Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 23CMCV01322, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling

INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must:

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If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on. 

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Case Number: 23CMCV01322    Hearing Date: June 20, 2024    Dept: A

23CMCV01322 Michael Brian Smith v. Seiko Epson Corporation r/t

Thursday, June 20, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING

 

I.        BACKGROUND

       The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that Plaintiff’s staffing agency, (“Volt”) assigned Plaintiff to work at Seiko Epson Corporation (“Seiko”). Plaintiff alleges that he was racially profiled, targeted, and harassed by “Rodger,” a manager, who also defamed Plaintiff’s reputation by calling Volt and demanding that Plaintiff be removed from a second work assignment upon Plaintiff’s termination from Seiko. (FAC ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges claims for “defamation under the vicarious liability doctrine, willful and wanton conduct, and punitive damages.” (FAC, filed 10/11/23.)

       On March 1, 2024, Seiko filed its answer to the FAC.

 

II.      ARGUMENTS

       Seiko argues that the first amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support claims for defamation, wanton, and malicious conduct, and for harassment and retaliation. In opposition, Plaintiff cites the pleading to argue that the elements for each claim are supported by the allegations.

       In reply, Seiko reiterates that the court previously determined that the amended pleading did not adequately allege claims when the court denied Plaintiff’s request for a court judgment.

 

III.    LEGAL STANDARDS

       A party can move for judgment on the pleadings on grounds the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438 subd. (c)(B).) The motion performs the same function as a general demurrer and attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters subject to judicial notice. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064). For the purposes of this motion, all properly alleged material facts are deemed true. (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)

       As with demurrers, the court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)

IV.    DISCUSSION

A.      The defamation fails to state a cause of action.

       The elements of a defamation claim are a “(1) publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 888.)

       In cases of libel involving a written publication, the “general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.” (Id.) Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, “orally uttered, including communications by radio or any mechanical or other means.” (Medical Marijuana at 893.) To state a claim for slander, Plaintiff must allege the substance of the defamatory statement. (Id.)

       The alleged defamatory statement must be a provably false factual assertion. (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 32.) The court considers the totality of circumstances to determine whether the statement is fact or opinion. (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 678.) Whether a statement constitutes actionable defamation is a question of law for the court. (Id.)

       The FAC alleges that Rodger “emailed” and “called” Plaintiff’s employment agency and stated that “Plaintiff was disciplined because of behavior problems and had issues with Rodger.” (FAC, ¶ 33.) Rodger allegedly and maliciously caused harm as Plaintiff was subsequently terminated from his employment with unidentified Doe defendants. (FAC, ¶ 36-37.)

       The FAC states facts that undermine the requirement that statements must be provably false in order to be actionable; rather the allegations demonstrate the truth of Rodger’s belief that Plaintiff had behavioral problems and that Plaintiff had “issues” with Rodger. Plaintiff alleges that Rodger would follow Plaintiff around the warehouse and/or watch plaintiff through video cameras.  Rodger allegedly harassed, confronted, and interrogated Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s immediate manager being present; Rodger accused Plaintiff of leaving trash in the work area, although Plaintiff denied it; Plaintiff admits he felt threatened by Rodger and reported Rodger to his supervisor; Plaintiff’s supervisor advised Plaintiff that he needed to have a meeting with Rodger before filing grievances against Rodger which ultimately occurred; Plaintiff alleges he was satisfied with the meeting; Rodger engaged in acts to keep track of Plaintiff’s production numbers “in an attempt to keep an eye on Plaintiff”; Rodger allegedly had a personal grudge with Plaintiff over a “harassment meeting” that occurred in 2018. (FAC, ¶¶ 14-22.)

       The foregoing allegations negate the contention that Rodger’s alleged statements were false.

B.      Plaintiff admits he did not allege claims for harassment and retaliation.

       In his opposition, Plaintiff alleges that he does not claim harassment or retaliation as causes of action. (Opp. p. 6, ¶ 26.) Rather, Plaintiff alleges that he obtained his “right to sue letter” for a second lawsuit in the near future. (Id.)

       The first page of the pleading identifies three causes of action, none of which include harassment or discrimination claims. Accordingly, the motion is not directed at an actual cause of action in this respect.

 

C.      The second and third causes of action for willful and wanton conduct and for punitive damages are not supported by the alleged facts.

 

       “Willful and wanton” misconduct is not a cause of action standing alone. Rather, such conduct has legal consequences that justify imposition of punitive damages. (Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 863, 869.)

       Punitive damages may be imposed by statute where the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).) The predicate acts to support a claim for punitive damages must be intended to cause injury or must constitute “malicious” or “oppressive” conduct as defined by statute. “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 ["malice involves awareness of dangerous consequences and a willful and deliberate failure to avoid them"].) "Oppression" is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a) subd. (c)(2).)

       These claims all arise from the same set of facts, namely Rodger’s alleged defamatory statements. (FAC, ¶¶ 30-31, 40.) As previously stated, the allegations do not support a claim for defamation in the absence of provably untrue statements, and as a consequence, does not support a claim for punitive damages based on willful or wanton misconduct or malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct.

 

V.      CONCLUSION

       Leave to amend is ordinarily given if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured. It is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate how he or she can amend the complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. "]. (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.) The factual circumstances as alleged do not support actionable conduct. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleading is GRANTED without leave to amend.