Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 23CMCV01906, Date: 2024-04-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CMCV01906 Hearing Date: April 16, 2024 Dept: A
23CMCV01906
Ngozi Patricia Anyogu Faith etc. v. Roland Hawkins
[TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING
I.
BACKGROUND
The complaint
alleges that Ngozi Patricia Anyogu Faith (“Faith”) as conservator for Uguchukwu
Michecl Anyogu Faith, and as Attorney-in-Fact for Emmanuel C. Anyogu Faith (“Michecl”
and “Emmanuel”), alleges that Defendant became indebted to Andrew S. Faith, (“Decedent”),
Michec and Emmanuel’s father and Faith’s former spouse. Defendant failed to pay
the debt and now owes $273,000.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff Faith lacks standing to pursue a debt owed to decedent
based on a claim for open book account. Plaintiff has not stated a claim on
behalf of the estate nor has she been appointed as a representative of the
decedent’s estate. Plaintiff did not attach the documents giving her the power
to pursue litigation on behalf of her sons. A cause of action for “collection
of a sum of money” does not exist. The claims are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.
Plaintiff
Faith argues she brought this action on behalf of Michecl and Emmanuel.
Plaintiff has documents to establish her authority to bring this action for her
sons. Plaintiff’s ability to prove allegations is not considered at the
demurrer stage.
Defendant
argues that the alleged debt belongs to decedent’s estate, not Plaintiff Faith
or her sons. Plaintiff improperly asserts new facts in the opposition.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a
complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the complaint’s sufficiency, the court must
assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations as well as facts
that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded facts. The court
may also consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.)
The court may not consider contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7
Cal.4th 634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to
establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians
Service (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
Sufficient facts are the essential facts
of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity that is
sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and
extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) Whether the
Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180
Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)
A demurrer may also be sustained if a
complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual
allegations are so confusing, they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of
the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2;
Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).)
A pleading is required to assert general
allegations of ultimate fact. Evidentiary facts are not required. (Quelimane
Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 47; Lim v. The.TV Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 684, 690.)
However, unlike federal courts, California state courts are not a notice
pleading jurisdiction, and notice alone is not a sufficient basis for any
pleading. California is a fact pleading jurisdiction. Merely putting an
opposing party on notice is not sufficient. (Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147
Cal.App.3d 554, 561; see Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260
Cal.App.2d 244, 250.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
The complaint does not allege facts to support
Plaintiffs’ standing to sue.
The
issue of standing is properly raised at the demurrer stage. (Buckland
v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798, 813.) It is
a threshold issue to be determined before the merits can be reached. Every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, defined as
the person who has title to and the right to maintain the cause of action. (Wanke,
Industrial, Commercial, Residential, Inc. v. AV Builder Corp. (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 466, 474; Code
Civ. Proc., § 367.)
Here,
the complaint alleges that Defendant owes a debt to the Decedent. (Complaint, ¶
9.) Plaintiff Faith states in opposition that she does not bring this action in
her individual capacity, but rather as a representative for her sons. (Opp. 2:28-3:2.)
Regardless of whether Plaintiff Faith has the legal capacity to prosecute an
action on behalf of her sons, fundamentally, the complaint does not allege any
basis for Michecl’s and Emmanuel’s standing to sue for a debt owed to their now
deceased father.
An
action may survive a real party’s death subject to the statute of limitations. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 377.20.) However, the person with capacity to pursue a
decedent’s lawsuit is the decedent’s personal representative, or if none, the
decedent’s successor-in-interest. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 377.30.) The complaint does not allege facts sufficient to
establish the Plaintiffs’ standing to sue.
B.
Defendant has not shown that the complaint shows
clearly and affirmatively that the statute of limitations has run.
Defendant
argues that the complaint may be barred by the statute of limitations, because
the debt allegedly arose on June 6, 2016. (Complaint, ¶ ¶ 9.) In order for the
court to sustain demurrer to the complaint based on a statute of limitations
defect, “the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the
complaint… . A demurrer will not lie where the action may be but is not
necessarily barred.” (Citizens
for a Responsible Caltrans Decision v. Department of Transportation (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1117.)
The
complaint alleges that the debt is evidenced by various promissory notes and a
loan agreement, among other documentation. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) A claim for breach
of a written contract is four years. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 337.) However, the claim accrues at the time of the breach. (Piedmont
Capital Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 961, 964.)
The complaint does not allege the date of breach, therefore, whether the claim
is barred by the statute of limitations cannot be determined on the face of the complaint.
C.
Second cause of action for “Collection of a Sum
of Money” is adequately stated.
This
claim is based on the same facts supporting the first cause of action. This
claim adequately alleges a common count claim, which is properly asserted
“whenever the plaintiff claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in
a sum certain, or for the reasonable value of services, goods, etc., furnished.
It makes no difference in such a case that the proof shows the original transaction
to be an express contract, a contract implied in fact, or a
quasi-contract." (Citation.)” (Kawasho
Internat., U.S.A. Inc. v. Lakewood Pipe Service, Inc. (1983) 152
Cal.App.3d 785, 793.)
V.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, demurrer to the entire complaint is SUSTAINED as the
complaint lacks allegations to support the Plaintiffs’ standing to sue. As there
is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured, the Court grants 10
days leave to amend. (Association
of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.)