Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 23CMCV01685, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CMCV01685    Hearing Date: March 14, 2024    Dept: A

23CMCV01685 Anthony C. Chatmon Sr. v. Audrey Marva Chatmon, et al.

Thursday, March 14, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DEMURRER BY DEFENDANT, MONA FENDERSON, TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER MOTION TO STRIKE BY DEFENDANT, MONA FENDERSON (NONE FILED)

 

I.        BACKGROUND

      Plaintiff, Anthony C. Chatmon, Sr., as Trustee of the Willie Belle Chatmon Living Trust (“Trust”), files this action to quiet Defendants’ title to real property now owned by the Trust pursuant to a transfer by Willie Belle Chatmon (“Decedent”). Decedent transferred title to the real property to her trust by grant deed recorded on July 22, 2014. However, one year before the creation of the Trust, Defendant, Marion Chatmon, Trustor’s daughter, caused Trustor to sign a deed transferring the real property to a group of family members as tenants in common. Defendant recorded the second grant deed on August 1, 2014, without the knowledge or permission of Decedent, who desired to have the first deed destroyed. Plaintiff alleges one cause of action for quiet title.

II.      ARGUMENTS

      Defendant, Mona Fenderson, (“Defendant”) argues this action is barred by the statute of limitations and is uncertain. Plaintiff did not allege a legal description of the property or file a lis pendens. Plaintiff failed to substantiate the complaint with proof.

      In opposition, Plaintiff argues there is no statute of limitations when the Plaintiff is in possession of the real property. There is no dispute that the Trustor and subsequently Plaintiff has been in possession of the real property.

      Defendant did not file a reply brief within five court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005.)

III.    LEGAL STANDARDS

      A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the complaint’s sufficiency, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations as well as facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded facts. The court may also consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

      The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)

      Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity that is sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.)  Whether the Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)

IV.    DISCUSSION

      Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s failure to include facts proving the claim is without merit. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their truth, the Plaintiff’s ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof. (Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.)

      Plaintiff alleged one cause of action for quiet title. The complaint must include both a legal description and its street address. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) The body of the complaint does not include a legal description; however, it does include exhibits, including recorded documents setting forth the property’s legal description, all of which the court can consider. (Mead v. Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 567 [“For purposes of a demurrer, we accept as true both facts alleged in the text of the complaint and facts appearing in exhibits attached to it."].) Moreover, the omission of the legal description in the complaint is not prejudicial to the Defendant given the attached exhibits. The court must disregard errors in pleadings which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Additionally, while Plaintiff is required to file a notice of pendency of action where an action for quiet title is commenced, that is not a requirement of pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.010.)

      In order for a court to sustain demurrer to the complaint based on a statute of limitations defect, “the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint… . A demurrer will not lie where the action may be but is not necessarily barred.” (Citizens for a Responsible Caltrans Decision v. Department of Transportation (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1117.) 

      The applicable statute of limitations for a particular claim depends on the nature of the cause of action i.e., the gravamen of the action. (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22.) The court considers the “nature of the right sued upon.” (Vera v. REL-BC, LLC (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 57, 64.) In an action for quiet title, the statute of limitations “is determined with reference to the underlying theory of relief.” (Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 944.)

      Here, Defendant assumes that the underlying theory for the claim is fraud. (Dem. 9:25-26.) Plaintiff did not allege a claim for fraud. The basis for the quiet title action is that the first recorded transfer of the real property to the Trust preceded Defendants’ alleged recorded transfer of the real property to other family members. As Defendant’s argument is based on facts not alleged in the complaint, Defendant has not clearly and affirmatively established that the complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.

      Moreover, Defendant argues facts extrinsic to the complaint to establish when Plaintiff had actual or constructive notice that Defendants recorded the second deed. The Court does not consider extraneous facts to determine the sufficiency of the complaint.

      Defendant concedes that the statute of limitations does not run against a person in undisturbed possession of the land. (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 477.) Defendant anticipates that Plaintiff will argue possession and will misapply the law. (Dem. 11:12-14.) Whether the Plaintiff was in possession of the real property, or whether Plaintiff had actual or constructive notice of the second deed, or when that occurred are all facts extrinsic to the complaint and are not considered. These are factual issues for other dispositive motions or trial.

      Plaintiff is not obligated to anticipate a statute of limitations defense and allege facts to “negative the bar” where such a defect does not appear in the first instance. (Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 15, 25.)

V.      CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant is required to answer within 10 days. While Defendant reserved a motion to strike, none has been filed.