
guard pupils against harassment and abuse. (Hart at 871.)
B.
Analysis
Defendant’s contention that no one had
knowledge of Johnson’s propensities is supported by the absence of disciplinary
records in Johnson’s personnel file for engaging in inappropriate behavior. This
fact is probative of Defendant’s lack of knowledge and the lack of foreseeability;
not whether or not Defendant engaged in inappropriate behavior as Plaintiff
argues. DUF 11 is undisputed. (DUF 11.)
There is also no dispute that Johnson’s
personnel records show he submitted a grievance for being displaced from his
position, and that he was disciplined for dishonesty. (DUF 13.) Plaintiff’s
contention that this fact is vague and ambiguous is without merit. The fact is
material to support Defendant’s argument of lack of knowledge given that
nothing in Johnson’s file pertained to discipline for inappropriate behavior.
These material facts are sufficient to
shift the burden of proof to Plaintiff to proffer evidence that Defendant had
knowledge of Johnson’s propensities, which is essential to the foreseeability and knowledge elements necessary
to establish negligence and negligent supervision. Plaintiff has not proffered
any evidence to create a triable issue of fact.
C.
Objections
Plaintiff’s objections are addressed to
the material facts not to particular evidence. The material facts are
Defendant’s characterization of evidence, not evidence. Defendant’s particular
objections to Johnson’s personnel file are OVERRULED. It is admissible by way
of the declaration of Marilyn Fuller, Director of Human Resources, with
oversight of employee personnel files. She has authenticated Johnson’s
personnel file. (Fuller Declaration ¶
3.)
Plaintiff proffers the declarations of
former employees of LAUSD. Dena Green, former student; Gabriel Grosz, former
employee; Rosamy Gross, former teacher; Annetta Lawrence, a former teacher
beginning in 1974. (Plaintiff’s Ex 4-7.) None of the declarations are based on
personal knowledge. Supporting and opposing affidavits "shall be made by a
person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated in the affidavits or declarations." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (d). Defendant’s objections thereto are SUSTAINED.
The declaration of the former student,
Dena Green, is irrelevant and based on hearsay. (Defendant’s Obj 1-10)
The remaining declarations of former
teachers are not based on personal knowledge and attest that they “became
aware” or heard rumors about Johnson without explaining the basis for their
awareness. Declarations based on “the best of [declarant’s] knowledge” is less
than personal knowledge and implies something closer to information and belief,
which is insufficient. (Bowden
v. Robinson (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 705, 719.) The objections based on
hearsay and relevance are also meritorious.
Therefore, Defendant’s objections 11—14; 18-21;
22-32; 33-41 are SUSTAINED.
Defendant’s objection to the Declaration
of Dr. Fraise, who provides an expert opinion as to Defendant’s duty of care is
SUSTAINED. It is not made under penalty of perjury. He does not have experience during the relevant
time period and his attestations otherwise include hearsay information. He also
bases his opinion on information and belief. Defendant’s objections thereto are SUSTAINED.
(Defendant’s Obj. 42-58.)
V.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff
has not met her burden of controverting Defendant’s material facts noted above
with admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.