Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 23STCV21461, Date: 2025-05-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21461 Hearing Date: May 1, 2025 Dept: 40
23STCV21461 Michelle Higuera, et al v.
USC Village Properties, LLC
Thursday,
May 1, 2025
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The
second amended complaint alleges that Defendant failed to provide habitable
premises to Plaintiffs throughout the years of Plaintiffs’ tenancies. Plaintiff
alleges 11 causes of action for statutory violations and tort claims arising
from the uninhabitable living conditions.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant
moves to strike allegations in support of Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive
damages. Plaintiffs do not allege specific facts showing that Defendant acted
with malice, fraud, or oppression. Plaintiffs must allege facts showing the
misconduct occurred with knowledge or with the express direction or
ratification of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. This
is a garden variety landlord/tenant action.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the alleged facts show that Defendant’s
conduct was despicable. Alternatively, Plaintiffs ask for leave to amend.
In
reply, Defendant argues that there is no alleged basis for an award of punitive
damages. The alleged misconduct must be vile, base, contemptible, miserable,
wretched, or loathsome.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A motion to strike is limited to matters
that appear on the face of the pleading or on any matter of which the court can
take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) The court may strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or strike all or any part
of the pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a
court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. §436 subd. (a)-(b).)
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standards
for punitive damage allegations
A
plaintiff may recover on a claim for exemplary damages where the defendant is
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).) The predicate acts to support the claim must be
intended to cause injury or must constitute “malicious” or “oppressive” conduct
as defined by statute. “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the
defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1); College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994)
8 Cal.4th 704, 725 ["malice
involves awareness of dangerous consequences and a willful and deliberate
failure to avoid them"].) "Oppression" is defined as “despicable
conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious
disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a) subd. (c)(2).)
To
support recovery of punitive damages, Plaintiffs can allege ultimate facts. Clauson
v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 ["In
order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the
ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a
plaintiff."].) Whether a principal authorized the doing and manner of the
act can be alleged using “conclusional words.” (Kiseskey
v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 235
["We accordingly conclude that the conclusional words ‘permission and
consent’ used in the FAC, coupled with the factual allegations therein,
constitute an allegation, sufficient if proven, upon which punitive damages may
be assessed against defendant for the conduct of its agents."].
B.
The
SAC alleges facts to support a claim for punitive damages.
Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant began construction behind Plaintiffs’ backyard by digging
deep trenches, which deprived Plaintiffs of emergency egress and use of their
backyard because of the hazardous condition created by Defendant. (SAC ¶ 21.)
Defendant’s property manager told Plaintiffs not to use the back door because
it posed a significant safety risk especially to the minor Plaintiff. (SAC ¶
21.) Defendant gave Plaintiffs alternative, temporary relocation but failed to
pay for it, exposing Plaintiffs to uninhabitable and hazardous living
conditions. (SAC ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs were required to pay for their temporary
relocation with help from their church. (SAC ¶ 38.)
The
construction caused pests and rats to infest the property and created constant noise
and vibration. (SAC ¶ 28.) Defendant placed a portable toilet next to the
property’s kitchen causing order to enter into the dining area. (SAC ¶ 29.) Defendant
failed to install a dust cover around the property. (SAC ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff,
Jose Arellano (“Arellano”), suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
of which Defendant was informed. (SAC ¶ 26.) Arellano needed the garage to
accommodate his medical condition, as it was difficult for him to climb up a
sloped walkway. (SAC ¶ 32.) Defendant refused Plaintiff’s request to
accommodate his medical condition by allowing Arellano to park in the driveway.
(SAC ¶ 33.) Defendant demolished Arellano’s garage and storage area. (SAC ¶
31.)
The SAC alleges that Plaintiffs suffered
utility interruptions over weeks and were exposed to a gas leak. SoCal Gas
turned off the gas. (SAC ¶¶ 39-40.) Defendant’s construction workers used
electricity from Plaintiffs’ panel overloading the circuits and causing
disruptions and increased electricity bills. (SAC ¶ 42.) When Plaintiffs
complained, Defendant “either laughed or ignored” Plaintiff, Michelle Higuera.
(SAC ¶ 44.) Defendant ignored Plaintiffs’ other complaints. (SAC ¶ 34.)
The predicate acts supporting a claim for
punitive damages must be “despicable” defined as “base, vile, or contemptible.”
(College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 724 ["malice
involves awareness of dangerous consequences and a willful and deliberate
failure to avoid them"].) " Punitive damages are appropriate if the
defendant's acts are reprehensible or in blatant violation of law or policy or when
the tortious conduct rises to levels of “extreme indifference to the
plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to
tolerate."
(American
Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051.)
The above-cited allegations are a few
examples of conduct from which a jury could decide constitutes “cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a) subd. (c)(2).)
C.
Corporate
ratification is supported by the alleged facts.
Punitive damages against a corporate
employer are permitted where there is a showing of advance knowledge and
conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud or
malice on the part of an officer, director or managing agent of the
corporation. (Civ. Code,
§ 3294.) Whether a principal authorized the doing and manner of the act can
be alleged using “conclusional words.” (Kiseskey
v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 235
["We accordingly conclude that the conclusional words ‘permission and
consent’ used in the FAC, coupled with the factual allegations therein,
constitute an allegation, sufficient if proven, upon which punitive damages may
be assessed against defendant for the conduct of its agents."]; O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75
Cal.App.3d 798, 806 ("The corporate respondents contend that no
facts are alleged to support punitive damages against them. But it was alleged
that the misrepresentations were made by persons who acted ‘with the permission
and consent’ of all the defendants. For the purpose of meeting a general
demurrer, this was a sufficient allegation that the corporations had authorized
their agent's acts; a corporation is liable for punitive damages when it
authorizes the wrongful act."].)
Plaintiffs allege that during the
relevant time period, Defendant and Doe agents were acting within the course
and scope of employment, and “directed, aided, and abetted, authorized, or
ratified each and every act alleged.” (SAC ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege that
unnamed individuals are or were directors, board members, partners, trustees,
or beneficiaries of Defendants’ organization, and did the acts within the
course and scope of employment. (SAC ¶ 13.)
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion
to strike is DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file their answer within 30 days.