Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 23CMCV01432, Date: 2024-04-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CMCV01432 Hearing Date: April 25, 2024 Dept: A
23CMCV01432
Johnathan Quintanar v. Ruben Lopez, Jr.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The complaint
alleges that the parties were co-occupants of residential real property along
with their families. Defendant allegedly made false claims that Plaintiff was
perpetrating elder abuse on other tenants. As a result of the allegations,
Plaintiff was arrested, and a restraining order was issued against him. While
Plaintiff was away from the premises, Defendant allegedly converted all of
Plaintiff’s personal property. Plaintiff alleges claims for conversion, misuse
of judicial proceedings, false imprisonment, wrongful eviction and assault and
battery.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant
moves to strike the claim for conversion, misuse of judicial proceedings, false
imprisonment, and wrongful eviction. Defendant argues he has a constitutional
right to use the court process to obtain a restraining order. The alleged
misconduct and the claims arising therefrom are protected by the litigation
privilege. Defendant served the motion on Plaintiff on March 25, 2024, by mail.
Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The anti-SLAPP statute[1]
codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides that any act of a
person “in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection
with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (Code Civ.
Proc., § 425.16(b).) The statute provides a procedure for "weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity."
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 384.)
As the
moving party, Defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims “arise from protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged." (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11
Cal.5th 995, 1009.) To that end, courts are to “consider the
elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those
elements and consequently form the basis for liability. (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063.)
The defendant's burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on
and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category
of protected activity." (Id.)
The
court must identify the alleged wrongful and injury-producing conduct that
provides the foundation for the claim. (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna &
Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 209.) The action must be based on the defendant’s
protected free speech or petitioning activity. (Finton at 209-210.)
If the defendant
establishes the first prong, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a
probability of prevailing on the merits by demonstrating that "the
complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff is credited.” (Finton at 211.) Plaintiff must produce evidence that
would be admissible at trial. (Id.)
A.
Defendant has not established that the second cause
of action for conversion arises from protected activity.
The
basic elements of a claim for conversion are (1) the plaintiff's ownership or
right to possession of personal property; (2) the defendant's disposition of
the property in a manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff's property
rights; and (3) resulting damages. (Fremont Indemnity Co.
v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)
Plaintiff
alleges that following his arrest and upon his return to the premises,
Plaintiff discovered that Defendant had stolen, discarded, or trashed much of
Plaintiff’s personal effects. (Complaint, ¶5.) The action is founded upon this allegation.
While Plaintiff also alleges that a restraining order was issued against him,
that is not the basis for the conversion claim. Allegations of protected activity that provide context
are not subject to a motion to strike. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 394.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was ordered to
vacate the premises as a result of Defendant’s false allegations. Plaintiff
alleges damage arising from the conversion of his personal property (Complaint,
¶¶ 4.)
B.
The second cause of action for misuse of judicial
proceedings arises from the filing of a petition for a restraining order, which
is protected activity.
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant falsely alleged that Plaintiff engaged in elder abuse
that resulted in the court’s issuance of a restraining order requiring
Plaintiff to vacate the residence. (Complaint, ¶ p. 5.) A claim for malicious
prosecution requires a plaintiff to plead and prove “that the prior action (1)
was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a
legal termination in his, plaintiff's, favor [citations]; (2) was brought
without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice
[citations]." (Medley Capital Corp. v. Security National
Guaranty, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 33, 45.)
Any written
or oral statement or writing made before a judicial proceeding is protected
activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 subd. (e)(1).) This right encompasses the act of filing
a lawsuit. (Cordoba Corp. v. City of Industry (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 145, 151; Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 1467, 1479. Accordingly, this claim is subject to a special
motion to strike.
C.
The third cause of action for false imprisonment
arises from protected activity.
A claim for false imprisonment
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the following: “(1) the nonconsensual,
intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for
an appreciable period of time, however brief." (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496.) Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant’s use of the restraining order process using false
claims resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration. (Complaint, ¶ p. 6.) As
the claim arises from Defendant’s use of the judicial process, the claim is
subject to a special motion to strike.
D. The claim for
wrongful eviction is subject to Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.
A person in peaceable
possession of premises has the right to quiet enjoyment. (Spinks v. Equity Residential
Briarwood Apartments (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 1004.) Plaintiff alleges he was “rendered homeless and forced to spend
several days in motels at substantial cost “because Defendant misused the
restraining order process. (Complaint, ¶27-31.) This claim also arises from the
restraining order and thus is subject to a special motion to strike.
E. The litigation
privilege also applies to bar claims arising from protected activity.
The
litigation privilege codified in Civil Code, section 47 defines a “privileged
communication” or “broadcast” as one made in "any (1) legislative
proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding
authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding
authorized by law … ." (Civ. Code, § 47(b).) The
privilege applies if the defendant’s conduct was communicative. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37
Cal.4th 1048, 1058.) The privilege does not apply to a course of
conduct. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1133 fn. 12 [“Thus,
while it could be argued that an exhortation to sue might be privileged,
financing and otherwise promoting the litigation would not be.”].
Therefore, conduct
arising from defendant’s protected activity are subject to the being stricken.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the conversion
claim is not subject to the motion to strike. However, Defendant has met his
burden of demonstrating that the claims for misuse of judicial proceedings,
false imprisonment, and wrongful eviction arise from protected activity. Plaintiff
has not attempted to meet his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on
the merits. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the second, third, and
fourth causes of action only.